

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THE CASE FOR LIMITED REFORM OF THE JCS

by

BRUCE PALMER, JR.

In researching this essay, I looked back to recall my experience in the joint system for a period of roughly 20 years from 1954 to 1974. It involved various positions such as Commander US Forces, Dominican Republic, 1965; Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, US Army; Vice Chief of Staff and Acting Chief of Staff, US Army, between Generals Westmoreland and Abrams; and Commander US Readiness Command, a unified command.

During this period, I was associated with five Chairmen of the JCS and their special assistants; eight Directors of the Joint Staff (three Navy, three Army, two Air Force); four Army Chiefs of Staff; three CNOs; four Air Force Chiefs of Staff; and three Commandants of the Marine Corps; not to mention their Vice Chiefs and Operations Deputies. In all, a lot of outstanding people—the best of their respective services.

In reflecting on this joint experience, I was struck by the influence of the personalities involved, not only of the military men concerned, but even more importantly of the top civilian leaders, starting with the President and his Secretary of Defense. Their attitudes make a great difference on how well the JCS system works.

President Eisenhower liked the services but held them at arm's length, bending over backward not to show any preferential treatment, especially toward the Army. It was an unhappy period for the Army because the CJCS, Admiral Radford, visualized only a minor job for the Army in the nuclear age. General Taylor, the Army Chief of Staff, was frustrated and after his retirement wrote a book, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, that describes his dissatisfaction during this period.

President Kennedy was a very warm person who had a deep concern and affection for the military, perhaps as a result of his World War II service in the Navy. The Bay of Pigs fiasco, however, had left him with a lack of confidence in the senior military officers, the JCS, which had to be overcome. I first met him when he visited the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in the fall of 1961—he made a deep impression on all of us. His death was a great loss to the nation and was felt especially in the armed forces.

With the abrupt end of the Camelot years, President Johnson's advent came as a distinct shock. He did not care much for the military and generally showed it. He treated me personally very well because of our successful mission accomplishment in the Dominican Republic, but he basically distrusted the military and saw it as a threat to his plans for the Great Society. I recall one meeting he had with the Chiefs, who rather timidly broached the subject of a pay raise. His response was to knock their heads together verbally and say, "You people have been nipping on the bottle too much."

The President's attitude was shared by his Secretary of Defense. McNamara expressed his philosophy at a meeting with the JCS during the same period with the comment that compensation for the military must not be as attractive as compensation in the private sector, as it was important to ensure that the higher quality people remain in the civilian society. When Admiral Moorer, then

CNO, asked whether the Secretary considered the armed forces as second-class citizens, McNamara replied, "If you want to interpret it that way, yes." McNamara did his best to dominate, if not intimidate, the Chiefs. His successor, Clark Clifford, was a smooth operator who had no real interest in the job nor in the problems facing our armed forces.

President Nixon respected the armed forces and at times seemed a little awed by senior military officers. He was a little reticent with the Chiefs but in talking directly with a field commander could be quite lively, explicit, and effective in getting across his desires. Nixon's Secretary of Defense Laird was a wise, skillful politician and bureaucrat. The problem the JCS had with him, and with some subsequent Secretaries, was in understanding and interpreting what his real views were. He could be oblique and indirect, and he was a master at spinning his own programs (scarcely resembling the official ones submitted to the Congress) through informal contacts with key members of the Congress. He did not always see eye-to-eye with the President, and an adversarial relationship developed as a result.

Secretary of Defense Richardson was a fast learner and a gentleman, and he sincerely liked the armed services. He was not happy when he had to leave the job after only a few months.

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger did not suffer fools easily and terrified even senior people at times. He had strong views that he did not hesitate to express, and he could be bitterly intolerant of the JCS. Yet, I found him easy to talk to and get along with.

The personalities of the Chiefs themselves, especially the Chairmen, also had a large influence on their effectiveness as a collegial body. I recall the rather unpleasant feeling that existed between General Taylor, the CJCS, and General LeMay, Chief of Staff, US Air Force. They each had hearing difficulties and unfortunately had to sit next to each other at JCS meetings with their bad ears side by side. The hearing problem compounded a natural distaste for each other, and the meeting could well end suddenly with General Taylor slamming his briefing book shut, adjourning the seminar, and stalking out of the room.

When General Abrams became the Army Chief and I served briefly as his Vice Chief, he told me that he planned to send General Haig, slated to succeed me, to all JCS meetings in his stead. We finally talked him out of it, pointing out that this was his primary duty under the law and that it would be unfair to the Chairman and the other Chiefs, not to mention the Army. Abrams nevertheless remained hostile to the joint system and much preferred to work directly with another Chief, particularly General Ryan, the Air Force Chief, who was not enamored of the joint system either. In fact, the two of them got together on many matters so often, particularly in the doctrinal area, that they somewhat usurped REDCOM, whose primary job was to see that the Army and Air Force trained together and exercised the joint interfaces between the two services.

The reform of the JCS organization and system is a perennial and favorite topic for the critics of the Department of Defense. Unfortunately, many of the highly vocal commentators have had little, if any, actual experience with the JCS. The JCS are

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General Bruce Palmer, Jr. (USA Ret.), served as Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, from 1968 to 1973 and concluded his career in 1973-74 as Commander in Chief, US Readiness Command. Since his retirement, he has been Executive Director of the Defense Manpower Commission staff and consultant for the American Enterprise Institute as well as a member of the Senior Review Panel of the National Foreign Assessments Center. He also was a Senior Fellow of the Center for the Study of International Affairs for the CIA. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy and the Army War College. During World War II General Palmer served in the Operations Division of the General Staff in Washington and was the Chief of Staff of the 6th Infantry Division in the Pacific Theater. His later assignments included Chief of Staff for the Eighth Army in Korea, 1962-63. In 1963 he became Commanding General of the XVIII Airborne Corps and the following year assumed command of the II Field Force in Vietnam. General Palmer is the author of the acclaimed book *The 25-Year War, America's Military Role in Vietnam*.



often unjustly blamed for shortcomings that are quite beyond their control and are inherent in the legal underpinnings of the organization of the Department of Defense. Thus, it seems fundamental that any discussion of JCS reform should be preceded with at least a brief reminder of how the Department of Defense and JCS came into being. Moreover, it is important to recognize how the very nature of the organization of the DOD affects the role of the military, in particular the JCS.

Many people have forgotten the highly charged, often bitter, debate that surrounded the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 not long after the end of World War II, not to mention subsequent debates when significant amendments to the act were legislated in 1953 and 1958, changes that continue to have a major effect on the way the DOD functions today. There were truly head-on struggles between the advocates of strong central direction of a more unified military structure and the champions of a loose confederation of separate military departments and services. In the initial debate, the Army, which at that time included the land-based air forces, generally supported the more centralized solution while its air element was primarily interested in breaking away from the Army and becoming a separate service. The Navy and the Marine Corps, on the other hand, have always strongly opposed any real unification, pointing out very properly that they already had an army (Marine Corps), navy, and air element, and were therefore unified—why break up a going team? This is a persuasive argument, and if I were in the Navy I would probably support it.

In any event, the confederationists won the first battle, and in effect, with the birth of the Air Force, we had triplication rather than unification of the services. However, the confederationists over time have lost ground while the authority of the Secretary of Defense over DOD has become absolute, at least as spelled out in the law. The role of the Chairman, JCS, likewise has become more powerful both by law and practice, although he still functions as the first among equals. In the process the service secretaries have been downgraded to below cabinet rank and the military departments or services have been, at least theoretically, removed from any operational authority or responsibilities.

The significant point, however, is that the basic confederate or committee nature of the JCS organization has remained essentially unchanged while the Office of the Secretary of Defense from the beginning has functioned as an entity under the control and direction of one person, the Secretary. As an institution the JCS cannot function in a manner divorced from the interests of the several services, and so there is a built-in conflict of interest that is inherent, unavoidable and, indeed, was intended by the legislative framers of the laws dealing with DOD.

A second significant point is that Congress has not shown any inclination over the years to change the basic organization of DOD. Most members of the Congress seem to have liked it that way, although this consensus might be changing. Nevertheless, the current organization gives each individual member more clout because he or she can deal separately with each service and department, as well as OSD. This fact permits members to play both ends against the middle, one service against another, thus increasing the influence of individual members and committees in defense matters. The present DOD organization also allows each member direct access to more groups of constituents with common interests, and thus more political power. Another factor in the past has been the strong antipathy of the Congress toward anything suggesting a single chief of staff or one general staff.

But the most important reason of all has been that most members of the Congress sincerely believed that the nation's security is enhanced, if not safeguarded, by having competing groups share in the shaping of our national security policy, especially when it comes to overall strategic concepts and interrelated basic defense policies. I share this general notion. Furthermore, the above circumstances lead me to believe that fun-

damental changes in the structure of the DOD are probably not in the cards and that the only practical course of action, if one has JCS reform in mind, is to work within the present arrangement. This is not to say, however, that there is no room for improvement. I believe that major improvements can be achieved in the effectiveness of the JCS system, even though some changes may require relatively minor amendments of current statutes.

It is not difficult to understand why the frequent panels and studies on reorganization have not gotten very far in the past. At least one such effort has occurred during the tenure of every Secretary of Defense since the last major legislative change of 1958: some initiated by the Administration, some by the Congress, and others on the part of private research groups and think tanks, both private and quasi-governmental. The pace of such efforts to effect change seems to have accelerated in recent years. Indeed, they have spawned specific legislative proposals from the Congress that have in turn compelled the current JCS to respond with their own proposals. On top of all this, self-proclaimed defense experts, some serving in influential positions on congressional staffs and others writing as private citizens, have come forward with solutions of their own that are sometimes half-baked and infeasible.

The most recent such effort is a book, *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, written by Edward Luttwak. In this book, which was a best-seller, Luttwak makes certain observations about the DOD that are quite valid although much of his criticism is overdrawn and inaccurate. Unfortunately his solution is narrowly focused on the JCS, ignoring the many other problem areas in the DOD but proposing a drastic plan that would abolish the JCS, reduce the power and stature of the service Chiefs, and establish an elite central military staff under a five-star officer, composed of "national-defense officers" divorced completely from their original parent services. Not satisfied with this sweeping proposal, Luttwak would have all unified commands commanded by these new national defense officers with the staffs of the unified commands made up of such officers as well. I suspect that his proposal has little, if any, chance of being considered seriously by responsible officials in either the Department of Defense or in the Congress. It certainly does not appeal to me.

Returning to the basic differences between the JCS and OSD, perhaps the most significant has been that the Joint Chiefs have been unable to participate effectively in key defense program and budget decisions which drive the force structure of each service and thus have a profound influence on the strategic concepts pursued by the United States. This has come about not necessarily because civilians want to dominate or denigrate the military. Rather, it has stemmed from the fact that the Joint Chiefs have been reluctant to insert themselves into this process and prefer to articulate overall views as to the force and weapon system requirements of the services. Unfortunately, these requirements invariably exceed what the Administration is willing to support for defense and thus are of little practical value to the Secretary of Defense.

Given reasonable time and the pressure created by a major crisis, the JCS system can provide sound, coherent, timely advice, but it is usually in response to a specific situation. It should be remembered, however, that many other agencies—State, OSD, CIA, and the National Security Advisor—contribute to national security decisions, and that the JCS views on matters of strategic importance are only one source. Nevertheless, JCS views with respect to major issues, for example the Panama Canal Treaty and the SALT II Treaty, can have a very large influence on their acceptance or rejection. But on questions of force structure, programs, and budgets, the joint system, because of its basic nature and built-in internal conflicts, has had little influence on OSD decisions. Instead, the Secretary of Defense and his civilian staff have been left with a clear field to formulate the options and surface fresh ideas without a

coherent, nationally oriented input from the JCS that transcends service biases. Clearly this is not a healthy state of affairs, but one that has come about by default, because of the basic inhibitions inherent in the joint system, and is further aggravated by the way the system functions.

With respect to the forces in the field and the control of operations, the Joint Chiefs play an important role but, in some ways, only a nominal role. Neither the JCS nor the services are formally in the chain of command to the unified commanders, although the JCS by OSD directive generally act as a conduit for the Secretary of Defense who *is* in the direct chain of command running from the President as Commander in Chief to the unified commanders. But the unified commanders, who have operational control of all US combat forces, have had no formal military boss, and until recently no one outside those commands reviewed their plans or the effectiveness of their control, training, and operational supervision of their assigned forces. Recent statutory changes, however, are beginning to bring about an improvement in that respect. Nevertheless, the most damaging aspect of the relatively weak relationship between the JCS and the unified commanders has been the tendency to avoid involvement in issues deemed to be the province of a single service even when the issues may have an adverse effect on the operational forces.

At this juncture it may be helpful to recall the basic roles and missions of the services as prescribed by statute. Each service is charged individually with being organized, trained, and equipped for prompt and sustained combat operations in its respective environment—land, sea, or air. Moreover, each is assigned primary interest in all operations in its own medium, with specific exceptions spelled out in the pertinent statute. Although the services technically are confined to administrative and logistic matters, in reality it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to divorce them completely from so-called operational matters.

How does one separate organization, training, weapons, and equipment from the operations they are designed to carry out? This is particularly difficult for the Navy and its Marine component, as well as for the Air Force, because these services possess strategic mobility by virtue of their own strategic lift. How can the Navy ignore the operational aspects inherently involved in the constant presence of US warships on the high seas? If an incident occurs at sea, the Secretary of Defense, not to mention the President, will look to the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO, as well as the unified commander involved and the JCS, for information, advice, and recommendations. It is inescapable, and I see no alternative for the Navy but to keep a close operational overwatch of its ships and fleets at sea. Likewise, the Air Force constantly has aircraft in the air all over the world and cannot divest itself of a certain amount of responsibility for its people no matter where they may find themselves. The Army and the Marine Corps inherently have the same kind of responsibility for their soldiers and Marines, but to a lesser extent because they are strategic hitchhikers who generally do not have their own means of strategic lift.

At any rate, it seems clear that the very nature of the joint system and the very existence of separate services have tended to inhibit the role and voice of the military. It follows then that if the military wants to counterbalance the evergrowing ascendancy of OSD, it can only do so by changing the nature of the JCS organization. Indeed, it seems imperative at this point that the current body of Chiefs not only be willing to accept change, but also take the initiative and recommend specific revisions in order to contain the pace of such change and influence its direction.

Let us now turn to specific proposals that might be considered within the outlines I have briefly discussed. I will try to confine my thoughts to those proposals where, in my opinion, a clear case can be made. My listing is not necessarily in any order of importance or priority.

Status of Senior Chiefs. I do not support the idea of replacing the JCS with a council of advisers, but rather support the dual role of the senior Chiefs.

The Chain of Command. Present statutes are currently interpreted to mean that the chain of command shall run from the President as Commander in Chief to the Secretary of Defense to the unified commanders in the field, and that the JCS are confined to an off-line advisory position. I use the word "interpreted" because the pertinent statutes (Title 10-Armed Forces, Sub Title A—General, Part I—Organization and General Military Powers) are not entirely clear on the matter. At any rate, past and present Secretaries of Defense have seen fit to place the JCS in the chain of command between the Secretary and the unified commanders by means of an OSD directive. In my view this command arrangement is seriously flawed. I accept entirely the necessity to give the Secretary all the peacetime authority he needs to raise, train, equip, and budget for the armed forces, but I do not believe that he should be made responsible for their performance in battle. Our experiences in Vietnam—when at times our commander in the field, as well as the CJCS, received conflicting orders from the President and Secretary of Defense—convinced me that in time of crisis, emergency, or war, the operational chain of command must go from the President directly to the JCS and thence to the unified commanders. Conflicting instructions were issued regarding at least two operations during the Vietnam War: the ground attack against NVA sanctuaries in Cambodia and the Linebacker II bombing campaign. The Secretary of Defense must not be in a position to override or amend Presidential operational decisions involving orders to the combatant forces. There can be only one Commander in Chief!

Therefore, I believe that present statutes should be amended to make it clear that operational orders from the President functioning as the Commander in Chief relating to strategy, tactics, and operations will normally be issued to the combatant commanders through the JCS. In order not to limit the flexibility of the President, the law should provide an escape clause that would allow the Commander in Chief to give deputized authority to the Secretary of Defense for specific times and purposes. The intent of such legislative changes would be to avoid formally placing the Secretary of Defense in the *regular military chain* of command, handling operational matters, except under extraordinary circumstances expressly authorized by the President.

Chairman, JCS, and the NSC. The CJCS should be made a statutory member of the National Security Council, not just an advisor—as is his current status. All too often he is excluded from the high councils of the government, some of which may be considerably smaller and more informal than full-scale NSC meetings but nevertheless carry much weight. During the first four days of the Dominican Republic crisis that began on 25 April 1965, President Johnson met almost continuously in the White House with his closest personal advisors and the Secretaries of State and Defense, but without the CJCS, General Wheeler, who was not invited until 29 April after numerous significant decisions already had been made. Other examples of such exclusion were commonplace during the Vietnam War. Making the Chairman an NSC member is not a guarantee that he will always be invited to the high-level councils handling national security affairs, but it should serve to inhibit any tendency to exclude deliberately a military voice.

Civil-Military Relations. During the Vietnam War, especially during the Johnson Administration, there was ample evidence of poor civil-military relations at the highest levels in Washington. The overriding need for close civil-military relations in wartime is, in my opinion, one of the most important lessons to be remembered from that tragic experience. To carry out his functions as Commander in Chief, the President must have direct and frequent access to the JCS, collectively and individually. If he neglects them or allows his Secretary of Defense to isolate the Chiefs, he does so at the nation's

peril. The position taken by the Secretary of Defense is fundamental to the question of good civil-military relations. All too frequently Secretaries have shut off access to the President and blocked JCS recommendations from reaching the President. Indeed, by always insisting on being present when the President meets with his Chiefs, a Secretary can effectively inhibit any frank exchange of views and suppress the discussion of dissenting views, a situation which could prove disastrous in wartime. Perhaps the ever-present threat of nuclear warfare will deter any total war for survival in the future, but as the Vietnam War has demonstrated, the United States can lose big even in a relatively small limited war.

In this connection, it is comforting to hear that President Reagan is meeting regularly with the Chairman and the other Chiefs.

The JCS and Force Structure, Program, and Budget Issues. This is one of the thorniest problems of all: how to get the JCS system intermeshed with the decision-making process in OSD that determines the force structure, program, and budget for each service. One solution, which would greatly increase the power of the Chairman, would be to charge the CJCS, in consultation with the other Chiefs, but not necessarily with their individual or collective consent, with the responsibility of providing advice to the Secretary on force structure, program, and budget issues. In this role, the Chairman would be supported by the Joint Staff or OSD staff as appropriate. Admittedly this is a contentious proposal but it is the kind of bold proposal that the JCS must consider if they are to stay in the defense ball game.

The Joint Staff. Frequently new ideas are put forth to improve the expertise, professionalism, objectivity, and the like of the Joint Staff. My impression of the Joint Staff during my service was that it was an experienced, professional, and dedicated group. Nevertheless, efforts to improve the quality of the Joint Staff should have worthwhile payoffs. However, to achieve the goal of developing people that are both well grounded and experienced in their parent service and in the joint arena will require, in my opinion, a drastic change in the current concept of what constitutes a full military career. Thirty years of service for colonels and 35 years for most general and flag officers are the present limits for career officers. These are simply inadequate periods of time to acquire truly professional standards of excellence in a wide range of command and staff jobs in the individual's parent service and, additionally, in joint positions of important responsibility.

Before I conclude, I would like to point out that there are numerous problem areas within the DOD that are *very probably far more serious* than the JCS problem, if there is a critical one on that score. I might point out just a few:

A bloated bureaucracy exists in the Pentagon, especially with respect to the OSD staff and the staff secretariats of the service Secretaries. The proliferation of interminable layers of review within the DOD stifles initiative, consumes an enormous amount of time and energy, and constitutes a major source of discontent and low morale among the staff "troops" in Washington. Indeed, the services probably lose more outstanding officers because of this intolerable situation than for any other single reason. I feel certain that given the will and direction from the Secretary of Defense, far-reaching improvements in the way the DOD does its business could result.

There are also too many officers (field grade and above) in each service and there are far too many on duty in Washington. I am familiar with the historical reasons for these conditions, but they do not excuse inaction. It will take a lot of courage for the DOD and the Congress to tackle this one, but it is a situation that must be confronted and dealt with because it is potentially ruinous to the good name of the armed services. On the other hand, the benefit of correcting these weaknesses would be enormous for the nation as well as the DOD.

Finally, I have two gratuitous suggestions for the JCS:

First, there is a perception in some quarters that our armed forces can handle in a commendable manner a large crisis or

emergency if given plenty of strategic warning and allowed sufficient time for planning, mobilization if indicated, and the like, but that they are ill-prepared to handle a sudden, small problem that requires swift, decisive action. It strikes me that in today's world of unexpected hostile acts to our people abroad we need a different arrangement outside the normal unified command structure to cope with such threats. I sincerely hope that our Chiefs are addressing this problem as a matter of urgency.

Second, today the DOD is essentially geared to a peacetime mission of deterring hostilities and preparing for possible war, but it would have immense difficulties in going to war. This is admittedly my perception, but I strongly believe that the present superstructure of the DOD would soon collapse in a major emergency or conflict, and that drastic surgery would be required to achieve a streamlined organization that could get things done in an effective way and in the least amount of time. Again, it is my hope that the Chiefs have a small group quietly looking at the situation with a view to having some drastic reorganization proposals ready, if and when the occasion should arise.

In summary, I have tried to give some historical background and context to the question of JCS reform and have concluded that only evolutionary change is possible in time of peace. Wartime might be an entirely different horse race. I have also indicated that the inevitable trend seems to be toward more centralized authority within the DOD and that the JCS should recognize this by taking the initiative and possibly preempting less-desirable proposals. And, finally, I would underscore that some other problem areas appear to me to have far more potentially damaging aspects than any that exist within the joint system.



VIETNAM AND THE SIX CRITERIA FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE

by

DAVID T. TWINING

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On 28 November 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger delivered a speech which deserves attention both within and beyond the military forces and government of the United States. This historic document was personally written by Mr. Weinberger, endorsed by the National Security Council, and discussed with and approved by the President.[1] It represents a maturation and sophistication of our strategic judgment; more importantly, it adapts and clarifies defense policies of a different time and slower world to the exigencies of the present and the challenges of the future.

Questions concerning the role and use of armed force by a democratic state within a turbulent, pluralistic world are central, vital, and absolutely fundamental as never before. War has always been the ultimate political act, but threats to our sovereignty have now become increasingly gray, obscuring clear lines of war and peace by means of terrorism, uncertain alliances, and hidden intentions. It is the irony of the present era that assassinations, bombings, and technology theft are facilitated by the very freedoms totalitarian forces seek to destroy.

While strategic nuclear war remains a real concern, this is the least likely security contingency we face. Instead, most challenges to US sovereignty and interests lie at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, the significance of which democratic nation-states have traditionally been unwilling or unable adequately to grasp. Added to the ambiguity of the ever-changing strategic environment is the fourth dimension of military affairs, space. In the days ahead, the all-enveloping nature of security challenges facing the West will increasingly intrude upon our lives, making us less rather than more secure.

The Weinberger policy statement represents an operational guide for a future in which purposefully cumbersome democratic states must coexist with totalitarian states unencumbered by public opinion and individual freedoms. As Mr. Weinberger has observed, the responsible use of military force is a moral issue, and military power is but one tool among many. For democracies, however, it is most appropriately the final political tool when all else fails.

In his speech, Mr. Weinberger enunciated six criteria to be met before the use of military power is considered appropriate. The quintessential significance of these standards is their role as a catharsis of past debates, doubts, and national trauma. Because of this

thoughtful and far-reaching analysis, these six tests provide positive guidance and direction for meeting future challenges to our security and national interests. The uneasy legacy of Vietnam, more than any single factor or event in this century, has demanded this reappraisal.

THE SIX TESTS

I. "*The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.*"[2]

According to Mr. Weinberger, national interest—ours or our allies'—will determine if the application of force is indeed appropriate. US troops and national will are not to be substituted for those of our allies, nor will the United States become the world's policeman. Allies will be supported with economic and military aid to help in their self-defense, but national interest will be the measure by which this decision is made. Nor will the United States announce in advance, as with Korea in 1950, that particular regions are beyond our strategic perimeter.

From the beginning of the Vietnam War, there was no agreement on what was at stake and which US national interests, if any, were involved. The 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution explicitly stated that the peace and security of Southeast Asia were "vital" to US national interests. Many similar references to US "interests" and "objectives" led to a "verbal extravagance" which confused both American policymakers and the public at large as to the issues at stake and their priority.[3]

By being clear about whether a possible interest is vital—that is, a goal or purpose of such significance to justify the use of national power for its defense or attainment—the term provides a useful measure with which to evaluate critically the justification for and results of actions taken on its behalf.[4] To those who led the nation in the early years of the Vietnam War, the conflict was viewed as essential to our security, to our allies, and to South Vietnam. Yet only the President can truly define and defend that determination. In the end, the case was neither defined nor defended well.

By making it imperative that a national security problem be analyzed to determine if it indeed represents a vital national interest, Mr. Weinberger has made explicit a consideration which was never clear during the Vietnam era. This very important factor, seen over the litany of Vietnam pathos, is the first of the six criteria which validate the use of force in the current era.

II. "*If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.*"

If a vital national interest requires committing US troops to combat, the force so committed must be of sufficient size and strength to assure victory. Once this decision has been made, there can be no question of our resolve to win. Military force will not be incrementally drawn into combat, a strategy "which almost always means the use of insufficient force."

In many respects, the conduct of the Vietnam War represented the antithesis of

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Lieutenant Colonel David T. Twining is Director of Soviet and East European Studies in the Department of National Security, US Army War College. He is a Soviet foreign area officer and a strategist. Colonel Twining is a graduate of Michigan State University and holds an M.P.A. from Syracuse University and an M.A. in Russian Area Studies from Georgetown University. He has served as an Infantry officer in the Berlin Brigade and in intelligence assignments during two Vietnam tours. He has been a Soviet/East European political-military analyst in the Defense Intelligence Agency and Executive Officer of the National Military Intelligence Center. Colonel Twining taught Soviet area and strategic studies at the US Army Command and General Staff College, and in 1981 he was appointed Chief of the DIA Liaison Detachment, Canberra, Australia. Prior to his current assignment he was a US Army Senior Service College Fellow at Harvard University.



this policy. The United States won every major tactical engagement, yet lost the war. Because of a fear of direct Chinese and Soviet involvement, US objectives were cast in negative terms of preventing the fall of South Vietnam rather than in positive terms of defeating the source of the insurgency, North Vietnam. This produced what has been called an "unimaginative strategy of attrition and cautious escalation which yielded unsatisfactory results in the long term."[5]

By restricting the military means in pursuit of limited objectives, the United States fought a war of attrition which corresponded to the enemy's strategic doctrine, first published in 1947 and reissued by Hanoi in 1960. This doctrine sought a protracted war. According to Truong Chin, the preeminent North Vietnamese theoretician, "The guiding principle of the strategy of our whole resistance must be to prolong the war." This would lower enemy morale, unite the North Vietnamese people, increase outside support, and encourage the antiwar movement to tie the enemy's hands. "To achieve all these results, the war must be prolonged, and we must have time. Time works for us."[6] This strategy worked against the French and, with time, it would be effective against the Americans.

Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., author of the profound analysis of the Vietnam War *On Strategy*, has asserted that the United States failed to concentrate its efforts on the source of the conflict—Hanoi—and mistakenly pursued the symptom of the war—the guerrilla. Because of the failure of our strategic military doctrine, "It was four North Vietnamese Army corps, not 'dialectical materialism,' that ultimately conquered South Vietnam." While guerrilla forces distracted US forces in a tactic of trading space for time, time ran out for an army committed to using restricted means to achieve limited, negative objectives. This permitted regular North Vietnamese forces to achieve a decisive victory following the US withdrawal.[7]

The failure of US military professionals to understand the dynamics of the Vietnam War, Summers observed, has led to continuing confusion over tactics and strategy. By failing to achieve decisive victory over the source of the war, "North Vietnam's tactical failures did not prevent their strategic success, and in strategic terms people's war *was* a success." The victorious strategy in this, as in all wars, has not changed. "Carrying the war to the enemy and the destruction of his armed forces and his will to fight through the strategic offensive is the classic way wars are fought and won."[8]

III. "*If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have, and send, the forces needed to do just that.*"

The failure to pursue victory—destroying the enemy's forces and will to fight in order to achieve the political objective for which victory is sought—has been termed the essence of our strategic failure in Vietnam.[9] Because the Clausewitzian political aim of war is the quintessential goal and war is its means, political and military objectives contributing to that end may never be considered in isolation of one another.[10] Yet this was done in Vietnam in much the same way as it was during previous conflicts in which American forces were employed. In reviewing the mixed results victory had brought the United States following World War II, former Secretary of Defense James Forrestal declared, "The great mistakes were made during the war because of American failure to realize that military and political action had to go hand in hand."[11]

The essential unity of political and military objectives in pursuit of the ultimate political object of war was not readily apparent during the Vietnam era. The tendency of Americans to view military and political operations as separate, compartmented functions eventually proved fatal against an enemy with a clear understanding of its objectives and their contribution to the war's ultimate political aim. Hanoi, which saw its

military struggle in the South as the intermediate stage of broader regional political ambitions, had little to fear from those who saw only the limited military struggle as threatening.[12]

Since US military and political objectives were never clear—largely because victory in the classic sense was not sought and the war's relevance to the national interest was clouded at best—the enemy retained the initiative. Until 1969, when the sanctuaries were first invaded, bombing became more aggressive, Vietnamization was emphasized, and pacification began to show real progress, the war was in "a state of perpetual motion. It could have gone on forever." As S. L. A. Marshall observed, "Once the commitment was made, the war need not have been muddled through to indecisive and nationally convulsive conclusions in a manner wholly unworthy of a great power."[13]

Because political and military objectives were not clearly enunciated, the United States was placed in a position of reacting to North Vietnamese political and military actions. This led to widespread confusion in Vietnam, among US allies, and among the American people. Even 20 years following the introduction of American troops at Da Nang, the misunderstanding and confusion over US objectives persist.

While Hanoi "skillfully combined political and military means in pursuit of clearly defined political objectives to exploit the problems of a democracy in conducting a distant war," things were less satisfactory for Washington. After the war, former Vice President Hubert Humphrey wrote, "We seem to have gotten things in reverse order. We all know that knowledge is power, but in Vietnam we acted as though power gave us knowledge. Therein, possibly, lay our greatest mistake."[14] Because the United States failed to define and adopt consistent and clear strategic objectives leading to the political end for which the war was fought, we were condemned to tactical rather than strategic success.[15]

The failure to translate US tactical success, accomplished with such valor and sacrifice, to strategic success is our most enduring failure of the war. Because we did not adequately define our objectives or comprehend the role of battlefield success in contributing to larger strategic goals, the aims for which the Vietnam War was fought were never within our grasp.

IV. "*The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition, and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.*"

The conditions and objectives of a conflict inevitably change, and this requires that combat requirements be adjusted accordingly. National leaders must conduct a continuous assessment to determine whether the conflict is indeed in the national interest and if military force is appropriate for its resolution. If the assessment concludes this is the case, victory must then be sought. If not, as Mr. Weinberger states, "we should not be in combat."

One of the major lessons of Vietnam is the necessity to conduct a continuous and honest review of the premises underlying a particular national policy. This implies a willingness to accept responsibility in the case of policy failure, when it becomes apparent that the price for a specific policy has become unacceptable. In Vietnam, the driving premise of containing communist expansion led successive Presidents to accept a growing commitment to South Vietnam without fully determining if US vital interests were involved or, if so, had changed. Once the United States became heavily involved, the need to preserve national prestige overrode any intrinsic importance of South Vietnam itself.[16]

A continuous assessment of objectives and requisite military forces requires a receptivity to a spectrum of possible ideas and views, particularly by the President. According to Townsend Hoopes, President Lyndon Johnson primarily relied on a small circle of advisors among whom the premises of US involvement were seen as a choice between appeasement or military resolve. Hoopes has said that no one saw the need to redefine US interests or to question the basic

requirement to counter communism forcefully. "To the President's men in early 1965," Hoopes said, "there seemed no logical stopping point between isolationism and globalism."[17]

This prevailing atmosphere led to the suppression of dissenting views, an attitude that originated not in the bureaucracies but with the President and his key advisors. According to Richard Holbrooke, "They knew what they wanted to hear, and they took steps which squeezed other points of view out of the reporting system." This prevented the bureaucracies from carrying out their role of promoting continuity in policy and noting the risks particular decisions hold for larger policy positions. Because broad strategic issues were not adequately debated, the President's ultimate vulnerability before history was vastly increased.[18]

When reflecting on the entire Vietnam experience, one must agree with David M. Abshire, who noted, "The foremost lesson is that wise decisions on foreign intervention require a constant accommodation of means to ends and of strategy to objectives."[19] This constant assessment process, the adjustment of means to ends, forces to objectives, is culminated by a single act of courage and supreme statesmanship: admitting, when judged to be appropriate by the most senior authorities, that "we should not be in combat."[20]

V. "*Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation.*"

No war—whether the tragedy of Vietnam or the quick victory in Grenada—can receive a guarantee of public support in advance of military action. What is desired, however, is the reasonable expectation that the American people and their elected representatives will understand the necessity for action when the case for it has been clearly made. This requires effective, decisive action by a chief executive who acts in what he believes to be the national interest. This also requires a frank dialogue between the executive and legislative branches over the nature of the threat prompting the military intervention. The American people have always supported a President who acts in a timely manner to serve or protect what are perceived to be vital national interests.

The Vietnam War proved, if anything, the validity of this basic principle: that the domestic environment must be considered when troops are to be committed to combat in a foreign land and, once committed, that close, continuous, and candid consultation with the American people and with Congress must be maintained.[21] If Grenada has shown the merits of the effective, responsible use of military power, Vietnam, according to Secretary of State George Shultz, "shows that public support can be frittered away if we do not act wisely and effectively."[22]

In prosecuting the Vietnam War, President Johnson made the deliberate decision not to mobilize the national will of the American people by seeking a declaration of war from Congress. As a result, maintaining public support for the war and its rising costs became increasingly difficult—a strategic lesson that was lost on neither Hanoi nor many in Washington. In a 14 October 1966 top secret memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, General Earle G. Wheeler noted that "communist leaders in both North and South Vietnam expect to win this war in Washington, just as they won the war with France in Paris. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that there is reason for such expectations on the part of the communist leadership."[23] As General Lewis M. Walt later wrote, "American opinion has been as much a target in this war as an enemy soldier in the sights of a rifle."[24]

While a reprehensible attack such as Pearl Harbor or some other clear act of war that inflames public sentiment makes the issue of public support less problematic, few national leaders expect future tests of the

national will to be this clear-cut. Instead, there are many less-distinct contingencies in which a President must act, where a *reasonable* assurance of support is sought. As Mr. Weinberger has observed, future challenges will be mostly gray, precisely the most troublesome national security problems with which democracies must deal. This uncertainty does not preclude a decisive response; it only makes it more difficult.

The burden of decision is never easy for a democracy, particularly a world power which is judged by both its action and its inaction.[25] History is replete with acts of courage, and the future will call for more. While the Vietnam era may not have been our proudest moment, it has inextricably linked the requirement of public support to the commitment of US troops for foreign combat.

VI. "*The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.*"

The resort to military force by a democracy, particularly its American variant, is not just a deliberate, rational decision, but a moral one as well. This stems not from the purpose for which a war is conducted, but from its nature. As Clausewitz has succinctly stated, "The character of battle, like its name, is slaughter, and its price is blood."[26]

General John A. Wickham, Jr., US Army Chief of Staff, has said that in a future war soldiers must know that the conflict in which they are engaged is important to their country. Because the commitment of troops to combat is inevitably a moral decision, the nation has a moral responsibility to its troops. According to General Wickham, "Once we commit force, we must be prepared to back it up and win as opposed to just sending soldiers into operations for limited goals."[27]

Until man's inherent propensity toward violence is more fully restrained, governments will continue to consider armed conflict an option of state policy. However, the maintenance of standing armies and their use in the course of relations with other nations is a necessity democratic governments would prefer to avoid. To state explicitly that US forces will be deployed in combat as a last resort is to acknowledge John Keegan's assertion that the essence of armies lies not in what they "are," but in what they "do": the "infliction of human suffering through violence," of "combat *corps à corps.*"[28]

In this view, no responsible person starts a war without clearly knowing what is to be achieved—its political purpose—and how it is to be conducted—its operational objective. These, in turn, establish the "scale of means and effort" required to attain the ultimate political objective.[29] In Vietnam, the ultimate objective was never clear, its operational corollary was obscure, and the scale of effort was imprecisely defined.

This failure of strategic analysis during the Vietnam War produced a confusion of ends and means, of scale and utility. In an effort to limit US and South Vietnamese casualties, firepower was substituted for manpower. Over eight million tons of munitions—three times that dropped on both Europe and Japan during the Second World War—were expended in the Vietnam War.[30] In one extreme example, as many as 1000 sorties and the loss of 95 aircraft were required before laser-guided bombs downed North Vietnam's Thanh Hoa bridge on 13 May 1972, after more than seven years of effort.[31] During the 1967-68 siege at Khe Sanh, more than 75,000 tons of ordnance were dropped from B-52 aircraft over a nine-week period—the most explosives dumped on a tactical target in history.[32]

The war cost the United States $165 billion, representing only direct costs of the war rather than the total expense of US military programs and indirect costs to the American government and society. Another $24 billion was expended on aid to the South Vietnamese government between 1955 and 1975.[33] Robert Komer has estimated that the United States spent more on intelligence than North Vietnam spent on the entire war.[34] Soviet support to Hanoi is believed to have cost no more than one-thirtieth the sum the United States expended annually; for Moscow, it was a low-cost, low-risk strategy.[35]

No statistics are more sensitive to a democracy than combat casualties. To those

affected by the deaths of over 58,000 Americans, the trauma of nearly 2500 missing in action, and the pain of 300,000 wounded, the cost will always be too high.[36] The scars of this war 8000 miles from the American mainland persist, yet it is the loss of its own to which each country, parent, spouse, and child is drawn. The number of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong dead is far higher, some 925,000,[37] but the difference in societal values and the manner in which the popular will is translated into national deeds of armed combat make Western nations particularly sensitive to casualties, especially their own. For democratic nations, it is this human cost and sense of individual worth it represents—more than any other factor—that makes the commitment of US forces to combat truly a last resort.

CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACIES AND LIMITED WAR

Implicit in most analyses of the Vietnam War is that democracies lack the will and the means required to maintain a protracted struggle under contemporary conditions. The usefulness of the six major tests enunciated by Mr. Weinberger is that they acknowledge that the spectrum of threat now faced by the United States has complicated but not negated the possibility of an appropriate, measured response. This is consistent with the Clausewitzian principles of war, which recognize that every period has its own unique form of conflict, with particular constraints and preconceptions. This requires that threats which give rise to hostile acts must be analyzed and, in the current era, accommodated by defense policy.[38]

The contemporary spectrum of conflict with which we are confronted has as its source what Harlan Cleveland terms "the disintegration of national governance."[39] The limited ability of many national governments to cope with social resentment and frustrated expectations has created new opportunities for those seeking radical change through widespread disorder and state-sponsored terrorism. The record of such change since World War II reflects a declining number of democratic states amidst a growing number of centrally controlled, single-party, authoritarian and totalitarian states with disenfranchised, mobilized populations. To adapt to this new reality requires a forward-looking defense policy capable of recognizing military objectives within the larger political milieu and decisively responding to them.

Clausewitz taught that war is the continuation of politics and that armed force is but a means of state policy contributing to the ultimate political objective. It is this political purpose which determines the nature of the military instrument selected as well as its use. A vigorous and ambitious policy requires a more absolute and active military effort; a subtle policy requires a more precise military means. Policy will determine the character of the war but not its operational details; "the posting of guards or the employment of patrols" is best left to those responsible for securing the military objective.[40] The tailoring of military means to meet political aims is the challenge of contemporary defense policy. It was the strategic failure of policymakers and strategists of the Vietnam era that this was not appropriately done.

It is the political objective of our potential adversaries that lies at the heart of the current defense challenge facing the United States. Military weapons such as the 441 Soviet SS-20s and their vast destructive power mask the larger political challenge they represent. The uniquely pragmatic prism through which Americans view the world and interpret its events has obscured the more enduring, and perhaps more sophisticated, political aims of those intent upon our destruction. George Kennan has decried the "almost exclusive militarization of thinking" by which US officials view the Soviet challenge. At the same time, Norman Podhoretz has spoken of the "politically pampered American experience" as responsible for our strategic naiveté.[41]

Did the United States understand the political nature of the Vietnam War? Robert Komer has acknowledged that "Hanoi was far wiser than we in seeing the struggles as

essentially a seamless web, a political, military, economic, ideological, and psychological conflict."[42] General Vo Nguyen Giap, in reviewing the Tet Offensive after the war, indicated much the same: "For us, you know, there is no such thing as a single strategy. Ours is always a synthesis, simultaneously military, political, and diplomatic—which is why, quite clearly, the Tet offensive had multiple objectives."[43] The failure to comprehend and counter Hanoi's political objectives, from which its subordinate goals flowed, led the United States to concentrate on the military challenge to the detriment of the larger political war.

The legacy of this failure has been the incremental expansion of a harsh mechanism of oligarchic rule supported by Soviet military power. To focus exclusively on that military power, however, will overlook Moscow's political objectives in the Western Hemisphere and in the larger world. The success of the USSR's low-cost, low-risk strategy during the Vietnam War and the subsequent consolidation of ties with Hanoi have undoubtedly convinced the Soviet leadership to pursue similar efforts elsewhere, in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. According to Jean-Francois Revel, this is an unprecedented period in which communist inefficiency does not prevent the expansion of a centrally directed and controlled system of power.[44]

The political utility of the expanded Soviet military presence has given client states the confidence to act with relative impunity. In Central America, this has led Nicaragua to evacuate peasants from rural areas to create free-fire zones and strategic hamlets, and to conduct search-and-destroy operations against opposition forces with interior lines of communication and external sanctuaries.[45] Those who see this situation as "another Vietnam" would do better to identify whether Nicaragua is akin to Vietnam's North or South. To those who believe poverty and political oppression created the conditions leading to the political crisis in Grenada before the US intervention, a review of documents captured there should dispel the myth of revolutionary spontaneity.[46]

Mr. Weinberger's reasoned and thought-provoking criteria for the use of military force acknowledge the growing political utility of Soviet military power in all its permutations. By placing the role of armed force in its proper strategic perspective, Mr. Weinberger addresses the larger political threat to our way of life posed by Soviet and proxy military power. He also acknowledges a future in which a proliferation of external unrest and the reality of Soviet global ambitions pose grave risks to our way of life at all levels of the conflict spectrum.

Mr. Weinberger's six criteria for the use of military force will not endanger American democracy, but will foster it at home and abroad. The criteria recognize that US military strategy must have a political aim and that this larger aim, for ourselves and for our potential adversaries, determines security or threat, friend or foe. As long as our basic freedoms remain intact, these guidelines will permit thoroughly democratic means to be mobilized properly and appropriately against those seeking anti-democratic ends. The will and the power for this purpose are thereby strengthened.

> There have been in the 20th century two kinds of revolution: the totalitarian revolution and the democratic revolution. The first one has been an abysmal failure, the second a reasonable success—but only the people who live under totalitarianism know this.[47]

NOTES

1. Richard Halloran, "U.S. Will Not Drift Into Combat Role, Weinberger Says," *The New York Times*, 29 November 1984, p. 1.

2. Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Use of Force and the National Will," *Baltimore Sun*, 3 December 1984, p. 11. All six tests and their detailed descriptions are from this source.

3. BDM Corporation, *A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam*, Vol. 3: *U.S. Foreign Policy and Vietnam, 1945-1975*; 8 vols. (McLean, Va.: BDM Corporation, 1980), p. 1-42.

4. Ibid., pp. 1-1 to 4-3.

5. W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, eds., *The Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 15. Representative John McCain paid an emotional visit to Hanoi in early 1985, where he had spent 5½ years as a US prisoner of war. In discussing the major result of the trip,

he described it in terms of the loss of close friends with whom he had served. "My thinking about them again reinforces my opinion that the United States should not send its young men to fight and die in a conflict unless the goal is victory." "Inside Vietnam: What a Former POW Found," *U.S. News and World Report*, 11 March 1985, p. 34.

6. Truong Chin, *Primer for Revolt: The Communist Takeover in Viet-Nam* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 111-12. Truong Chin at one time was the Secretary-General of the Vietnamese Communist Party and Vice Premier of North Vietnam.

7. Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (New York: Dell, 1984), p. 123; also pp. 114-28.

8. Ibid., pp. 130-31; p. 249.

9. Ibid., p. 46. See also Sir Robert Thompson in *Lessons of Vietnam*, pp. 98-99.

10. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), p. 87.

11. Anne Armstrong, "Shortsighted and Destructive," in *The Roosevelt Diplomacy and World War II*, ed. Robert Dallek (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970), p. 95.

12. Edward Lansdale, "Contradictions in Military Culture," in *Lessons of Vietnam*, pp. 42-43.

13. Robert Thompson in *Lessons of Vietnam*, p. 100; S. L. A. Marshall, "Thoughts on Vietnam," in ibid., p. 55.

14. David M. Abshire, "Lessons of Vietnam: Proportionality and Credibility," in *The Vietnam Legacy: The War, American Society and the Future of American Foreign Policy*, ed. Anthony Lake (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1976), p. 396; Hubert Humphrey, "Building on the Past: Lessons for a Future Foreign Policy," in ibid., p. 364.

15. Summers, p. 152.

16. BDM Corporation, *Strategic Lessons*, Vol. 3: *U.S. Foreign Policy and Vietnam, 1945-1975*, p. EX-6; pp. 3-56 to 3-57. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt has written that Vietnam in the early 1960s was not vital to our national interests, but it later became so "because we had linked our sacred national honor to it." Elmo R. Zumwalt, "Costing the Vietnamese War," in *Lessons of Vietnam*, pp. 201-02.

17. Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention* (New York: Longman, 1978), pp. 7-16.

18. Richard Holbrooke, "Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Something In-Between," in *Vietnam Legacy*, pp. 162-63. Holbrooke noted that the JCS probably raised strategic issues more than anyone, but that their rigid stance caused their positions to be discounted in advance. Ibid., p. 163.

19. Abshire, "Lessons of Vietnam," in *Vietnam Legacy*, pp. 392-93.

20. Weinberger, p. 11.

21. BDM Corporation, *Strategic Lessons*, Vol. 4: *U.S. Domestic Factors Influencing Vietnam War Policy Making*, p. EX-9.

22. George Shultz, "The Ethics of Power," address at Yeshiva University, 9 December 1984, US Department of State, *Current Policy*, No. 642 (Washington: GPO, 1984), p. 3.

23. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Actions Recommended for Vietnam," Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, JSCM-672-66, 14 October 1966, p. 2.

24. Lewis M. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General's Report on Vietnam* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1970), p. 200. Former President Nixon has written, "In the end, Vietnam was lost on the political front in the United States, not on the battlefront in Southeast Asia." Richard Nixon, *No More Vietnams* (New York: Arbor House, 1985), p. 15.

25. Shultz, p. 3.

26. Clausewitz, p. 259.

27. George C. Wilson, "War's Lessons Struck Home," *The Washington Post*, 16 April 1985, p. A9.

28. John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 28. One former battalion commander in Vietnam said, "Remember, we're watchdogs you unchain to eat up the burglar. Don't ask us to be mayors or sociologists worrying about hearts and minds. Let us eat up the burglar our own way and then put us back on the chain." Wilson, p. A9.

29. Clausewitz, p. 579.

30. Robert Komer in *Lessons of Vietnam*, p. 96.

31. Robert Thompson in *Lessons of Vietnam*, p. 104.

32. Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 540.

33. Charles Mohr, "History and Hindsight: Lessons from Vietnam," *The New York Times*, 30 April 1985, p. A6, citing *The Vietnam Experience*, Vol. 1 (Boston: Boston Publishing Co., 1981, and US Defense Department).

34. Komer in *Lessons of Vietnam*, p. 270.

35. William Zimmerman, "The Korean and Vietnam Wars," in Stephen S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 355.

36. Tom Morganthau, et al., "We're Still Prisoners of War," *Newsweek*, 15 April 1985, p. 35; "Hanoi-U.S. Relations Still Icy," *U.S. News and World Report*, 26 August 1985, p. 27. See also, Jeffrey Record, "Casualties," *Baltimore Sun*, 26 February 1985, p. 13.

37. Richard Butwell, "Vietnam War," *Encyclopedia Americana*, 1984 international ed., Vol. 28, p. 112b.

38. Clausewitz, p. 593.

39. Harlan Cleveland, "Defining Security: A Sober 'Threat Analysis,'" *The Inter Dependent*, (November-December 1983), p. 3.

40. Clausewitz, pp. 605-06.

41. Steven J. Dryden, "U.S. Says Soviets Adding SS20s Despite Freeze," *The Washington Post*, 18 September 1985, p. A23; Ronald Steel, "The Statesman of Survival," *Esquire* (January 1985), p. 72; Norman Podhoretz, "The Present Danger," *Commentary*, 79 (March 1980), 39.

42. Robert Komer, "Was There Another Way?" in *Lessons of Vietnam*, p. 211. Bernard Brodie, reflecting on the Vietnam War in 1972, wrote much the same: "Our failures there have been at least 95 percent due to our incomprehension and inability to cope with the political dimensions of the problem." Bernard Brodie, "Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?" *Military Review*, 52 (June 1972), 44.

43. Karnow, p. 535.

44. Jean-Francois Revel, *How Democracies Perish*, trans. William Byron (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983), pp. 353-55.

45. "Sandinistas Forcing Thousands Out of War Zone," *The New York Times*, 19 March 1985, p. A11.

46. Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall, eds. *The Grenada Papers* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984).

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SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES AND DISINFORMATION:

OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

by

DENNIS KUX

Lately there has been increased public attention regarding Soviet "disinformation" and "active measures," attempts by Moscow to influence political attitudes and public opinion in non-communist countries through deceptive and often covert means.

Yet serious analysis has been limited. There has been a great deal of focus on Moscow's espionage endeavors, but this other facet of the Kremlin's intelligence operations has received far less scrutiny, either by the press or academics.

The terminology pertaining to the subject is unfamiliar and loosely defined, even among specialists. In fact, the terms "active measures" and "disinformation" are both imported directly from the Soviet intelligence lexicon. "Disinformation," the more frequently used and better-known term, is the English transliteration of the Russian "dezinformatsiya" or misinforming through the dissemination of information that is totally or partially false. The phrase "active measures" is the English translation of "aktivnyye meropriyatiya," the name of the Soviet KGB unit charged with implementing these activities.

In Soviet intelligence doctrine, the concept of "active measures" covers a wide span of practices including disinformation operations, political influence efforts, and the activities of Soviet front groups and foreign communist parties. All active measures have the common goal of enhancing Soviet influence, usually by tarnishing the image of opponents. They generally involve elements of deception and often employ clandestine means to mask Moscow's hand in the operation.

Overall, where active measures fit in the Soviet framework may be better understood by considering the whole spectrum of Soviet foreign policy endeavors through the optic of "white," "gray," and "black" operations. Normal diplomatic, trade, aid, and informational efforts can be considered "white" or overt activities. "Gray" activities are those involving communist fronts, foreign communist parties, "clandestine" radio stations, or well-known media outlets for disinformation. While not officially acknowledged to be Soviet sponsored, semi-overt "gray" activities are widely known as under Soviet direction and control. In contrast, "black" activities involve genuinely clandestine operations: the use of agents of influence, spreading false rumors, duping politicians and journalists, and disseminating forgeries and fake documents. Active measures fall under either the "gray" or the "black" rubric, although the line between the semi-overt and the clandestine is often blurred.

Finding an appropriate English phrase to describe active measures is difficult. Former Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has written: "No phrase in English

conveys precisely the meaning of active measures. Perhaps World War II psychological warfare operations provide the closest parallel."[1]

BACKGROUND

The Soviets first used active measures as a policy tool in the 1920s when Moscow sought to discredit emigré groups in Western Europe, particularly in France, by spreading disinformation and by luring emigré activists back to Russia through various subterfuges. Even before the 1917 Revolution, the Tsarist secret police employed similar deceptive techniques, using foreign agents not only to collect intelligence but also to sow dissent among emigré groups and, by covert subsidies to selected journals, to attempt to create a better foreign press for Imperial Russia.[2]

In the 1950s the Soviet Union institutionalized these practices, establishing an intelligence unit that specialized in disinformation; this was Department D within the First Chief Directorate of the Soviet intelligence organization. In the 1960s, the term "active measures" appeared on the scene when the name of Department D was changed to the Active Measures Department, Department A for short. This conveyed the idea that these activities, as conceived by Soviet authorities, were broader than mere dissemination of disinformation or the circulation of fake documents.

In 1968, the non-communist world received a clearer picture of active measures with the defection of Ladislav Bittman, onetime chief of the disinformation section of Czechoslovakian intelligence. Bittman's book, *The Deception Game*, offered a comprehensive discussion of active measures; in many respects, it is still the most lucid one.[3] According to Bittman, the principal aim of Czechoslovakian operations was to damage the West German image by fabricating links between West German officials and the Nazis. The most dramatic venture in which Bittman participated was Operation Neptune, the "discovery" in June 1964 of a trunkful of forged Nazi documents at the bottom of a lake. Publicity in the West about the cache stirred latent anti-German sentiments, as the Czechs and their Soviet collaborators had hoped.[4]

In the mid-1970s, there was another indication that the Soviets attached increased importance to active measures; the KGB's active measures unit was organizationally upgraded from a department to a service and placed under the direction of a KGB general. In the latter 1970s Western Europe saw a vigorous active measures campaign to intensify opposition to the neutron bomb and later to fan the flames of the incipient peace movement to oppose the NATO decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).[5] There was also a series of bold forgeries intended to cause friction in relations between the United States and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.[6]

US State Department reports and CIA testimony in 1982 hearings before the House Intelligence Committee charged that a high level of active measures has continued.[7] State Department Special Report No. 110, released in September 1983, stated that these activities "have grown in boldness and intensity, reflecting what appears to be increased use of active measures as a policy instrument by the Soviets and their allies."[8]

ORGANIZATION

Within the KGB, the First Chief Directorate has responsibility for active measures as part of its charter to collect foreign intelligence and conduct overseas intelligence operations. The active measures unit, Service A, is organized along functional and geographic lines. Its half dozen departments have a staff of about 300 but draw on other elements of the KGB and Soviet government for people with specialized skills, such as translators.

Service A processes proposals for new active measures sent to Moscow by KGB residencies, monitors approved active measures being conducted in various parts of the world, and provides technical support—such as preparing fake documents and forgeries—for operations. Service A coordinates active

measures with KGB regional and country desks, and with other concerned elements of the Soviet government. It maintains close liaison with the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, which provides direction to front groups and foreign communist parties. In addition, Service A cooperates with the International Information Department of the CPSU, founded in 1978 to coordinate Soviet external publicity and propaganda.

The KGB often works in harness with friendly intelligence services in conducting active measures; indeed, it is at times difficult to know if the Soviets or a cooperative intelligence service is implementing an operation. Since the purpose is the same, the difficulty in differentiating a KGB operation from a satellite active measure is not really significant.

Former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko, an active measures specialist who defected to the United States in 1979, has shed some interesting light on these operations.[9] According to Levchenko, all KGB residencies now consider active measures, along with traditional espionage, as a key part of their work. Residencies propose new active measures and assess past undertakings in the annual plan sent to Moscow every December. While they can suggest new operations to take advantage of opportunities at any time during the year, final approval must come from KGB headquarters.

Moscow itself can instruct residencies to conduct operations and does so frequently. Although the techniques of active measures vary, Levchenko stresses that all reinforce Soviet policy objectives. The United States and the NATO Alliance, as the Soviet Union's chief foes, are the principal targets; however, Major Levchenko's revelations about Japan make clear that active measures have a global aim.[10] The geographic location of the active measure and the target are not necessarily the same. A false story—for example, the *Times of India* account that the United States labeled blood for export by race—may be floated in India, but the main target audience may be elsewhere, in this case, Black Africa.[11]

Within KGB residencies, the active measures cell forms part of the political intelligence or Line PR unit. The size varies with the importance of the post and the potential for active measures. In Tokyo, where Levchenko was assigned, there were five KGB officers working on active measures; they in turn managed about 25 Japanese agents. According to Levchenko, who ostensibly was the Tokyo correspondent for the Soviet magazine *New Times*, journalistic cover is especially desirable for active measures work since it provides greater access to politically influential people than the diplomatic cover normally assumed by KGB officers.[12]

Posing as a journalist is not always foolproof. In April 1983, Swiss authorities charged that Alexei Dumov, the Bern correspondent for the Soviet news agency Novosti, had misused his position for "disinformation, subversion and agitation" and expelled the Russian. The Swiss stated that Dumov, a KGB officer, carried on "political and ideological indoctrination" of Swiss anti-nuclear and peace movement adherents, provided clandestine support for the December 1981 peace rally, and helped organize a 1982 demonstration in the Swiss parliament.[13]

POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS

Fronts. Most major communist front organizations date to the early postwar years. The World Peace Council (WPC), which remains the largest and best-known group,

Dennis Kux is a career Foreign Service Officer and currently Deputy Director of Management Operations in the Department of State. His previous assignments in Washington include tours as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Coordination in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and Country Director for India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. He has served overseas at the US Embassy in Bonn, Germany; Islamabad, Pakistan; and Ankara, Turkey; and at the Consulate General in Madras, India. Mr. Kux is a graduate of the Army War College and Lafayette College, and holds an M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.



was formed in 1949 as part of the Soviet campaign to capture the "peace" issue from the West. The WPC faithfully echoes the Kremlin's foreign policy line through its yearly work programs and periodic international assemblies. Its longtime chairman, Indian communist Romesh Chandra, makes little attempt to conceal the WPC's subservience to Moscow. He declared in 1975, "The World Peace Council in its turn positively reacts to all Soviet initiatives in international affairs."[14]

Other major fronts, such as the World Federation of Free Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the Christian Peace Conference, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the International Organization of Journalists, and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, provide Moscow similarly pliant organizational platforms across the spectrum of professions and interest groups and with Third World nations.

The WPC, other international front organizations, and bilateral friendship societies are generally recognized today as Soviet policy instruments; as such, they have only limited capacity to mobilize or influence public opinion outside communist countries or radical nonaligned countries that cooperate with Moscow. Regional affiliates of international fronts have in some instances greater credibility. Front affiliates in Latin America, for example, especially in the labor, cultural, and journalism fields, have succeeded in attracting meaningful non-communist membership, thereby greatly increasing their value to Moscow and Havana.

Parties. Foreign communist parties vary from country to country in strength and their relationship to Moscow. Some, like the parties of Portugal, Greece, and India, and the minuscule US Communist Party, are subservient to Moscow and follow detailed directives. Some, like the Italian Communist Party or the Indian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), while sharing many policy positions with the Soviets, choose their own political paths independent of Moscow. Still others, like the French Communist Party, fall in between, accepting Moscow's lead on most but not all issues.

Parties and international fronts under Moscow's control receive policy direction from the International Department of the CPSU. Moscow is frequently a source of financial support. When funds are transferred clandestinely, the KGB normally provides the channel. In 1982 hearings before the House Intelligence Committee, Ed O'Malley, the FBI's counterintelligence chief, testified that KGB officers assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington perform this service for the US Communist Party.[15]

On occasion, the Soviets get sloppy. In January 1980 the New Zealand security service apprehended Soviet Ambassador Sofinskiy personally passing money to the head of the Socialist Unity Party, the local pro-Moscow communist group, in an Auckland hotel room. He was declared *persona non grata* and expelled from New Zealand.[16]

Despite their tarnished credentials, international fronts and parties continue to be regarded by Moscow as useful active measures instruments, providing platforms to amplify the Soviet foreign policy line, especially in the Third World. The Soviets have taken advantage of this in arenas such as the United Nations, where the WPC and other fronts have formal standing as non-governmental organizations. Of increasing importance in recent years, however, is their behind-the-scenes role as a source of trained cadres to work in Moscow-approved propaganda campaigns, a relatively discreet channel for Moscow to fund favored activities without advertising its hand, and a means of influencing broader-based umbrella organizations, such as the peace movements in Western European countries.[17]

The Agent of Influence. The extent of this type of "black" active measure is much harder to gauge than that of the more visible "gray" activities of front groups and local pro-Moscow communists. To be effective, agents of influence must remain clandestine. Once exposed, they lose all utility.

The ideal agent of influence is someone close to the Western or non-aligned nation's senior leadership; the most striking example

in recent years was the East German agent Gunther Guillaume, who was a personal assistant of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Although of primary value to East Berlin and Moscow as a source of intelligence because of his unique access to Western secrets, Guillaume could also serve as an influence agent with Brandt.

While it is tempting to label the dramatic 1985 defectors Hans-Joachim Tiegde, a senior West German counterintelligence official, and Mikhail S. Gordievsky, the KGB chief in London, as agents of influence, this seems unlikely. Both were high-level intelligence officers and presumably were excellent sources of clandestine information. It appears doubtful their utility would be jeopardized by trying to use them as influence agents.

A more plausible influence operation was the highly publicized case of Norway's Foreign Ministry press spokesman Arne Treholt, who was arrested in January 1984. Treholt was taken into custody at Oslo's airport about to depart for a clandestine meeting with his KGB handler in Vienna. Recruited during the late 1960s, Treholt rose to senior levels of the Norwegian Labor Party before becoming Foreign Ministry press spokesman in 1983. Treholt provided the KGB with classified Norwegian and NATO secrets (in 1982-83 he attended the Defense Institute, Norway's equivalent to the US National War College), and he served as an agent of influence. In this latter capacity, he furthered positions favorable to the Soviets in Norwegian political deliberations, for example, the adoption of the Soviet-sponsored Nordic nuclear free zone proposal.[18]

Influence operations also can be undertaken by less-exalted agents like French journalist Pierre-Charles Pathe, who served the Soviets from 1959 until convicted in 1980. Through subtle support for the Soviet line, Pathe tried to influence readers of his newsletter and his wide range of political contacts.[19] Another lower-level operation came to light in 1981 when Denmark declared that Arne Herloev Petersen, a freelance journalist, was providing the Soviets a covert link with the peace movement.[20] Major Levchenko also created a stir in 1982 when he publicly named a number of Japanese as Soviet agents of influence. Among the most influential were an editor of the conservative newspaper *Sankei Shinbun* and several leaders of the Japanese Socialist Party.[21]

MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION INFLUENCE OPERATIONS: DISINFORMATION

Disinformation involves various practices, including circulating false or misleading news stories, surfacing forgeries, broadcasting over clandestine radio transmitters, and spreading rumors. Whatever technique is employed, the purpose is the same: to distort the adversary's perception by gaining acceptance for some point the Soviets wish to make that is either not true or a distortion of the truth.

When mounting a disinformation operation, the KGB ideally would like to surface stories in non-communist media rather than relying on placements in the fellow-traveling or communist press. The reason is evident: spreading disinformation via untainted outlets advances the prospects for credible replay of the distorted story. However, it is no easy task to achieve publication in reputable journals, and the KGB continues to surface disinformation in pro-Soviet news outlets, such as the Bombay *Blitz*, in the hope that the bogus story will gain acceptance through repetition even though the initial report may lack credibility. The campaign to implicate the CIA in the assassination attempt on the Pope is an example of this technique. Nonetheless, a number of widely circulated non-communist journals, including *Jeune Afrique* of Paris, the Italian newsweekly *Panorama*, the influential *Times of India*, and the conservative *Jang*, Pakistan's leading Urdu language journal, have been victimized by disinformation in recent years.[22]

Because many disinformation operations need tangible "proof" to gain acceptance, the Soviets provide fabricated documents and forgeries as evidence. Indeed the Soviets have made such extensive use of forgeries of US government documents that this has become

a hallmark of their postwar disinformation operations. In 1961, then CIA Assistant Director Richard Helms told the US Senate Judiciary Committee that some 32 forgeries of official US documents had been uncovered during the preceding four years.[23] Nineteen years later, John McMahon, then head of the CIA's clandestine service, testified before the House Select Committee on Intelligence in a similar vein about two dozen forgeries that had surfaced following the establishment of the Active Measures Service in the mid-1970s.[24] According to US reports, the flow of forgeries has continued in the 1980s; more than 30 faked documents have come to light and several earlier forgeries have resurfaced. These durable fabrications include a supposed US Army field manual on destabilization (FM 30-31B) and a bogus pamphlet outlining US plans for nuclear war in Western Europe, called the Holocaust papers.[25]

The subject matter of Soviet forgeries in the 1980s ranges the globe:

- Murdered Afghan leader Amin's supposed links with the CIA (fake 1980 Embassy Islamabad telegram).[26]
- US pressure on Spain over NATO entry (forged 1981 Reagan-King Juan Carlos letter).[27]
- US-NATO pressure against the peace movement (forged 1982 Haig-Luns letter).[28]
- European gas pipeline controversy (fake 1982 US Commerce Department memo).[29]
- Possible US overthrow of Greek government (fake 1982 Clark-Stearns letter and intelligence study).[30]
- Close US-South Africa ties (bogus letter to Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick from a South African official, and two forged letters from US companies to the head of South Africa's air force, all in 1982).[31]
- US plans to overthrow the Ghana regime (fake 1983 West German Embassy report).[32]
- Destabilization of Poland (bogus 1983 Brzezinski NSC memo, and fake 1983 letter from an AFL/CIO official).[33]
- US policy toward the Third World and support for "Balkanization" of India (fake 1983 policy speech by UN Ambassador Kirkpatrick).[34]
- US assassination plan in Nigeria (bogus 1983 Embassy Lagos document).
- Alleged US hand in the papal assassination controversy (1983 forgeries of two Embassy Rome cables).

The latter two instances are fairly typical illustrations of how disinformation operations are conducted. The Nigeria operation, which was a success for the Soviets, started on 13 April 1983 when two major daily newspapers in Ibadan, the *Nigerian Tribune* and the *Daily Sketch*, carried on their front pages allegations that US Ambassador Thomas Pickering had approved plans to assassinate the major opposition candidate in Nigeria's presidential race, Chief Awolowo, and his associate, Chief Abiola.

These sensational charges were based on an alleged internal US Embassy memorandum recommending the killing of the two political leaders. Although the American Embassy in Lagos immediately denounced the document as a fabrication (the supposed author was a US Information Agency officer formerly assigned to Nigeria) and branded the *Sketch* and *Tribune* stories totally false, the allegation created a major stir in Nigeria. It was also replayed as straight news elsewhere in Africa by the Western wire services and quickly repeated by East European and Soviet media. While the story was eventually put to rest, a senior US official conceded that many in Nigeria believed the charge or at least thought it possibly true. This was so even though the text of the fake USIA document contained a telltale linguistic error, its use of the term "wet affair." In American English the phrase is meaningless; "wet affair" is, however, the euphemism for "assassination" in Soviet intelligence jargon.[35]

The papal assassination disinformation operation occurred in Italy in July 1983, and failed. A left-wing Rome newsweekly, *Pace e Guerra*, alleged in a sensationalized story that the United States, together with Italian intelligence and pro-United States elements in the Socialist Party, had orchestrated a large-scale disinformation campaign designed to

pin the blame for the assassination plot on Moscow and Sofia. The "proof" of US complicity rested on two fabricated American Embassy Rome telegrams. The first detailed the "proposed" campaign to influence West European media, while the second forged telegram expressed satisfaction with the results. This message declared, "The European media have enthusiastically developed themes along the lines anticipated: that the gunman was directed by the Bulgarian secret police; that the Bulgarians are under the total control of the KGB; that the KGB was headed at the time by the present Soviet leader [Andropov]."[36]

A prompt and convincing denial by the US Embassy squelched this disinformation gambit. The Italian press tagged the cables as bogus and labeled the effort a Soviet active measure. In its denial, the Embassy was able to point out several serious formatting errors in the forged telegrams. The fact that *Pace e Guerra* had close links with the Democratic Party of Proletarian Unity (PDUP), whose members of parliament were elected on a joint list with the Communist Party, also raised questions about the authenticity of the charges, especially as the newsweekly refused to say how it had obtained the alleged cables.[37]

Over the years the technical quality of KGB forgeries has improved. The formatting is on the whole good, usually sufficiently so to fool those unfamiliar with US government documents or unwilling to seek expert opinion. There are, however, not infrequent discrepancies and mistakes; it is difficult for an outsider, even a KGB expert, to duplicate US government documents with total accuracy given the frequent changes in form and bureaucratic jargon. While the American English in most documents is colloquial, there are occasional linguistic mistakes, such as the use of British rather than American phraseology.[38]

Many disinformation campaigns do not involve forgeries; they seek to gain public acceptance for the distortion through repetition and periodic resurfacing. Several recent examples illustrate this technique:

- A complex tale that circulated in the African press in 1981 that US, Zairian, and South African intelligence were conspiring to overthrow the Angolan government. In addition to a number of African papers, this report was carried by the *Portugal Hoje*, a Lisbon paper close to the Portuguese Socialist Party.[39]
- A campaign begun in late 1981 to blame the United States for the attempted overthrow of the Seychelles government by South Africa-based mercenaries. After Soviet media spread the word that the CIA was behind the coup, a number of African papers, including the prestigious Nairobi *Nation* and the *Lagos Daily Times*, leading dailies in Kenya and Nigeria, replayed this disinformation.[40]
- A 1983 disinformation operation falsely alleging US, Israeli, and South African cooperation to deploy cruise missiles in Africa led to stories in a number of papers despite repeated US denials.[41]
- An effort ongoing since 1982 to deflect criticism of possible Soviet use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia by charging US use of biological warfare in Afghanistan and Central America. Even though the United States promptly labeled the report which first appeared in the 2 February 1982 *Literaturnaya Gazeta* as "utterly baseless," it was later published in respected non-communist papers, including the *Times of India*, the Lahore *Jang*, and the *Muslim News* of South Africa.[42]

SIGNIFICANCE OF ACTIVE MEASURES

Active measures represent a limited but not unimportant technique which the USSR uses to advance its interests by attempting to influence foreign public opinion and attitudes. Measuring the technique's significance remains a highly subjective exercise, which many evaluators prefer to duck. Looked at broadly, there appears to be a marked difference between the effects on the Western industrial democracies and the Third World. In the West, there are plenty of signs

of Soviet activity, but little evidence that the Kremlin has achieved much substantial success in manipulating the essential political processes of democratic countries through active measures. With regard to the United States, the FBI declared in public testimony in 1982, "We do not see Soviet active measures in the United States as having a significant impact on U.S. decision-makers."[43]

Disinformation efforts appear to fare poorly in Western democracies with their free press. With a few exceptions, disinformation has largely surfaced either in sensationalist or pro-communist journals where it has little impact on public opinion. Responsible journalists and journals check out suspicious-sounding allegations or anonymous documents. They do not generally publish stories lacking supporting evidence and sourcing.

Still the Soviets have mounted a substantial effort to influence Western opinion through various active measures. One of the most dramatic is the alleged KGB sponsorship of the Athens daily *To Ethnos*, the largest newspaper in Greece. *London Daily Telegraph* and *New York Times* reporter Paul Anastasi provides a detailed and graphic account of this effort in his book, *Take the Nation in Your Hands*.[44]

In the Third World, disinformation operations have often scored bull's-eyes and the cumulative effect has helped sour public opinion against the United States and its allies. Why the dichotomy between the developed and developing world? One explanation lies with the state of the respective media. Looser professional standards of journalism in many Third World countries work to the KGB's advantage. In much of the Third World, forgeries can be floated with relative ease. There is often a willingness to accept faked documents at face value without seeking confirmation or at least offering the target an opportunity to reply. Since Third World media are often financially wobblier than those in major Western democracies, the blandishment of KGB funds is more tempting. Government control of much of the media also makes susceptibility to active measures a reflection of government political orientation.

As important, in many parts of the Third World the Soviets are able to exploit anti-American attitudes caused by long-standing policy differences with Washington. In Africa, as Robert Keeley, then US Ambassador to Zimbabwe, told *The Washington Post*, Soviet disinformation can take advantage of existing African suspicions toward US policies, particularly those relating to South Africa.[45] Disinformation operations in Africa play to and reinforce these doubts about the United States.

Similarly, Soviet disinformation takes advantage of anti-American attitudes in India, in this case stirred by US arms assistance to Pakistan. For more than a generation, the Soviets have fanned anxiety about US policies through a steady stream of disinformation spread by publications like *Blitz*, *Patriot*, and *Link* and amplified by a small but vocal pro-Moscow Communist Party of India and local pro-Soviet fronts.[46] Even though the bogus Kirkpatrick "Balkanization" speech was branded a fake by *India Today*, the country's premier newsweekly,[47] a respected Indian journalist told the author that many would believe the story because of the inclination to accept the worst about US intentions after so many years of foreign policy friction between Washington and New Delhi.

HOW BEST TO RESPOND?

Countering active measures is not an easy task. When the KGB violates local laws in active measures operations, counter-intelligence agencies have the basic responsibility. But their experience is more attuned to dealing with traditional espionage than to covert attempts to influence public opinion. Moreover, it is frequently difficult to distinguish between legal "white" or "gray" propaganda activities and illegal, clandestine, "black" operations.

Responding to disinformation also raises significant questions of judgment. If the targets remain silent, there is little incentive for Moscow and its friends to desist. But if they respond too vociferously, they may be crediting active measures with greater influence over public opinion than is the case. Generally Western governments have taken

the former approach and decided to ignore active measures even when exposed. "We do not wish to dignify a forgery with a comment," is a fairly typical response by government press spokesmen when a fabrication surfaces. The problem with silence is that it encourages the Soviets to continue the "dirty tricks" game. It ensures that active measures remain a "no lose" proposition for the Kremlin.

Viewing active measures through Soviet eyes may help in framing the response. Moscow takes an extremely long-term view of these operations. The Soviets do not necessarily seek immediate gains and are not looking for a major impact from every effort. They are satisfied that the cumulative effect of periodic successes outweighs failures and misfires and makes their considerable investment of people and money worthwhile.

A similarly long-term strategy is needed in response. The key should be a steady flow of factual information to expose active measures when this can be done in a credible manner. As former Under Secretary of State Eagleburger wrote, "They are infections that flourish only in darkness, and sunlight is the best antiseptic."[48] When governments become aware of active measures or disinformation operations directed against them, they should speak out. The best means of rendering the ground less fertile is to ensure that people, especially in the Third World, are fully aware of attempts to deceive them.

Informed publics and the media in non-communist countries will then have a chance to draw their own conclusions. Few appreciate being gulled by the deliberate distortion of the news. However, the response to active measures needs to be non-polemic and avoid hyperbole. Vague charges are not the way to proceed. Detailed supporting information is needed. Reliance on classified information which cannot be released provides a poor basis for a sustained response to active measures.

The soundest strategy for dealing with disinformation thus has two main ingredients: a steady flow of facts and lots of patience. The Soviets have been at the deception game a long time. Realistically, they are not going to desist until others ensure through repeated exposure that active measures no longer pay off.

NOTES

1. Lawrence Eagleburger, "Unacceptable Intervention: Soviet Active Measures," *NATO Review*, 31 (April 1983).
2. Wojciech Karpinski, "Agents and Exiles," *Survey*, 27 (Autumn-Winter 1983), 41-48.
3. Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game* (Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Research Corp., 1972). A more recent overview is provided in Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, *Dezinformatsia* (Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1984). This offers a useful analysis of the relationship between overt propaganda and themes stressed through active measures.
4. Bittman, pp. 39-78.
5. US Congress, House, *Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives (Washington: GPO, 1980), pp. 75-77. For an analysis of the USSR's propaganda campaign against the neutron bomb, see Steven D. Syms and Edward Snow, Jr., "Soviet Propaganda and the Neutron Bomb Decision," *Political Communication and Persuasion*, 1 (No. 3, 1981), 257-68.
6. These and other fabricated documents from the late 1970s are discussed in *Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)*. The US-Egyptian forgeries are reviewed on pp. 138-60.
7. US Congress, House, *Soviet Active Measures*, Hearings before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives (Washington: GPO, 1982); "Soviet Active Measures: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations," *State Department Special Report No. 88* (Washington: US Department of State, October 1981); "Soviet Active Measures: An Update," *State Department Special Report No. 101* (Washington: US Department of State, July 1982); "Soviet Active Measures," *State Department Special Report No. 110* (Washington: US Department of State, September 1983).
8. *State Department Special Report No. 110*, p. 1.
9. Levchenko told his story in some detail during the 1982 House Intelligence Committee hearings. He also gave a lengthy interview in *Der Spiegel* (14 February 1983). A more dramatic account of Levchenko's KGB career is contained in John Barron's *KGB Today: The Hidden Hand* (New York: Readers' Digest Press, 1983), pp. 48-194.
10. *Soviet Active Measures*, 1982 House Intelligence Committee Hearings, p. 142.
11. *Times of India*, 15 May 1984.
12. *Soviet Active Measures*, 1982 House Intelligence Committee Hearings, pp. 144, 155.
13. Bruce Vandervort, "Swiss Shut Down Soviet Bureau, Cite Subversion," *The Washington Post*, 30 April 1983, pp. 1, 24. *Neuer Zuericher Zeitung*, 30 April 1983.
14. "World Peace Council," *Department of State Foreign Affairs Note* (April 1982), p. 4. The Chandra statement originally appeared in the July 1975 *New Times*.
15. *Soviet Active Measures*, 1982 House Intelligence Committee Hearings, p. 201.
16. *Auckland Star*, 25 January 1980.
17. A thoughtful analysis of Kremlin efforts to influence European peace movements through fronts and local communist parties is contained in J. A. Emerson Vermaat's "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement," *Problems of Communism*, 31 (November-December 1982), 43-56. See also Wynfred Joshua, "Soviet Manipulation of the

European Peace Movement," *Strategic Review*, 11 (Winter 1983), 9-18.

18. "Norwegian Jailed as Spy was Trailed by FBI," *The New York Times*, 28 January 1984, p. 4; Jan Nordheimer, "Portrait of Spy as Golden Young Man," *The New York Times*, 29 January 1984, p. 10; "Norway Expels Five Russians," *The New York Times*, 2 February 1984, p. 2. A Norwegian view of the Treholt affair can be found in Thorleif Andreassen and Gunnar Moe's, *Spies and Their Objectives in Norway* (Oslo: Forlaget Atheneum, 1984).

19. *State Department Special Report No. 88*, p. 2. For an interesting analyis of the thematic content of Pathe's efforts see Shultz and Godson, pp. 134-49.

20. *State Department Special Report No. 101*, p. 4. See also John Vinocur, "KGB Officers Try to Infiltrate Antiwar Groups," *The New York Times*, 24 July 1983, pp. 1, 6.

21. Barron, pp. 173-75; Sam Jameson, "Combination of 3 Factors Creating New Japanese-Soviet Tensions," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 April 1983, p. 9; *Far East Economic Review*, 16 June 1983, pp. 46-48.

22. The 17 November 1982 *Jeune Afrique*, a newsweekly widely read in Africa, reported as factual a forged letter from Northrop Aviation to the Chief of South Africa's air force. The August 1981 *Panorama*, a major Italian newsweekly, published an account of "secret" Pentagon nuclear war plans based on the bogus Holocaust papers, a fact omitted by the article. The *Times of India*, one of India's leading English language newspapers, on 15 May 1984 carried as straight news the false report about the US's classifying blood exports on the basis of race. On 9 March 1982, the *Times of India* also reported as factual Soviet disinformation that the CIA was using the Lahore Malaria Research Center to conduct bacteriological warfare against Afghanistan. On 2 February 1983, *Jang* carried as hard news the story, based on a fabricated speech by US Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, that the US favored the "Balkanization" of India.

23. US Congress, Senate, *Communist Forgeries*, Hearings before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Washington: GPO, 1961).

24. *Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)*, 1980 House Intelligence Committee Hearings.

25. "Soviet Active Measures: Focus on Forgeries," *State Department Foreign Affairs Note* (April 1983), pp. 1-2 and figures 1 and 2.

26. The faked US Embassy Islamabad telegram "confirmed" ties between the murdered Afghan leader and the CIA. Because the agent sent to Pakistan to surface the forgery decided to defect, US authorities, rather than the Pakistani press, received the document. See p. 90 of the 1982 House Intelligence Hearings for a facsimile.

27. A forged letter from President Reagan to King Juan Carlos of Spain surfaced in Madrid in 1981 and was intended to imply US interference in Spanish deliberations on the ticklish issue of Spanish entry into NATO. A facsimile can be found in "Soviet Active Measures: An Update," *State Department Special Report No. 101*, p. 2.

28. The forged letter from NATO Commander General Haig to NATO Secretary General Luns was presumably intended to spur the anti-nuclear campaign by suggesting agreement to exert improper pressure on INF opponents. A facsimile of the faked letter is in "Focus on Forgeries," April 1983 *State Department Foreign Affairs Note*, figure 4.

29. A bogus US Department of Commerce memorandum distorts US policy to add to frictions over the gas pipeline issue. Figure 5 of "Focus on Forgeries" provides a facsimile.

30. A forged letter from then Deputy Secretary of State William Clark to Ambassador to Greece Monteagle Stearns suggests US willingness to consider a coup against the newly elected Socialist government. For a facsimile, see pp. 120-21 of *Soviet Active Measures*, 1982 House Intelligence Hearings.

31. The forged letter to Kirkpatrick from the South African press counselor implied a link between the Ambassador and the South African military intelligence. The letter is discussed in *State Department Special Report No. 110*, p. 5. Bogus letters from Northrop Corporation and Aviation Personnel International to the Chief of South Africa's air force suggest a military relationship between the United States and South Africa, illegal because of the congressionally imposed embargo in force since the 1970s. See figures 6 and 9 in "Focus on Forgeries" for facsimilies.

32. A forged West German Embassy report spoke of US plans to overthrow the Rawlings government. The allegation was carried on the front page 1 April 1983 in Ghana's leading paper, the *Peoples Daily Graphic*. See *State Department Special Report No. 110*, p. 4 for a facsimile.

33. A fake 1978 NSC memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter spoke of destabilizing Poland. This forgery appeared in the 7 February 1983 Madrid newsweekly, *Tiempo*. Forged correspondence between AFL/CIO official Irving Brown and an Italian union official later arrested as a spy for Bulgaria suggests clandestine CIA assistance for Solidarity. See *State Department Special Report No. 110*, p. 3.

34. A bogus expose of US policy toward the Third World and India, based on a forged text of a speech supposedly given by Ambassador Kirkpatrick, surfaced in the far left Indian press in January 1983. The disinformation effort was timed just before the start of a non-aligned meeting in New Delhi. See *State Department Special Report No. 110*, p. 7.

35. *State Department Special Report No. 110*, p. 4.

36. *Pace e Guerra*, 21 July 1983.

37. *Corriere della Sera*, *La Nazione*, and *Giornale*, 24 July 1983.

38. *Focus on Forgeries*, p. 2.

39. *Portugal Hoje*, 15, 23, and 24 September 1981. See also *State Department Special Report No. 101*, p. 3.

40. Ibid; *Nairobi Nation*, 6 December 1981; *Daily Times* (Lagos, Nigeria), 11 December 1981.

41. *Noticias* (Maputo, Mozambique), 29 November 1982; *Ethiopian Herald*, 13 January 1983; *Daily Mail* (Lusaka, Zambia) 9 March 1983; *Times of Zambia*, 17 March 1983. See also *State Department Special Report No. 110*, p. 5.

42. John Schidlonsky, "UM Lab Chief Forced to Leave Pakistan," *Baltimore Sun*, 9 February 1982, pp. 1, 4; *Jang* (Lahore, Pakistan), 20 February 1982; *Times of India*, 9 March 1982; *Muslim News* (Capetown), 5 May 1982. See also *State Department Special Report No. 101*, p. 3.

43. An evaluation of the impact of active measures in the United States is provided by Ed O'Malley, head of the FBI's Intelligence Division, in the 1982 House Intelligence Committee Hearings. *Soviet Active Measures*, pp. 226-27.

44. For a fuller discussion of the *Ethnos* affair, see Gordon Crovitz, "Pericles, Greece Needs You Back," *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 June 1984, p. 13; "The Anastasi Affair," *The New York Times*, 21 January 1984, p. 21; and John Tagliubue, "Witness in Trial Says Moscow Helped Finance Paper," *The New York Times*, 23 May 1984, p. 13.

45. Glenn Frankel, "Officials See Soviets between the Lines of Phony Stories about the U.S. in Africa," *The Washington Post*, 3 December 1983, p. A22.

46. Prakash Chandra, "Soviets Wage Vigorous Propaganda War in India," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 January 1982, p. 13.

47. William Claiborne, "Pro-Soviet Press in India Mounts Propaganda Drive Against the U.S.," *The Washington Post*, 17 April 1983, p. 33.

48. Eagleburger.

SOVIET OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES:

EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS

by

JOHN M. WEINSTEIN

A fundamental assumption of various domestic critics of US strategic force acquisitions traditionally has been that the deployment of increasingly capable systems, justified in the name of maintaining the balance of deterrence, actually produces two deleterious consequences. The first is that we fuel the dangerous upward spiral of the arms race, forcing the Soviet Union to match US deployments with still more deadly weapons.[1] The second consequence, which follows from the first, is that the acquisition by both superpowers of such capable instruments of destruction presents a virtually insurmountable impediment to arms control.[2] In the long run, these weapons undermine crisis stability and therefore deterrence.

The critics argue that if only the superpowers could break out of the action-reaction acquisition cycle, deterrence and global well-being would be the fruits of their efforts. And since, they argue, each superpower retains abundant strategic resources to deliver a devastating retaliatory blow,[3] the United States should strive for peace by doing whatever is required to halt the vicious nuclear acquisition cycle, even if it requires us to take the first step. Not surprisingly, this theme strikes a responsive chord with Soviet officials such as the late Defense Minister Marshal D. F. Ustinov, who argued that various US technological and military developments "forced" the Soviets to develop and deploy comparable weapon systems, its own purely defensive strategy and desires for peaceful coexistence notwithstanding.[4]

It is obvious that each side is often influenced by both the actual military developments and the perceived intentions of its adversary. Indeed, the requirement for new US weapons is often couched in terms of the Soviet threat.[5] However, we must be careful not to overstate the ability of one superpower, through unilateral moratoria, weapon dismantling, or additional deployments, to influence the acquisition strategy and behavior of the other. In short, while the arms race is most certainly interactive, a host of variables exist which are *unique to each side* and which exercise crucial if not decisive influence on its perceptions, strategy, and acquisition decisions irrespective of its adversary's actions.[6] In the case of the Soviet Union, one must focus upon a number of unique variables such as its military heritage and historical experiences, its geopolitical position, the political and institutional interests of selected domestic actors, and the strengths and weaknesses of its technological production base to develop a complete understanding of the development, current disposition, and future direction of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces and doctrine.

The Soviet Union's experiences in the Great Patriotic War (World War II) had at least two legacies for Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The first was that in light of the numerous invasions of Russian territory

across geographically unprotected eastern and western borders, the Soviet fear of the potential threats along its borders was reaffirmed and heightened, especially when its adversaries possessed nuclear weapons. This fear provided the basis for the assignment of fundamental importance to the development of regional and variable-range (i.e. regional and intercontinental) nuclear forces.[7] The second legacy was the primary influence of ground forces in general and artillery in particular upon Soviet strategic nuclear doctrine. Specifically, the Soviets' successful wartime employment of massive artillery fire at the front to create avenues of attack by neutralizing enemy fortifications, isolating enemy troops, and undermining enemy morale insured that such an operational doctrine would influence subsequent nuclear employment concepts.[8] The crucial roles of artillery in defending the homeland, achieving the decisive defeat of the enemy, and subsequently occupying enemy territory (to deny forward bases for attack by hostile forces and to facilitate postwar Soviet reconstruction) further insured the ground forces and artillery flavor of Soviet strategic doctrine and force development.

Stalin's death in 1953, a heightened Western threat, and the advent of long-range ballistic missiles brought a revolution in Soviet military affairs, resulting in the shift to a modern strategic posture (although the influence of artillery remained preeminent). Doctrinally, the Soviet Union adopted the view that war between capitalism and socialism was no longer inevitable but that if a war between the two forces occurred, it would inevitably escalate and result in a decisive defeat of the former.[9] The Soviet Union also abandoned the beliefs that victory could only be achieved by a slow, sequential process of defeating the enemy and occupying his land, and that front-line rather than rear area attacks held the key to victory.[10] The advent of long-range nuclear missiles supported the view that massed nuclear strikes simultaneously engaging front-line troops *and* rear area logistics, command and control centers, and war-supporting economic assets could accomplish Soviet strategic objectives in the early stages of a war through the timely destruction of critical targets and the undermining of enemy morale.[11] The attractiveness of the long-range missile vis-à-vis the slower and more vulnerable bomber was enhanced by its abilities to achieve timely destruction and to be held in reserve, similar to field artillery, and then committed decisively. Moreover, this elevation of the role of missiles such as the SS-1, -2, and -3 (which were controlled by Soviet ground forces) served another purpose: the implied denigration of the bomber, which comprised the backbone of the US strategic arsenal.

By the early 1970s the Soviet Union's strategic and regional nuclear forces were massive in number and increasingly secure. Soviet strategic forces had achieved a rough quantitative parity with those of the United States, thereby establishing an effective deterrent from the Soviet perspective and according equal superpower status to the USSR. In the Soviet view, Soviet equality with the United States (confirmed by SALT I) would be greatly beneficial to the correlation of forces. Not only would the United States find it increasingly difficult and dangerous to project its military power abroad, it would be deterred from resorting to military force in a futile and ultimately suicidal attempt to reverse the inevitable march of mankind to a Soviet-led socialist order.[12]

Dr. John M. Weinstein is a strategic nuclear forces analyst in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army. He holds a Ph.D. in international politics from the University of Florida, has taught at several colleges and universities, and has served as a visiting research professor at the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. He has also studied weapons employment and effects at the US Army Chemical School, the Interservice Nuclear Weapons School, and the Strategic Air Command. Dr. Weinstein's essays on strategic policy and Soviet affairs have appeared in numerous professional publications, including *Parameters*, *Arms Control Today*, and *Russia*. Dr. Weinstein is coeditor of *The Defense of the West: Strategic and European Security Issues Reappraised* (Westview Press, 1984).



CURRENT SOVIET FORCES AND DOCTRINE

From the perspective of military effectiveness, the current fourth generation of Soviet ICBMs is the equal to its current US counterpart. Indeed, many have argued that highly accurate, large-yield ICBMs such as the SS-18 and SS-19, deployed in the mid-1970s, are much superior to the Minuteman III missile with the upgraded Mark-12A guidance system.[13] Compared to Minuteman III's three multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), the SS-18 and SS-19 have ten and six MIRVs respectively. Furthermore, the high yields (550kt to 20mt) of these missiles, their latest modifications, and their large numbers (which allow multiple warheads to be aimed at each target) make them potential silo killers and therefore a dangerous threat to US land-based ICBMs and their launch control facilities, in particular, and ultimately to deterrence.[14] The high-yield, single reentry vehicle and moderate-yield MIRVed SS-18s are complemented by other ICBMs: the MIRVed SS-17 (replacing the SS-7) for area target coverage, and the MIRVed, variable-range SS-11 (mod 3) and SS-19 systems.

Being prudent planners and anticipating improvements in US strategic forces such as those mandated by President Reagan's Strategic Modernization Program, the Soviet Union has begun work on diversifying its strategic arsenal. Although still heavily dependent upon the ICBM, the Soviet Union has deployed the 16-tube Delta III SSBN (1978) armed with the longer-range, MIRVed (three to seven reentry vehicles) SS-N-18 SLBMs (approximately .76 nm CEP), and five 20-tube Typhoon SSBNs (1980) with the MIRVed (12 reentry vehicles) and more accurate SS-NX-20 SLBM, having a range of 4500 nautical miles.[15] The accuracy and range of these Soviet submarines and SLBMs enhance their reserve role and allow them to engage numerous continental US targets (e.g. a conceivable decapitation strike against the National Command Authority in Washington, bomber bases, and other soft targets). Finally, Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities are being improved with near-term deployment of air launched cruise missiles on Bear bombers, the deployment of Backfire bombers (essentially designed for theater and long-range maritime missions but capable of one-way missions against the United States with Western hemisphere recovery), and the development of the intercontinental Blackjack bomber. The regional nuclear forces of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces also have been actively expanded with systems other than the variable-range ICBMs, SLBMs, and Backfire bomber noted above. Aircraft (SU-24, Fencer), short-range nuclear forces (SS-21, -22, -23), more than 410 long-range SS-20 IRBMs, and development and testing of this latter system's follow-on (SS-28) round out the picture of what has been a robust force acquisition program over the last three decades.[16]

To this point, we have seen how the development of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces has reflected more than a reaction to US, European, and later Chinese military developments. It has also been affected by such unique factors as technological capabilities, geopolitical considerations, wartime experiences, and the influence of ground and artillery forces. The same can be said for Soviet doctrine, which also reflects the Soviet Union's unique heritage.

Simply stated, Soviet forces are designed to maintain credible deterrence while allowing the USSR to pursue its global politico-military objectives. They are also designed to discourage the "imperialist" Western powers from attacking the USSR to reverse the "inevitable" socialist victory. The Soviets maintain that if war occurs, their forces must prevail to assure national survival and to preserve socialism. In war, Soviet objectives would be threefold: (1) defend Mother Russia while maintaining control of the party and internal power structure; (2) neutralize and defeat the military adversaries while maintaining sufficient reserve forces to exercise postwar hegemony; and (3) seize and occupy vital adjacent territory to deny forward staging bases and wartime resources to the enemy while at the same time exploiting

surviving industrial economic assets to facilitate postwar Soviet recovery.[17] Conventional ground forces play a primary role in the first and third objectives, thus reflecting and preserving their traditional importance. Intercontinental and regional nuclear forces would be key to the achievement of the second objective against the United States, Western Europe, and China. Soviet doctrine extols the unanticipated and decisive commitment of massed nuclear fire against the enemy's nuclear forces and command, control, and communications facilities to limit damage to the Soviet homeland; conventional enemy military forces to support Soviet ground force objectives; and industrial, economic, and transportation assets that provide wartime support to enemy forces.[18] Hence, one observes the complementary combined-arms roles played by Soviet nuclear and conventional forces.[19] The importance of traditional artillery concepts such as unanticipated and massed fire against critical targets is an additional dominant theme in Soviet military doctrine and is considered as a key prerequisite of victory.[20]

Soviet praise of massive fire should not be confused with indiscriminant targeting, however, especially in the case of the Soviets' regional nuclear forces. In a European scenario, where the Soviets would place much value upon a quick victory and the preservation of economic assets for postwar Soviet reconstruction, the development of highly accurate warheads such as the SS-20 and its follow-on, capable of more discriminating targeting on military objectives than their predecessors, is likely to be viewed as a necessity by Soviet political and military leaders. Moreover, the desire to minimize radioactive fallout carried by the prevailing west-to-east winds over the ethnic Russian portions of the USSR undoubtedly has played a significant role in the development of accurate regional weapons to support a discriminating target policy.[21] Let there be little doubt, however, that while Soviet leaders would like to minimize fallout over the Soviet Union and facilitate postwar reconstruction, they surely recognize that war with NATO would be no less than a battle for national survival. Therefore, the former goals would never be pushed to the detriment of the latter. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's relationship with its East European "allies" (so fundamentally different from that between the United States and Western Europe) does not mandate Soviet promulgation or advocacy of the limited war, selective targeting, and escalation control tenets of US nuclear doctrine.

Soviet military writings exhibit little faith in the ability of nuclear combatants to orchestrate escalation control or to perceive firebreaks in what would be, as Clausewitz called it, "the fog of war." Rather, according to Soviet declaratory policy, the peace-war threshold is the only one that is recognizable and realistic. In light of the horrific destruction of the Soviet homeland during World War II and the acknowledgement that nuclear war would likely bring destruction and suffering orders of magnitude greater in only a fraction of the time,[22] this public position is understandable. And when one recognizes the collocation of Soviet economic, agricultural, industrial, transportation, and military assets in the same areas inhabited largely by ethnic Great Russians who control all facets of Soviet life, we discover an additional insight into why the Russian leaders may find it difficult to discriminate between a limited counter-military strike and societal retaliation.[23] A final reason exists as to why the Kremlin derides the Western concept of limited war: its derision is meant to undermine the confidence of the NATO allies in the US nuclear guarantee. By threatening total retaliation for even a limited strike against the Soviet Union, Moscow hopes to raise the doubt, once suggested by Charles DeGaulle and more recently by Henry Kissinger, that the United States would not risk annihilation for the sake of Europe.[24]

In keeping with such pronouncements about the inevitability of nuclear escalation once war begins, the Soviet Union has traditionally stressed the need to acquire, maintain, and decisively employ all available means to achieve victory at the outset of war.

Consequently, Soviet forces are frighteningly capable and redundant, and they will remain (until the large-scale deployment of US prompt hard-target killers such as the MX and the D-5 SLBM at the end of the decade) relatively secure. And, in anticipation of the growing vulnerability of hardened silos against these future US systems, the Soviets located their most capable (i.e. accurate and highly MIRVed SS-18) ICBMs in the southern-central USSR to lengthen flight times of US weapons (flying polar trajectories) and thus maximized the chance of a successful SS-18 launch while under attack.[25] The location of these weapons and the tight command and control afforded by land-based missiles makes this launch-under-attack strategy feasible, especially if Soviet forces have strategic warning of an attack as asserted by Soviet doctrine.[26]

SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR-FIGHTING

A crucial question confronts the student of Soviet strategic forces and doctrine: namely, do the Soviets really believe that they could fight and win a nuclear war?[27] Since the mid-1970s, various analysts have concluded that in certain scenarios, the Soviet Union might perceive that a preemptive attack against the United States constituted its least unpleasant alternative,[28] citing the importance of surprise, massed firepower, and the expectation of victory in Soviet military and political doctrine, as well as Soviet familiarity with and tolerance to deprivation and suffering. Undoubtedly, the Moscow leadership would recognize the unprecedented destruction that might be visited upon Mother Russia in a retaliatory strike. However, some analysts speculate that Soviet active defense (i.e. anti-ballistic missile and air) and passive civil defense, combined with a successful damage-limiting SSBN attack on the US National Command Authority and an SS-18 and -19 two-on-one strike against US hardened ICBM silos, launch control facilities, and undispersed bombers and SSBNs could immobilize or deter by attrition a US response (due to larger Soviet reserve forces) or punish so severely any US attempted retaliation that the USSR would emerge from such an exchange in a better position than its adversary.[29] In any event, LTG William Odom, former Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and current Director of the National Security Agency, has argued that the USSR's ongoing emphasis on war-fighting (rather than the Western view of deterrence which extols retaliation) increasingly permits the Soviets to control the politico-military scenario. This growth shows few signs of slowing and would, in Odom's view, facilitate that country's pursuit of its politico-military objectives in most conceivable scenarios.[30]

Soviet spokesmen would refute this line of reasoning, noting the defensive nature of their declared policy and nuclear arsenal. Inasmuch as the triumph of socialism is guaranteed by the laws of history, in their eyes, there is no incentive to strike and invite savage retaliation unless it becomes apparent that the imperialists are preparing to do so to alter the course of history.[31]

Additional and less disingenuous arguments lead one to question the validity of the worst-case scenario outlined above. It is unlikely that the conservative Soviet leaders entertain any delusions of meaningful victory in a full-scale exchange with the United States. A damage-limiting strike against the United States could not guarantee that US forces would not launch on warning, leaving incoming Soviet warheads to engage empty silos. Furthermore, if a crisis preceeded the attack as Soviet doctrine asserts, US bomber and submarine forces (the latter carrying more than 50 percent of all US strategic warheads) would have been dispersed, thereby insuring the maximum number of arriving US strategic weapons.[32] And as President Reagan's strategic modernization improves each leg of the Triad with more capable platforms and weapons; insures command, control, and communications (C^3) connectivity and accelerated operations; and explores the expansion of US defenses (thereby complicating Soviet attack planning and reducing confidence in the outcome), the certainty of this deadly calculus probably

appears even more grave in Soviet exchange calculations. This argument becomes even more compelling if, as I have argued elsewhere, Soviet civil defenses are incapable of mitigating the terrible effects of nuclear war and cannot guarantee the Soviets' most critical national objectives: the continued integrity of the multinational Soviet empire and the continued national control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[33] As far as reading the tea leaves of Soviet military literature to divine Soviet intentions and philosophy, Robert Arnett, a Soviet force specialist on the Army General Staff, reminds us how difficult this exercise can be.[34] Noted Soviet military theoreticians such as Ye. Rybkin, who wrote that while "war is always the continuation of politics, it cannot always serve as its weapon,"[35] echo the view held by many in the West that beyond deterring an adversary's attack, nuclear weapons offer little utility for the achievement of more positive foreign policy initiatives.[36] While portions of Soviet military literature discuss the necessity of victory, one should not be too quick to conclude that the USSR believes it could actually win in any meaningful sense of the word. Such a cautionary note is supported by several considerations. First, the Soviets do not state what type of victory (Phyrric?) they expect. More recently, influential military leaders such as the late Defense Minister Ustinov, his successor, and the new Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, have said in effect that the concept of victory in nuclear war no longer bears true meaning.[37] Indeed, convincing argumentation has been presented that an internal Soviet debate between the "war-fighters" and those leading civilian and military leaders who deny, in the words of Ustinov, the "possibility of surviving or even winning a nuclear war," or that nuclear war could remain limited, has been won by the latter. The rather abrupt and unceremonious September 1984 dismissal of General Nikolai Ogarkov, whose *Always Ready in Defense of the Fatherland* espoused war-fighting views that flew in the face of the opinions of Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, Andrei Gromyko, and Ustinov may be viewed as evidence that the Soviet Union's senior civilian leadership (which controls military promotions at the highest level) was unwilling to countenance the more radical war-fighting views of Ogarkov and the unlimited force-building requirements they imply.[38] Furthermore, the Soviet Union's senior civilian leadership, traditionally concerned with the rise of "Bonapartism," demonstrated most forcefully by Ogarkov's removal that it is unwilling to tolerate such independent outspokenness. A second factor which must be remembered in reviewing Soviet military literature is that the discussion of victory in Soviet military literature serves certain extraneous, nonmilitary purposes (such as promoting certain bureaucratic interests). Third, various military and ideological factors (i.e. maintaining morale and discipline and not undermining socialist theory of inevitable victory or the theoretical primacy of politics over technology) mandate the constant attention to victory.[39] Finally, recent statements by numerous leaders of the Soviet scientific community to the effect that nobody would survive a "nuclear winter" induced by nuclear war are an interesting recent departure from the traditional Soviet Academy of Sciences position to the contrary.[40] In short, while selected and especially older Soviet political and military rhetoric may not endorse and may even deride deterrence by punishment, the statements of recent and current political and military leaders clearly recognize its reality. The question faced by Soviet force planners, then, is what must be acquired to maintain the deterrent balance and to support crisis stability into the 21st century.

FUTURE OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC FORCES

The introduction of this essay suggested that one should not focus exclusively on US and regional military developments when interpreting Soviet force structure decisions and doctrinal development. However, it was also acknowledged that such developments often exert a crucial stimulus upon Soviet strategic forces.

Unhappily for the Kremlin, it currently confronts numerous military, political, and economic developments that simultaneously define and yet constrain future force requirements. The most significant of these developments is the determined and substantial simultaneous nuclear modernization programs of the United States and those of the Soviet Union's regional European and Chinese adversaries.

These modernization projects are particularly frightening in the Soviets' view inasmuch as they are seen as the results of coordinated US efforts to encircle the Soviet Union with hostile nuclear states. General Ogarkov's view of this blueprint for the elimination of socialist power is illustrated in his 1982 treatise on Soviet security requirements:

> The various operations and acts of sabotage [against] the USSR and other countries of the socialist community and against the progressive forces of the world are of a coordinated nature, linked by a single design. The main goal of the U.S. imperialist is, gradually, consistently, by any means and methods, to weaken and undermine socialism as a system, and, as a result, to establish their global dominance.[41]

This same position was presented by Defense Minister Ustinov in a 12 July 1984 *Pravda* article:

> The United States is drawing other countries in different regions of the world within the orbit of its military preparations and is trying to set up new military blocs. The construction of new military bases and enlargement of the existing ones around the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community is being continued.[42]

After 15 years of piecemeal improvements to US strategic forces, President Reagan has committed the United States to an ambitious comprehensive program of strategic modernization. Within the next ten years, the United States plans to deploy the highly accurate and heavily MIRVed Peacekeeper (MX); the highly accurate, mobile, single-warhead small ICBM (Midgetman); two new bombers with improved penetrability and armed with hard-target-capable, air-launched cruise missiles; and at least ten additional Trident SSBNs with the hard-target-capable D-5 SLBM. Simultaneously, the United States is improving its C^3 connectivity and endurance and initiating a comprehensive program of strategic defenses. All of these improvements portend a long-term threat to the survivability of Soviet land-based ICBMs in fixed silos and to Soviet ICBM effectiveness. Because the Soviet Union chose to retain the greatest part of its strategic arsenal in these missiles (70 percent) rather than pursue the extensive decentralization and diversification of its Triad as did the United States, it is hardly surprising that the Soviet Union views these developments with such alarm.[43] Furthermore, the continued emphasis of Presidents Carter and Reagan toward a more credible war-fighting posture similar to that of the Soviet Union makes these US initiatives doubly disconcerting. Official Soviet pronouncements stress the deteriorating effect that these developments have upon the superpowers' ability to preserve peace. For instance, a February 1982 statement by Leonid Brezhnev maintained that "never before, since the end of World War II, has the situation been so serious."[44] Elsewhere, Soviet spokesmen have suggested that the current US military threat to the USSR is comparable to the Nazi threat of the 1930s.[45]

At the same time, regional developments compound the threat and guarantee that maintaining and developing forces to counter regional adversaries will also remain a high priority of Soviet force planners. Specifically, England has decided to replace its 20-year-old Polaris SSBNs with the more capable modern Trident boats armed with longer-range and more accurate D-5 SLBMs. France is expanding its SSBN fleet, deploying a new intermediate-range Pluton SSM, relying more extensively on nuclear rather than conventional forces, and seeking closer military cooperation with NATO in general and with, in the Soviet view, "neo-fascist, militaristic

and revanchist"[46] West Germany in particular. Third, NATO's support for the 1979 ministerial decision to deploy 464 ground-launched cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II missiles in the absence of progress in the INF talks resulted in a development even more distasteful to the Soviets than the timely modernization of NATO's aging systems, namely the Alliance's conspicuous display of political solidarity and support for the United States. Finally, the Chinese recently took a great leap toward making their C^3 to far-flung military border outposts and forces more reliable and secure and toward deploying a more capable three-stage booster for their ICBMs. The April 1984 successful launch of a communications satellite on a three-stage booster with a greatly refined guidance system is, without a doubt, demonstrative of propulsion and guidance capabilities very much superior to the 1980 test flight of a two-stage, 6200-mile-range ICBM. Chinese statements to the effect that PRC-USSR relations would not return to the cordiality of the early 1950s, nationalism in the Soviet Far East, and numbers of vulnerable Soviet assets east of the Urals provide additional causes for concern in the Kremlin, especially in light of the alleged conspiracy of the United States, Japan, and China to encircle the Soviets in that region: "The expansion of military-political ties between the U.S., China, and Japan, which is more and more advancing in the direction of militarization, creates a long-term military threat to peace in the Far East."[47]

These distressing military developments are occurring against worrisome political and economic backdrops. At home, the regime of Secretary Gorbachev, still including numerous gerontocrats, faces: internal squabbling pitting pro-military, pro-heavy-industry "metal eaters" against the advocates of economic reform (decentralization and greater consumerism); a stagnating economy due to a woefully inefficient agricultural system, steadily falling yields from investment, declining labor productivity rates, manpower shortages, foreign exchange shortages, and the burdens of empire; and increasing demands for a massive national redistribution of wealth from the nationalistic and demographically growing central Asian republics. Abroad, in addition to the souring of US-USSR detente and the previously described political problems with the PRC and NATO, the Soviet Union is facing increasingly restive Eastern European allies. While the Soviet Union has controlled problematic allies in the past, it finds the current situation unique in that some of its most trusted and conservative allies (East Germany and Bulgaria) are exploiting the Soviet leadership's immobilization of the last decade to assert their own greater autonomy and to maintain critically required improved economic relations with the West. Planned visits to West Germany by the GDR's Honecker[48] and Bulgaria's Zhivkov, new economic accords in return for GDR human rights concessions, GDR and Hungarian statements questioning the need for new Soviet theater nuclear deployments and expressing the need for *both* parties to return to the LRINF and START talks, continuing popularity of Solidarity in Poland combined with the Polish Workers' Party's crisis of confidence, and Romania's participation in the Olympics are more than embarrassing to the CPSU. They generate a crisis of confidence that goes to the very heart of the Soviet security equation. Thus, the Soviets see distressing signs on the horizon: expanded intercontinental and regional threats combined with increasing difficulty in marshaling the economic and political resources to deal with them.

These conditions present the Soviet Union with two strategies, both pursued either singly or collectively in the past, for maintaining national security: arms control and possibly even the reestablishment of detente on one hand, or a return to an unconstrained arms race with the West on the other.

Powerful incentives exist for the Soviet Union to improve superpower relations and to pursue arms control with the United States. The economic problems besetting that massive and inefficient economy could be alleviated with an influx of Western capital, trade, and technology. Certainly, the Kremlin

would prefer to avoid a costly arms race in light of its current economic conditions and political stagnation. Soviet spokesmen clearly recognize the dangerous economic consequences attending a heightened arms race with the United States. Oleg Bykov, deputy director of the Institute of World Economy and International Order, declared in a 1981 interview in the Italian newspaper *La Republica*, that while the USSR will do whatever is necessary to maintain its defense capability, "There is no doubt that this 5-year period and probably the next, too, will be among the most adverse in our recent history . . . . It is true that our domestic problems will become increasingly difficult the more we are forced to increase military spending."[49]

While this position is popular with advocates of greater consumerism, such as Politburo members Mikhail Gorbachev and Nikolai Tikhanov, some influential members of the military elite may also favor strategic arms control for other reasons:

> Soviet military economists themselves are raising questions as to whether the Soviet economy can stand a further diversion of resources to meet ongoing military requirements without irreparable damage to the base on which all Soviet military power depends. A. I. Pozharov, in a Ministry of Defense monograph published in early 1981 entitled *The Economic Bases of the Defense Might of a Socialist State*, linked in specific terms the relationship between the level of military spending and the rate of economic growth. He argued that excessive military expenditures "could decelerate the development of the very bases of military power—the economy—and therewith inflict irreparable damage on the defense capability."[50]

In a 9 May 1984 interview in the Soviet military newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda*, then Chief of Soviet General Staff Ogarkov presented an additional dimension of the military spending argument. He noted that emerging-technology conventional weapons are approaching nuclear weapons in effectiveness and that advanced conventional munitions are capable of changing "established notions of the methods and forms of armed struggle and even the military might of the state."[51] His interview suggested that the Soviet Union has neglected the development of critical non-nuclear weapon technology. He also maintained that military men had to overcome inertia and conservatism to generate a shift of resources to this area. Such comments are likely to find favor within Soviet ground and non-nuclear strategic forces and are quite consistent with the Soviet combined all-arms approach to military operations. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely in a society that places so high a premium on a unified public postwar and approval of "controversial" statements by luminaries that Ogarkov's prescriptions had not been reviewed and supported by powerful colleagues within the Soviet political and military hierarchies. Indeed, Malcolm Mackintosh, a leading British expert on Soviet politico-military affairs, wrote in a recent essay:

> When we recall that all material published or quoted by serving military officers in the press, on television or at international conferences is cleared with the Chief Political Directorate, I am forced to the conclusion that while differences of opinion probably exist and style and emphasis may change, the military's public stance on these defense issues is at one with the Party's.[52]

Nevertheless, the senior military leadership is thought to oppose significant reductions of Strategic Rocket Force spending levels and to favor the continuation of priority spending on traditional "heavy metal" items such as tanks and artillery.[53] Thus it is unclear what actual acquisition strategy is to be pursued by the Soviet military. To the extent that the views of the traditionally powerful advocates of ground force modernization find favor in the Politburo, and if it is true (as argued above) that the advocates of war-fighting in its more radical and optimistic form are out of favor with the Soviet Union's ruling civilian and military leadership, we may

observe Soviet arms control negotiators finding it easier to accept some reductions in their ICBM force as a *quid pro quo* for US bomber or SSBN concessions, a reduction in US regional (European) forces, or a reduction in US SDI initiatives.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union may decide to embark upon a major new arms buildup as a result of significant domestic arms control considerations. Regarding the former, Soviet economists have suggested that as a result of certain domestic developments (e.g. budget deficit and social welfare disruption) and international economic developments, the United States may be unable to stay the course of an arms race with the Soviet Union:

> Staking their plans on exhausting others with the arms race, increasing tension, threatening to change the cold war to a hot war, the U.S. leaders have obviously exaggerated and are beginning to feel the results. Without dramatization and without using excessive epithets, all the burdens of such a course have led to more difficulties in the U.S. economy. The United States, of course, remains the most powerful country in the capitalist world. It is a very rich country. However, everybody, and not just professional economists and analysts from computer centers, can see that this arms race is too expensive even for the rich United States.[54]

As far as arms control considerations are concerned, the Soviets may feel either that the President cannot assure Senate passage of an arms control treaty, as in SALT II, or that the United States has embarked upon a course to regain strategic superiority and is uninterested in arms control. In either event, the Soviet Union probably feels that the US technological advantage and ongoing force modernization do not allow the Kremlin the luxury to wait to see whether the negotiations are successful. In any event, deterioration of US-Soviet relations, substantiated by a new arms race, could have a useful domestic effect. A heightened sense of threat would rationalize continuing consumer deprivation and possibly rally domestic support around the CPSU and the military in a time of potential crisis. The recent growth of ostentatious public support for the late tyrant Josef Stalin is interpreted by many as a public desire for discipline instead of corruption and getting things done instead of immobilization. Such a public attitude would be conducive to the "rally round the Party" strategy suggested above. Indeed, there have been numerous statements advocating the need to "psychologically steel" the population through increased and more effective indoctrination and the need for stimulating "hatred" for the enemy.[55]

The actual course to be chosen by the Soviet Union probably lies somewhere between these two extremes. Domestic exigencies and a fear of another costly and potentially destabilizing arms race will make arms control attractive while the substantial influence of the military in the political arena, the continuing influence of the metal-eaters and the design bureaus, and the necessity of rationalizing social shortcomings (rather than making more explosive economic reforms) will insure that Soviet strategic nuclear modernization continues. The question is, what are the likely characteristics of future Soviet forces?

The Soviet Union's attempt to deal with the long-term threat to ICBM survivability is likely to incorporate numerous palliatives. To insure that Soviet systems which would provide lucrative targets for US "use or lose" forces in a crisis are not caught in their silos, improvements in Soviet early warning and C^3 as well as higher missile alert rates would be prudent Soviet responses. Hardening its fixed-site ICBMs to improve survivability against the United States' forthcoming more accurate and higher-yield MX and D-5 ballistic missiles is another likely candidate. Although the Soviet Union seems to prefer the lower operating costs, superior accuracy, and tighter command and control afforded by fixed-site missiles, the Soviets will continue to develop mobile single and MIRVed ICBMs such as the old SS-16 and the SS-24 and SS-25 currently undergoing deployment and development.[56] A final likely direction in

the Soviet ICBM force is the continuation of variable-range missiles to satisfy regional and intercontinental requirements.

An additional means of improving strategic force survivability will be undertaken in the SSBN and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) areas. The deployment of the new Typhoon-class SSBN and the longer-range, MIRVed SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-NX-23 SLBMs, though still problematic for command and control, will improve SSBN coverage of the United States. Furthermore, the Soviets can be expected to pursue ASW improvements, not only to improve their heretofore dismal coverage of the US SSBN threat, but more importantly, to protect their own strategic submarines. Toward this end, strategic choke points, an obstacle to Soviet SSBN operations in light of SLBM range limitations, will be turned to their benefit as a means of helping to keep US ASW assets from their prey.

As prudent military planners, Soviet strategists and force developers are loathe to consider strategic offensive nuclear forces in a vacuum. The USSR's military history and its doctrinal perspective that seeks the synergism of all military forces make it likely that research and development on strategic defenses, both active and passive, will continue to receive generous support and high-level attention. This attention is designed to maximize US perceptions of unacceptable exchange calculations that would attend a failure of deterrence and thus maximize the USSR's ability to translate its military power into leverage supporting its political objectives.

In short, future Soviet offensive strategic acquisitions are likely to be characterized more by continuity than by radical change. Economic constraints, a missile design process geared to modifying and improving existing systems, and the continuing primacy of the artillery tradition within the preeminent Strategic Rocket Forces all support this assessment. While the Soviet Union will continue to respond to the United States as well as the regional force developments of its adversaries, its own programs will continue to reflect a set of unique domestic factors. US arms control initiatives will be pursued when advantageous, but the West is well-advised not to overestimate the extent to which it can determine Soviet force decisions. The strategic regional and intercontinental nuclear forces of the USSR will remain modern and potent, irrespective of the desires and actions of the United States.

NOTES

1. D. F. Ustinov, "To Avert the Threat of Nuclear War," *Pravda*, 12 July 1982, p. 4.
2. Soviet statements on this subject are found in *Whence the Threat to Peace* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1982) and *How to Avert the Threat to Europe* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983). A consistent statement of this view in the United States is found in the Center for Defense Information's *Defense Monitor*, a newsletter published approximately ten times a year.
3. See Fred M. Kaplan, *Dubious Specter: A Skeptical Look at the Soviet Nuclear Threat* (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1980), pp. 4, 40-48, for a persuasive refutation of the "window of vulnerability" thesis.
4. Ustinov.
5. For the most explicit statement linking US defense requirements to the Soviet threat, see *Soviet Military Power*, 4th ed. (Washington: GPO, April 1985).
6. Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, *Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1982) offer an excellent analysis of the unique factors affecting Soviet nuclear force development. Also see Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 32-42; and Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Thought," *International Security*, 3 (Fall 1978), 146-48.
7. Berman and Baker, pp. 2, 14.
8. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
9. See Ermarth.
10. See V. D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, ed. Harriet Fast Scott, 3d ed. (New York: Crane Russak, 1975), p. 242; and N. A. Sbitov, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Its Results," in William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott, eds., *The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs* (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1968), pp. 28-29.
11. Sokolovskiy, pp. 11, 193-94; Berman and Baker, p. 25.
12. John Collins, *US-Soviet Military Balance, 1960-1980* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), p. 116.
13. *Soviet Military Power*, 1985, pp. 29-30.
14. *Can the US Catch Up? The US Soviet Military Balance* (Washington: Committee on the Present Danger, November 1984), pp. 14-17.
15. Berman and Baker, pp. 106-07. Also see *The Military Balance, 1984-1985* (London: IISS, 1984), p. 134.
16. *Soviet Military Power*, 1985, pp. 36-41; *The Military Balance, 1984-1985*, p. 134.
17. William T. Lee, "Soviet Targeting Strategy and SALT," *Air Force Magazine*, 61 (September 1978), 121-25. Also see Sokolovskiy, pp. 282, 285.
18. Sokolovskiy, pp. 13, 284; Berman and Baker, pp. 19, 32-33.
19. Berman and Baker, p. 10.

20. For an excellent discussion of the role of surprise and the use of all weapons in Soviet military doctrine, see J. A. Stevens and Henry S. Marsh, "Surprise and Deception in Soviet Military Thought: Part 1," *Military Review*, 62 (June 1982), 2-11. Noted Soviet military theorist V. Savkin notes that "use of surprise brings success in a battle or operation . . . . As a result of the stunning effects of surprise . . . and decisive defensive operations by Soviet troops, the enemy's capabilities are sharply lowered and the correlation of forces changes immediately. He may panic and his morale [be] crushed." *The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics* (Soviet View), translated under the auspices of the US Air Force (Washington: GPO, 1972), pp. 230, 232-33.

21. Berman and Baker, p. 29. Also see Lee, p. 124.

22. Ye. Rybkin, "On the Nature of a Nuclear Missile War," *Kommunist Vooruzhenukh Sil*, No. 17 (September 1965). Also see Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking With Moscow* (New York: Knopf, 1985), pp. 286-87; G. Arbatov, "The Impasse of the Policy of Force," *Problemy Mirai Sotsializma*, No. 2 (February 1974); and V. M. Berezhkov, "Detente Prospects and Soviet-American Relations," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Idelogiya*, 21 August 1975, pp. 3-14, who notes that "universal war can no longer be regarded as a means of policy because of the destructiveness of the weapons."

23. John M. Weinstein, "The Strategic Implications of Civil Defense," in Robert Kennedy and John M. Weinstein, eds., *The Defense of the West: Strategic and European Security Issues Reappraised* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 89-93.

24. Henry Kissinger, "The Future of NATO," *The Washington Quarterly*, 2 (Autumn 1979), 6-7. Also see M. Dobbs, "French Debate Role of Atomic Force," *The Washington Post*, 24 April 1985, p. 27.

25. See *Soviet Military Power*, p. 26.

26. Kaplan, p. 28, cites the low alert rates of Soviet strategic submarines and bombers as evidence that the USSR expects to receive sufficient strategic warning to generate its forces. Also see Berman and Baker, p. 37.

27. For an affirmative answer, see Richard Pipes, "The Soviet Strategy for Nuclear Victory," *Commentary*, 64 (July 1977), 21-34. Shevchenko, pp. 286-87 suggests the opposite. Also, for numerous Soviet statements to the contrary, see Mose L. Harvey, Michael Deane et al., *Developments in Soviet Nuclear and Other Policies Relating to United States Security During the First Eighteen Months of the Reagan Administration, January 20, 1981-July 31, 1982*, a report submitted to the Director, Defense Nuclear Agency under Contract Number DNA-OR1-81-C-0239 (Washington: Advanced International Studies Institute, 30 November 1982). Hereinafter, *AISI Study*.

28. Shevchenko, p. 369. "Nuclear war could only be a last resort, to be initiated solely if the Soviets were fully convinced that the very existence of the nation was at stake, and if there appeared to be no alternatives."

29. Pipes; Collins, p. 117; Raymond Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Arms Control in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, 3 (Summer 1978), 114.

30. William E. Odom, "The Soviet Approach to Nuclear Weapons: A Historical View," *Annals* (AAPSS), 469 (September 1983), 117-34. Also see *AISI Study*, p. 35.

31. Shevchenko, p. 369. Also *AISI Study*, p. 25, and Ustinov.

32. Desmond Ball, "Counterforce Targeting: How New? How Viable?" *Arms Control Today*, 11 (February 1981).

33. Weinstein, pp. 88-93.

34. Robert L. Arnet, "Soviet Attitudes Towards Nuclear War: Do they really think they can win?" *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2 (September 1979), 172-91.

35. Rybkin.

36. The essence of deterrence is the prevention of a situation. It is an example of "negative power" as opposed to positive power, in which weapons facilitate the achievement of gains such as territory or the resolution of disputes.

37. G. Weickhardt, "Ustinov vs. Ogarkov," *Problems of Communism*, 34 (January-February 1985), 80-81.

38. Ibid. Also see "Ogarkov demotion could affect arms talks," *Free Press International*, 16 January 1985, p. 1.

39. Kaplan, pp. 18-20. Arnet, pp. 175-77.

40. "Soviet Study Says Weapons of 1 Sub Could End All Life," *Baltimore Sun*, 27 July 1984, p. 2.

41. Cited in *AISI Study*, p. 89.

42. Ustinov.

43. Kaplan, pp. 55-58.

44. Quoted in *AISI Study*, p. 7.

45. Ibid., p. 35. For instance, a cartoon in a 1984 issue of *Krokodil* (No. 17, 1984), the Soviet humor magazine, is captioned "Seance at the Pentagon" and shows a Hitler-like specter holding a banner that reads "Anti-Communism." See H. Gelman, "Rise and Fall of Detente," in *Problems of Communism*, 34 (March-April 1985), 64.

46. *AISI Study*, p. 35.

47. Quoted in ibid, p. 89.

48. What was particularly noteworthy about the Honecker visit to the FRG was not its cancellation under Soviet pressure but, rather, the two-month duration of the East German's resistance to Soviet pressures.

49. Quoted in *AISI Study*, p. 86. Also see John M. Weinstein, "All Features Grate and Stall: Soviet Strategic Vulnerabilities and the Future of Deterrence," in Kennedy and Weinstein, pp. 39-76.

50. *AISI Study*, p. 86.

51. Nikolai V. Ogarkov, "The Defense of Socialism: Historical Experience and the Present Day," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 9 May 1984, pp. 2-3.

52. Malcolm Mackintosh, "Power in the Kremlin: Politics and the Military," *RUSI*, 129 (December 1984), 11.

53. Weickhardt.

54. *AISI Study*, p. 74.

55. "The Vigilance Bequeathed by Lenin," *Kraznaya Zvezda*, 29 September 1983, p. 2. This article promotes the psychological preparation of Soviet troops and the population in light of a renewed and heightened threat emanating from the US attempt to achieve military superiority over the USSR. Also see *AISI Study*, p. 94.

56. This development has required the development of a ballistic missile of physically smaller dimensions, thus encouraging the major missile design bureaus to develop solid fuel propulsion systems (to improve missile efficiency, mobility, hardness, and safety while lowering operating costs) and smaller, more accurate reentry vehicles.



SOVIET THINKING ON THE NEXT LAND WAR

by

HUNG P. NGUYEN

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Writing in the Soviet General Staff journal *Voyennaya Mysl'* in 1968, Marshal Sokolovskii and Major General Cherednichenko argued that theory had to anticipate possible changes in the methods of conducting war by 10 or 15 years, roughly the time needed to develop and introduce the most important types of new and improved weapons.[1] Specifically, they called for essential changes in military art to deal with the contingencies of a limited nuclear war fought with both conventional and nuclear weapons, or of a general and relatively protracted nuclear war.[2] As it turned out, during the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, a sustained buildup of all types of conventional and nuclear weapons did occur, as well as corresponding changes in operational concepts and force structure. In fact, the character and scale of this buildup seemed to bear out Sokolovskii's prognosis in 1968. Together with the thorough integration of nuclear weapons, including nuclear-capable artillery, into the force structure, the Soviets have introduced new and improved conventional weapons and operational concepts to put into being Tukhachevskii's theory of deep offensive operations developed in the 1930s.

Judging by Sokolovskii's formula, the late 1970s should have witnessed further revisions in Soviet military doctrine in response to any reassessment of the character of a future war or anticipation of a new cycle of weapons development. In a book published in 1980, top Soviet military historians began to refer to NATO's renewed emphasis on the conventional defense since 1976 and cited NATO sources on the possibility of a "total conventional war" in Europe and "technological leaps" leading to new conventional weapons that match nuclear ones in destructive power.[3] Marshal Ogarkov, the Soviet Chief of the General Staff from 1977 to 1984, also pointed to this development in 1978 when he referred to the continuing contradiction "between the massing of forces at selected points and their destruction through firepower."[4] In July 1982 Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov declared that "in the training of the armed forces ever greater attention will now be paid to the tasks of preventing a military conflict from developing into a nuclear one," indicating that the conventional options in Soviet strategy were receiving greater emphasis.[5] In fact, according to Lieutenant General Kir'yan, the Soviet force development process is now seen to be governed by "the possibility of conducting military operations only with the use of conventional weapons under conditions of constant threat of the probable enemy's resort to weapons of mass destruction," and thus "the preeminence of one type of weapon to the detriment of others cannot be allowed."[6]

There is evidence that the leap forward in the development of conventional firepower,

together with the possibility that a future war could remain conventional, prompted some serious rethinking and debate on the character of the next land war and its implications for Soviet offensive strategy during Ogarkov's tenure. Soviet thought, and second thought, on the deep battle—the centerpiece in the Soviet conception of land warfare—thus demands our attention.

THE DEEP BATTLE IN THE NEXT LAND WAR

The modern followers of Tukhachevskii, Marshals Babadzhanyan and Losik and Major Generals Krupchenko and Radzievskii, were the main proponents of the concept of mobile tank forces and were, not surprisingly, leading members of the tank establishment. Based on the works of Babadzhanyan, Losik, and Krupchenko, Richard Simpkin has provided an excellent treatment of Tukhachevskii's turning operation concept.[7] Exploiting the breakthrough of a section of the defense, highly independent forward tank formations are funneled through the gap to achieve a rapid thrust into the depth of the defense in coordination with deep artillery strikes and air attacks. These tank forces then act as a lever turning on a moving fulcrum composed of the all-arms main forces, which also serve as the "magnetic steamroller" that holds opposing forces forward and crushes them.[8] According to Radzievskii, during the latter half of the Second World War, at the front level, the Mobile Groups performing the function of the lever were composed of one, two, or sometimes even three tank armies.[9] In general, the Mobile Groups that developed the success of the all-arms front were formed at the army level, whereas those that did so for the all-arms army were formed at the corps level.[10] At the operational level, therefore, the functions performed by these Mobile Groups required formations larger than a tank division. The recent organization of two tank divisions into a corps-like structure indicated that this formation will comprise the Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs) of the future.[11] On the echeloning of these forces, if the breakthrough was required only against a defense that was hastily organized with little depth, the Mobile Groups could belong to the first echelon of the offensive formations.[12]

Ogarkov himself was the leading critic of the modern application of Tukhachevskii's "deep battle," but not of the concept of mobile force itself. His emphasis on the effect of firepower on the modern battlefield was shared and developed further by Major Generals I. Vorob'yev and N. Kuznetsov. An important assumption underlying the view of this school was stated by Major General Vorob'yev in a theoretical article in *Voyennaya Mysl'* in 1980. According to Vorob'yev, of the triad of firepower, strike, and mobility, firepower is the main "driving force" in the evolution of forms and methods of conducting combat operations and has become even more important with the great improvements in the range, speed, mobility, yield, and precision of the means of firepower. Firepower also provides the impetus for changes in troop disposition and echeloning, in forms of combat actions and mobility to avoid enemy fire.[13] On the implications of recent developments in conventional firepower for Soviet strategic planning, Major General Kuznetsov stated in *Voyennaya Mysl'* in 1984,

> Changes in the character of war in general, especially in the forces and means of conducting war, in the forms and methods of strategic actions, have a direct effect on the construction of plans to rebuff a surprise attack . . . . The constant improvements in the destructive capabilities of not only nuclear but also conventional weapons have led to the unprecedented destructiveness of military activities at every level. A situation in which massive casualties are incurred due to the lack of in-depth research on protective measures cannot be accepted . . . . Problems of redisposition of troops, of securing the freedom of action for troop groupings, are those that need to be studied more deeply.[14]

Moreover, the impact of long-range conventional power on the traditional strategic principle of concentration of forces at the

decisive place and time is such that "while conducting combat with long-range conventional means, it is possible to prepare and carry out within a short period *fire strikes* throughout the depth of the formation of large enemy groupings and create a decisive impact on the course of the operation."[15] The critical rethinking by the school of firepower on the current application of the concept of mobile tank forces was thus centered on two key issues: the effects of new developments in firepower on the future mechanized battle, and the relative balance between offense and defense.

FIREPOWER AND THE FUTURE MECHANIZED BATTLE

In 1978, Ogarkov called attention to current developments of "qualitatively new types of weapons and equipment, as well as the improvement of conventional, 'classic' means of combat and the sharp increase in their combat potentials." He argued that the contradictions between offense and defense, between the massing of forces at selected points and their destruction through firepower, and between the "requirements of the armed forces for costly weapons and equipment and the economic potentials of the state" are among the most basic forms of contradictions in armed struggle.[16] Pointing out the dynamic nature of developments in these three areas, Ogarkov thus signaled the opening of a debate—in anticipation of a new cycle of weapons development—on basic principles of military science, similar to the call made by Sokolovskii in 1968. Ogarkov refrained from discussing the latter two themes at length (the Soviet mobilization experience in World War II was briefly mentioned) but raised discreet questions about the relationship between offense and defense.

Stressing that "the age-old struggle between the means of attack and defense is one of the causes for the development of the means of combat, and together with them the methods of conducting combat operations," he went on to argue that at a certain point the quantitative growth of new weapons may lead to qualitative changes in the dialectical relationship between offense and defense. This dialectical process is guided by the principle of "negation of the negation," as illustrated by the "negation" of the cavalry by the machine gun and improved firepower during World War I, which were then "negated" by tanks and airplanes. Of course, for the "negation of the negation" to occur, sufficient quantities of the new types of weapons had to be available, which was not the case until after World War I. Through this line of reasoning, Ogarkov admonished that "the process of negation" has not ended and that "at the present time, corresponding means of combat against tanks are being massively developed." Moreover, "they have reached such a quantitative and qualitative state" that "attentive studies of these tendencies and their consequences are required."[17] In other words, Ogarkov was subtly raising the question of whether mobile tank forces would suffer the same fate as the cavalry in the near future.

Ogarkov's challenge was probably in the minds of Marshal Babadzhanyan and a group of tank officers who coauthored a book on tank operations in 1980 when they stated, after a discussion of methods of defense against antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), that "there are no objective reasons to speak of a demise of the tank troops, of how the tank has allegedly ceased to be viable on the battlefield."[18] Specifically, they argued that the law of "negation of the negation" was still confirmed here by the fact that the appearance of ATGMs had led to "a new stage in the improvement in tanks and the development of new methods of using them and

Hung P. Nguyen is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Soviet studies at the Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, where he earned his M.A. degree in the same field. He received his undergraduate degree in economics from Lebanon Valley College, Pa. The author's current concentration is on economic and security issues in the Soviet Union.



combating the ATGMs." Major General Vorob'yev, on the other hand, stated categorically in 1980 that deep offensive operations would have to face "resolute resistance" from defense forces due to the "saturation in their combat formations of large quantities of anti-tank means, the rise in the effectiveness and mobility of these means, and the increase in anti-tank capabilities of the defense in general."[19] As a result, "in modern operations, tank losses will occur on a tremendously increased scale, as the experience of the Mideast war in 1973 has shown." Marshal of the Tank Forces O. A. Losik insisted, however, that despite heavy tank losses during the October War, "massive employment of tanks" has increased the "mobility and strike power of Ground Troops" and "the potential for rapid creation of large troop groupings and inflicting powerful primary strikes," and has created the "preconditions for conducting a maneuver war." To increase their effectiveness, Losik argued, the combat independence of tank formations should be constantly enhanced, especially in deep operations when they are detached from the main forces. Specifically, Losik suggested that tank and mechanized infantry formations should be made fully independent by incorporating into their force structure "self-propelled artillery, combat vehicles equipped with anti-tank missiles, means of air defense, etc.," besides their usual array of main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.[20] Although concurring with this opinion, Vorob'yev stressed that only when they are fully independent can these forward formations maintain their rapid tempo of attack, exploit the results of their firepower, and protect themselves from enemy fire.[21] Therefore, to preserve the momentum of an attack, one needs not only tanks—weapons traditionally regarded as offensive—but also tactical air defense systems and antitank missiles—weapons usually associated with the defense.

Apparently unmollified by the reassurances of Soviet tank specialists, Ogarkov returned again to the same theme in 1981 and 1982, citing the continued use of the cavalry and the disbandment of independent tank formations in the Soviet army before World War II as a historical example of outdated thinking.[22] Judging by the historical analogy that he employed, Ogarkov may have had in mind the development of airmobile formations in future deep operations, a new type of independent, forward formation with far greater mobility than the bulk of the force. Vorob'yev might have had something similar in mind when he predicted that in addition to direct air strikes and airborne landings, future operations would involve "the *concentrated movement of troops by air* into the enemy rear in order to rapidly transfer combat operations into the depth of the enemy formations, to cut up and isolate enemy forces not only along the front but also in depth, to pass over enemy defense lines and contaminated zones with high tempo, and to continuously pursue retreating enemy forces."[23] For that reason, Vorob'yev argued, any operation or battle in the future will be *air-land* [sic] in nature, i.e. "success will depend directly on conditions in the air, the soundness and stability of the air defense system, and high effectiveness in the employment of aviation."[24] Vorob'yev again returned to this theme in September 1984, stating categorically that aerial combat is becoming an organic element of any engagement and that combined arms commanders must have a "profound knowledge" of the air force's capabilities and the ability to interact with it precisely and constantly.[25]

In 1982, Ogarkov repeated the warning about "the quantitative and qualitative state" that has been reached by antitank means and added that "to ignore this trend is dangerous" in view of the "diversified" nature of the threat, especially from the air.[26] Whether Ogarkov has bought Vorob'yev's air-land concept or not, in 1983 he again called attention to "the ever accelerating process of quantitative stockpiling and qualitative changes in systems and means of destruction" in the West and complained that "the development and training of the Soviet Armed Forces is not taking place on a qualitatively new basis." Moreover, in view of the "emergence of new means of armed

struggle," Ogarkov called for "bold experiments and solutions . . . even if this means discarding obsolete traditions, views and propositions." The Soviet Chief of the General Staff also made the point that the mechanized forces now have the potential for independent operations in depth and possess "a sufficient quantity of self-propelled artillery and combat helicopters," besides tanks and armored vehicles.[27] However, by Losik's standard for an independent forward formation, Ogarkov failed to mention mobile air defense means, an extremely important factor. Moreover, while Ogarkov considered the quantity of combat helicopters, which are currently used in an antitank and ground support role, a kind of "flying artillery," as being sufficient, he did not mention troop transport helicopters for air assault units, a vital component of the OMGs. Ogarkov also mentioned, in particular, the need to devise new methods of combat operations to counter the "deep-strike" weapons and new means of electronic warfare and automated troop control.[28] On the importance of electronic warfare, Vorob'yev went so far as to state in 1980 that without reliable protection for the command and control system and the means to counter enemy electronic warfare, success for the attacking side may not be possible, even with superiority in the quantity and quality of forces and means of combat relative to the defense.[29]

OFFENSE VS. DEFENSE

The debate that Ogarkov initiated in the late 1970s has gone beyond arguments about the weapons mix or force structure for the mechanized battle to touch upon fundamental questions about the relationship between offense and defense itself. As Vorob'yev put it, modern firepower not only increases the tempo and depth of maneuver and the ability of the attacking side to crush the defense troop groupings but also enhances the stability and active nature of the defense and allows the defense to strike the attacking side while the latter is still at the preparatory or transitional stage.[30] Therefore, "in modern conditions, the defense has absolutely not lost any of its advantages" but, on the contrary, has acquired "an increasingly active nature."[31] In this view, the modern defense is based on a combination of positional defense and maneuver, with a preponderant emphasis on the latter.[32] The increased weight of mobility in the defense gives rise to the possibility of not only weakening and wearing down attacking forces but also of destroying them. As a result, there is a certain "balance" between offense and defense, with both using the same mixes of weapons and maneuver elements and with the possibility that at some point the attacking side will have to devote part or all of its forces to the defense to repulse the enemy counterattack.[33] Moreover, the encounter battles may occur not only during the course of development of combat operations but also right at the start of the offensive or defensive operations themselves since both sides would like to fulfill their tasks with active offensive methods.[34] Given the balance between offense and defense in both means and methods and their "interpretation," what conclusions can one make about the character of a future war? Vorob'yev seemed to point to the experiences of World War I as a possible guide. As Vorob'yev indicated, every General Staff in Europe at that time was planning for a short war stressing mobility and offense. As a result,

> Many General Staffs during the process of the war had to reexamine from the beginning their views on military strategy, to rebuild their force development process, and to reorganize their military economy in new ways because the reserves accumulated during peacetime were only sufficient for the first few months of the war.[35]

Soviet interest in the lessons of World War I was evidenced by the publication of a study on Russian military thought during this period done by top military historians of the General Staff, an unusual attention to such a subject.[36] According to this study, Russian

military theoreticians, particularly those at the General Staff Academy, correctly predicted the protracted nature of a future world war and the vital role of economic mobilization in war planning. Based on the "new conditions of combat operations" at the time, one theoretician predicted the failure of the German Schlieffen plan and the inability of the German economy to support a protracted two-front war.[37] Mikhnevich, a General Staff theoretician, was also among the first to explore the nature of a war of coalitions, which in his opinion is full of "contradictions" between coalition partners who constantly tried to shift the burden of war-fighting to the others. As a result, a coalition "is always less than the sum of its parts."[38] The parallel to the present is hard to miss, given the Soviet penchant for using historical arguments to debate on sensitive issues. On this issue, Major General Kuznetsov argued in the more restricted forum of *Voyennaya Mysl'*,

> The reliable defense of the gains of world socialism requires the resolution in depth of problems of coalition warfare in accordance with changes in the military-political situation, in the composition of the participants in the coalition of states, in the economic, political-psychological, and military capabilities of these states.[39]

In the light of his assessment that NATO "could initiate and carry out quite resolutely large-scale combat operations with *limited* objectives,"[40] Kuznetsov probably had in mind the possibility that the composition of the coalition itself might change if a future war is not won in the "initial period" and degenerates into a war of attrition.

Citing possible heavy losses of weapons and equipment in a future conflict, Ogarkov raised in 1981, for the first time, the question of "the timely transition of the Armed Forces and the whole national economy into wartime conditions" and their "mobilization expansion."[41] Moreover, the timely conversion of the economy to wartime production requires "precisely planned measures already in peacetime" as well as "the coordinated actions of party, soviet and military organs in the localities." In this respect, it is interesting to note that two years earlier, under the rubric of "foreign specialists," Army General Maiorov had stated in *Voyennaya Mysl'* this thesis on the strategic requirement for the simultaneous transition of the whole national economy and the armed forces into wartime conditions in an extremely short period in order to ensure the readiness of the armed forces "to rapidly initiate resolute combat operations until the final objectives have been achieved."[42] In an interview in May 1984, Ogarkov again seemed to buttress this argument by stressing the immediate extension of modern conventional operations "to the whole country's territory" and hence the "incomparably greater" significance of the initial period and operations.[43] After all, the ultimate argument in favor of the burdensome demand for immediate mobilization of the whole economy in case of war is that a new war "will certainly be strikingly different in nature from the last war."[44]

CONCLUSION

It is possible to speculate that it was the call for putting the mobilization preparedness of the economy at the same level as that of the armed forces that led to Ogarkov's demotion in September 1984, primarily because the measures that he proposed touched upon politico-economic domains, not just military ones. Ogarkov's controversial proposition, however, was a reflection of profound concerns about the impact of new developments in firepower on the workability of the deep battle concept and the balance between offense and defense. It is too early to tell whether the critical rethinking on the modern application of the deep battle concept has inexorably redirected the Soviet force development process toward Vorob'yev's vision of the three-dimensional "air-land" battle and the employment of helicopter formations in deep operations together with heliborne artillery support. As Richard Simpkin pointed out, such a force is extremely expensive in terms of combat manpower and materiel resources and operates at

great risk when air superiority is not assured.[45] However, the conceptual basis for such a force was already laid down by Vorob'yev, and its realization in the future is probably a function of economic resources and hence political decisions, although the views held by advocates of mobile tank forces toward such development could be an important factor as well.

NOTES

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10. Ibid., p. 47.
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12. Radzievskii, p. 47.
13. I. N. Vorob'yev, "The Relationship and Interaction between Offense and Defense," *Voyennaya Mysl'* (April 1980), in *TCQDND* (January 1982), p. 29. Vorob'yev was also one of the most prominent proponents of the modern applications of the theory of deep operations; see I. N. Vorob'yev, "Forward Detachments in Offensive Operations and Battles" (April 1965) in *Selected Readings*, Part I.
14. Ibid., p. 36.
15. N. N. Kuznetsov, "On the Categories and Principles of Soviet Military Strategy," *Voyennaya Mysl'* (January 1984), in *TCQDND* (June 1984), p. 30. [Emphasis added.]
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JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN AND THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

by

WALTER P. LANG, JR.,

J. FRANK HENNESSEE,

and WILLIAM E. BUSH, JR.

The US Army has recently acknowledged the existence of a previous gap in its framework of theoretical reference by including the concept of the operational level as a category of military activity distinct from the tactical and strategic levels in its family of manuals. This expansion of the basis on which we view warfare is likely to have a profound effect on American soldiers for a long time and should be studied thoroughly by those responsible for the direction of the nation's armed forces.

Our recognition of the operational level owes much to European military experience and thought. However, the operational art in warfare should not be considered an alien concept. Rather, it should be viewed equally as an American development, which sprang from the same basic source (the study of the wars of Napoleon Bonaparte) as continental military theory and developed here in parallel with European ideas on the subject.[1]

Although latent in recent years, the flowering of operational art in America is vividly portrayed in our military history. The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 must certainly be among the most remarkable campaigns in this respect. It is certainly not the only good example which can be found in the American Civil War. Grant at Vicksburg and Sherman in Georgia are names which come readily to mind. The Valley Campaign is a superior example, however, because its ratio of forces gives greater clarity to the issues of operational art.[2]

BACKGROUND

At the beginning of November 1861, Thomas Jonathan Jackson was promoted to Major General, Confederate States Army, and made commander of a geographical command encompassing the Shenandoah Valley and much of what is now northern West Virginia: the Valley District. The command had been called into being because Joseph Johnston's move over the Blue Ridge for the first Manassas operation had denuded the valley of trained troops, and the citizens were complaining of the threat of occupation by Northern forces located in the Hagerstown, Maryland, area as well as in trans-Allegheny Virginia.

Upon his arrival Jackson assumed command of what was really a subdivision of the eastern theater of war. The Confederate government at that time faced a number of severe threats in the east. The most serious of these was the huge Federal army being trained and equipped in the vicinity of

Washington by a soldier of high reputation, Major General George B. McClellan. The future movements of this imposing force could not be predicted, but it clearly posed the largest threat. Additional Union forces were located in western Maryland and might at any time descend upon the northern Shenandoah Valley, a region of great economic and political importance to Virginia. There were also substantial Federal forces disposed in the western portion of Virginia, a region that showed increasing signs of political disloyalty to the Southern cause. Those Federal forces located in what is now West Virginia might with little warning descend upon the valley in the area of Staunton/Harrisonburg or farther north (Strasburg/Winchester), approaching from the direction of the south fork of the Potomac River.


Jackson apparently felt that his duty lay at this point in: (1) protecting his district, its people and economic resources; (2) taking action to forestall a permanent separation of Western Virginia from the rest of the Commonwealth; and (3) causing as much confusion and disarray in the Union high command as he could with the limited forces available to him.

THE ROMNEY EXPEDITION

As Jackson gathered the elements of his Valley Army near Winchester in late December 1861, it was clear to his men that action was imminent. Jackson's major concern was that Federal forces to his north (Major General Banks) along the Potomac River and to his west (Major General Rosecrans) in the Alleghenies would unite in the vicinity of Martinsburg. This union would have amassed such superior strength that Confederate retention of the Shenandoah Valley would have been in jeopardy. To preempt such a potentiality, Stonewall had argued for and gained reinforcement by Brigadier General W. W. Loring's division to permit an attack to seize Romney.

On 1 January 1862, the Valley Army, now approximately 9000 men, departed its camps around Winchester without knowledge of its destination. Speculation ran high that Jackson was launching an offensive to seize Romney, where Union forces roughly equal to Jackson's were encamped. Romney was, in fact, Jackson's objective, but his movements in the succeeding week would breed confusion concerning his real objective, not only among soldiers and politicians of 1862, but also among military historians to this day. General Jackson's Confederate forces forsook the road to Romney and moved north toward Bath (now Berkeley Springs, West Virginia), an obscure Union outpost along the Potomac, where contact was made on 4 January with a Union force of three regiments.

Jackson attempted and failed to outflank the Federals and block their retreat northward, and thereafter he likewise failed to pin them against the Potomac and destroy or capture them. These tactical actions were unsuccessful because of lethargy and tactical ineptitude among Jackson's subordinate



leaders. The Union forces fought an effective rear guard action and crossed the Potomac by boat and fording with minimum casualties.

Jackson was far too prudent to try to force a crossing; he settled for destruction of the important Baltimore and Ohio Railroad bridge over the Big Cacapon River several miles to the west, severing many miles of railroad track and telegraph lines. He also shelled the town of Hancock, Maryland. These actions were not without their rewards, as they effectively cut communications between Banks and Rosecrans and apparently did substantial damage to the supply lines to Union forces in the Alleghenies.

To the surprise of everyone except Jackson, this relatively ill-fated excursion to Bath opened the door to Romney without a fight. As his men marched southward from Bath to occupy an assembly area near Unger's Store, Jackson received word from Major Turner Ashby, his cavalry commander, that the Federals, after a raid against the Confederate outpost at Hanging Rock, had withdrawn from Romney. Jackson moved westward to fill this void as quickly as the difficult terrain and the bitter winter weather permitted, and by 10 January the Valley Army occupied an outpost line (Bath, Romney, Moorefield) which effectively negated the threat to the Shenandoah Valley from the west.

The Romney expedition was Jackson's first as a major independent commander and it reveals some factors that contributed to his later success. The paramount characteristic of Jackson's success was his inclination toward the indirect approach. Given Jackson's mission, most commanders would have focused on Romney as the objective and would have moved with all due urgency to attack the Union forces there. A particularly astute commander might even have pursued his goal by conducting a tactical envelopment of the Northern forces in the vicinity of Romney.

Jackson's budding genius at the operational level devised a plan which effectively maneuvered his foe out of the objective area by striking at another point. The purpose of the strike to Bath remains cloaked in obscurity even today. Most historians seek to explain this strike as either a shakedown operation for his green troops or as a raid on the line of communication of the Union Army in the Alleghenies with little real relationship to his expressed objective of seizing Romney. Few have appreciated his skill in choosing an initial objective which would cause such concern to the Union chain of command that the garrison at Romney would be weakened or abandoned. Thus General Jackson demonstrated at the earliest stage of the Valley Campaign his mastery of the subtleties of operational maneuver, developing plans that would accomplish his aims without risking his precious few troops in a direct attack against superior combat power; he sought a point of enemy weakness which, if attacked, would create such a disruptive effect on the psyche of the enemy command that important gains could be achieved without confronting the enemy head-on.

Among Stonewall's laudable attributes were his inclination toward operations security, his skill in intelligence operations, and his proficiency in using the reconnaissance and security forces which produced much of his intelligence. Throughout the planning and execution of the Romney expedition, Jackson's intelligence preparation of the battlefield gave him an unqualified advantage which he retained throughout the Valley Campaign.

Another Jacksonian characteristic in evidence here was his willingness to take

Colonel Walter P. Lang, Jr., is the Defense Intelligence Officer for the Middle East and South Asia in the Defense Intelligence Agency. He is a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, holds an M.A. from the University of Utah, and is a 1985 graduate of the US Army War College. He has served in a variety of infantry, special forces, and intelligence assignments in Vietnam, Germany, the Canal Zone, Turkey, and the United States. Prior to attending the War College, he was the US Defense and Army Attaché in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; he also formerly served as USDAO in North Yemen.



great, yet prudent, risks to achieve success. His move to Bath opened enemy approaches to Winchester, Jackson's headquarters and support base, from both north and west. If he had taken counsel of his fears based on enemy capabilities, this success would not have been possible.

On the opposite side of the ledger, Jackson displayed characteristics which tended to constrain his successes. First was his uneven tactical ability. His failure to coordinate and control the operation effectively at the tactical level cost him even greater rewards at Bath. It is perhaps more important for the military professional who aspires to senior command to note that tactical success in every battle is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for success at the operational level. Although the Valley Army suffered through a tactical fiasco during this phase of the campaign, success at the operational level was gained.

Second, Jackson's obsession with secrecy, which was carried to such an extreme that his subordinate commanders often did not know the tactical objective or his concept of the operation, was evinced in this expedition. Although he did not pay a high price for this proclivity in January 1862, he was later to have his potential successes limited considerably by lack of flexibility and initiative among subordinates. This can be attributed directly to Jackson's overly taciturn behavior concerning his campaign and battle plans.

WINCHESTER TO RUDE'S HILL TO KERNSTOWN

The spring of 1862 found Jackson's Valley Army at a strength of less than 5000 men. His mission was to hold as many Union forces as possible in the valley. When Union forces under Banks moved into the northern valley in strength in March, Jackson was forced to withdraw from Winchester to a more defensible position in the vicinity of Rude's Hill (about 45 miles south of Winchester), where an S-turn in the Shenandoah River is overlooked by a relatively low height which nevertheless dominates the river valley to the north. Banks failed to press the Valley Army, and based upon a perception of Jackson's weakness and the need for additional Union forces in eastern Virginia, Banks moved the majority of his force east of the Blue Ridge. Jackson reacted immediately. Stonewall pushed his men northward in a forced march, attempting to gain contact with the Union forces remaining in the valley under Brigadier General James Shields. Although Shields' forces still outnumbered Jackson's two to one, Jackson attacked without delay. On 23 March a bloody battle ensued at Kernstown, just south of Winchester, in which the Valley Army was soundly defeated.

Again, confused, piecemeal commitment of forces to a battle and a general lack of good command and control cost Jackson dearly. Nevertheless his boldness, daring, and timing brought great success without tactical victory, for the battle at Kernstown caused McClellan to direct the return of significant Union forces (approximately 25,000) under Banks to the Shenandoah. Major General Irvin McDowell's Union corps was held near Washington rather than proceeding south toward Richmond. Additionally, Major General Blanker's division was dispatched west to the Alleghenies to reinforce Major General John C. Fremont, who had replaced Rosecrans there. Coming at a time when the North had just embarked on a grand maneuver to seize Richmond through an amphibious envelopment on the Peninsula coupled with a supporting attack due south from Washington, the distraction in the

Colonel J. Frank Hennessee is assigned to the Army Studies Group in the Office of the Army Chief of Staff. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy, holds an M.S. from Georgia Tech, and is a 1985 graduate of the US Army War College. Colonel Hennessee has commanded infantry companies in the United States and in Vietnam and served as operations officer for battalions in Vietnam and Korea. He has also served on the Army Staff in ODCS-OPS and in Legislative Liaison in the Office of the Secretary of the Army. From 1981 to 1984 he commanded a battalion in the Berlin Brigade.



Virginia from a great distance, and in a very real sense was inside the enemy command decision cycle.

MOUNT SOLON TO HARPERS FERRY (THE DEEP ATTACK)

Even though Jackson's action had been highly effective, the situation on 18 May looked increasingly dark for the Confederacy. McClellan, with over 100,000 men, was scarcely 30 miles down the Peninsula from Richmond. McDowell was poised at Fredericksburg, restrained by the disruptions created by Jackson, but fully capable of a rapid attack on Richmond. Banks had withdrawn to Strasburg, and Shields' division from his command was close to joining McDowell's force.

Lee must have been sorely tempted to call Jackson eastward to strengthen the Richmond defenses, but both Lee and Jackson showed their understanding of the operational art by rejecting the obvious "necessity" for increasing Confederate strength in eastern Virginia in favor of a daring maneuver—a deep attack by the Valley Army.

Jackson had already used deception and speed to mass unexpectedly against Fremont. Now he pushed his light infantry to its limits as he marched north along the Shenandoah toward Banks' position at Strasburg. With his cavalry screening to his front, Jackson created the impression of a headlong thrust at Bank's position while he turned his columns east through the New Market Gap in the Massanutten to link up with Ewell's division in the Luray Valley, a terrain compartment which runs parallel to the Shenandoah Valley. Concentrating his forces on the move, Stonewall continued north and fell upon the unsuspecting Union garrison at Front Royal. The small Federal force of about 1000 was routed, and Jackson seized the important bridges across the Shenandoah River complex.

Jackson had deceived Banks through the effective use of cavalry while using the masking effect of terrain compartments to mass against a point of enemy weakness. He was acting faster than Banks could react. The way into the Federal rear lay open.

In fact, this success created an interesting dilemma for Jackson. Clearly, the opportunity existed for a quick march to Winchester, which lay astride Banks' line of communication. Securing Winchester before Banks could react would have constituted a classic turning movement which would have forced Banks out of his strong defensive position at Strasburg. In all probability Banks would have been forced to attack Jackson on less than equal terms since Stonewall would have had the advantage of choosing good defensive terrain along Banks' communication line.

Jackson was keenly aware of the multi-leveled nature of the operational art. Even though his mission to deal Banks a strong blow would have been best served by a rapid move on Winchester, there existed the possibility that if the Valley Army executed this maneuver, Banks could move due east through Front Royal and the Manassas Gap to effect a linkup with McDowell. Even though this possibility seemed somewhat remote, its consequences were so dire that Jackson sacrificed his opportunity to fall upon Banks' line of communication. Instead he deployed his advance elements between Cedarville and Ninevah until he confirmed that Banks was withdrawing north.

Upon receiving this information from his cavalry, Jackson leaped into action, moving his infantry west at the double-time to intersect the Valley Pike at Middletown. From there he moved quickly into the exploitation, falling upon Banks' combat service support tail as it moved down the Valley Pike. He pressed the exploitation ruthlessly and relentlessly northward toward the Potomac, frustrated only by the ineptitude of his cavalry. In spite of this ineptitude, however, the results were spectacular. In retreating over 50 miles in two days (24 and 25 May), Banks' force lost 2300 men captured and enormous amounts of equipment and supplies.

As both Lee and Jackson had known, the real success of the operation could not be weighed in the battle statistics from the

Shenandoah Valley. As Jackson pursued Banks and moved to occupy Harpers Ferry, the consternation in Washington grew to great proportion. Lincoln dispatched orders to McDowell to call off his attack on Richmond, planned for 25 May, and move to the Shenandoah to cut off Jackson. This respite relieved the Confederate defenders of Richmond from a precarious situation. Although the siege of Richmond was not abandoned, not for another two years would the existence of the Confederacy be so much in doubt.

As Jackson closed on Harpers Ferry in late May, his deep attack had been successful almost beyond the bounds of logic. It had achieved results completely out of proportion to the physical correlation of forces. The ultimate objective of the operational deep attack had been the enemy high command psyche, not enemy casualties or key terrain. The choice of a terrain objective (in this case Harpers Ferry) was important only to the extent that its attainment would cause psychological panic in Washington. And that it did, for Harpers Ferry was well known not only as a strategic junction of transportation arteries and for its importance to the lines of communication to the west, but also for its proximity to unprotected Union cities. The illogical fears generated by the deep attack secured results in geometric proportion to the depth of the penetration (50 miles from where Jackson had initially penetrated Banks' position a few days earlier and over 120 miles north of the Union position of three weeks prior).

Jackson's successes were not accidental. From the complexities of the mind of a master of the operational art had emerged a spectacular operation. The insight to see the potential for success on this scale was born of many years of study and analysis of military history. Stonewall had preserved his freedom of action and seized the initiative. He developed sound, timely intelligence and demonstrated the willingness to act on it. He had the audacity to plan a deep attack and the boldness and skill to ensure its proper execution. He moved with great speed, massing unexpectedly to fall upon the enemy with violence at his weakest point. He achieved superiority and then exploited relentlessly. He showed flexibility in adjusting to enemy reactions once he had penetrated the enemy's lines while never losing sight of his real objective. He had clearly gotten "inside the decision cycle" of the Union high command.

SOUTH TO PORT REPUBLIC

Lincoln had not only ordered McDowell to cut off the Valley Army by moving west, he had dispatched similar instructions to Fremont to move east out of the Alleghenies into the valley. His plan was to close the jaws of a trap behind Jackson and destroy him before the Valley Army could escape south. Stonewall had not let the euphoria of success blind his operational foresight. He carefully positioned reconnaissance elements to report the approach of forces which might threaten his ability to withdraw. Jackson had maximized the results he could achieve in the deep attack. Now he showed the good judgment to recognize that preservation of the force had become the paramount mission. Therefore, on 30 May when reports indicated the movement of Union forces to cut him off, Stonewall moved with characteristic swiftness, sending an advance guard to delay Shields (from McDowell's force) and Fremont in their move to close the trap. While his cavalry fought these delaying actions, Stonewall moved his main body over 50 miles in two days, squeezing through the jaws of the planned trap just before they could be closed. Jackson then skillfully used his cavalry both to cover his rear and to destroy bridges and emplace obstacles at key points. Of particular note is his destruction of the bridges over the South Fork of the Shenandoah River in the Luray Valley. By so doing, he denied Shields the opportunity to move quickly up the Luray Valley and preclude a move eastward by the Valley Army to reinforce the defense of Richmond, if that should become necessary.

Clearly Jackson now needed to rest his weary troops. The deep attack had drained his men, not only physically, but emotionally

as well. Jackson therefore needed to occupy terrain which offered great advantages to the defender (since he was now outnumbered by at least four to one in the area) while still protecting his support base at Staunton and positioning the Valley Army for rapid movement east of the Blue Ridge. Jackson moved up the Shenandoah Valley around the Massanutten, and into the Port Republic area on 5 June, from which an impregnable position in Brown's Gap could have been established.

At this point, with Union columns approaching from two directions (around the Massanutten from the northwest and down the east bank of the South Fork from the northeast), Jackson chose to attack rather than defend. His scheme was easy to understand but would be more difficult to execute than he realized. His plan was to use his interior position to mass rapidly against each of the Union forces in succession while his cavalry screened to the northwest. Jackson intended to mass his force against Shields east of the South Fork, defeat him quickly, and then turn against Fremont to the northwest.

The result was a complete tactical failure. The concept required moving the majority of his forces across two rivers to strike Shields at 0800, then recrossing the two rivers to defeat Fremont before nightfall. Chaos ensued! The buildup of forces east of the South Fork went slowly, and units were committed piecemeal against Shields. By day's end, Jackson had barely managed a draw against Shields and had lost over 800 men. The second phase of the operation had, of course, been abandoned, and Jackson moved into Brown's Gap as night fell on 9 June.

Thus the Valley Campaign ended on a sour note. Although morale and confidence had been soaring as a result of the successful deep attack, Jackson had failed to realize fully its physical and emotional toll on his men. His initial inclination to occupy a strong defensive position had been the right one. In fact, Jackson had not recognized or admitted to himself the profound physical, emotional, and mental effects of the deep attack on him personally. His plan to attack was ill-fated from its inception. Stonewall either failed to understand the tactical complexities of moving his force through the bottlenecks of a bridge and a hastily constructed man-made ford twice in a single day, concentrating, attacking, breaking contact, recrossing, and reconcentrating in the face of the enemy; or his judgment was severely impaired by the events of the preceding weeks.

Either possibility suggests a learning point for the aspiring practitioner of the operational art. In the first case the operational-level commander must recognize the fundamental differences between the operational and tactical levels. Given greater dimensions of space and time (i.e. at the operational level) Jackson's plan was potentially brilliant, certainly executable with at least a good probability of success. The considerations at the tactical level are radically different. Maneuvering forces in the face of the enemy necessitates simple, direct plans (not complex schemes of maneuver), and a detailed understanding of the time required to perform a multitude of simple tasks while under direct observation and fire.

Ironically, most contemporary US Army commanders are much better prepared to conceive operations, fight, and win at the tactical level than at the operational level. Jackson was apparently just the opposite.

The other obvious lesson from Jackson's example is that senior commanders must develop an understanding of the limits of human endurance. By the time of Port Republic, the men who had rested in Swift Run Gap six weeks before had marched almost 400 miles and fought many engagements. Senior commanders must also recognize the increased emotional and mental demands of operating deep inside enemy territory. Seizing the initiative and attacking are necessary to ultimate success, but the astute commander must recognize when *not* to attack.

Another lesson to be learned from this example is the importance of reconnaissance and security operations inside territory controlled by the enemy. Stonewall's attention to this aspect of the deep attack and

good judgment in recognizing when to redeploy his forces to friendly lines were prerequisite to preservation of the force. Any commander who hopes to fight outnumbered and win should learn this lesson well.

THE RELEVANCE OF JACKSON'S EXAMPLE

An analysis of Jackson's Valley Campaign of 1862 seems to reveal that the fundamentals of Jackson's success are as relevant today for the senior leader as they were in the 19th century.

Then as now:

- The essential goal of the deep battle is most likely to be some form of interdiction, whether it be of arriving reserve or second echelon combat forces, support, the enemy commander's intentions, or his train of thought.
- Operational maneuver requires a skillful use of deception and operations security in order to allow smaller forces to concentrate against local enemy weakness with relative security.
- Highly reliable and timely intelligence is essential to the deep battle.
- Decisive deep maneuver requires the willingness to commit a relatively large percentage of the available force to maneuver into the enemy rear and the assumption of the attendant risk.
- The commander involved in deep maneuver must be prepared to bypass some enemy forces.
- At the operational level the astute commander can often accomplish through the indirect approach that which he does not have the means to achieve through direct action.

In any war with our principal adversary, the operational art would be critical. In other theaters which would not be likely to receive the bulk of resources, we, like Jackson, will have to rely on our artistry to win.

NOTES

1. A question that logically suggests itself is why the idea of the operational level of war should have become more typical of the armies of the continent of Europe than of the US Army. The institutions of the United States and Prussian armies both seem to have derived their theoretical texts for the study of warfare from the same basic source, the wars of Napoleon Bonaparte.

In the case of the Prussian army, firsthand experience of defeat by Bonaparte followed by the reform and restructuring of their forces, which led to victory over Napoleon, provided a powerful incentive for the study of his methods. The Prussians did this principally within the context of their War Academy, the creation of which had been one of the post-Jena actions by reformers such as Clausewitz. The Prussians focused on that part of the example of Napoleon which showed that by highly skilled large-scale maneuver of forces it was possible to deal deadly blows to numerically superior enemies.

Over a protracted period of time the Prussians came to the view that it was the particular function of the army senior leadership to be prepared to perform what had been Napoleon's purely military role above the tactical level. With minds thus focused, the Prussian general staff sought to develop a high degree of skill in the conduct of large operations. Over the decades they sought to do this through the media of intensive theoretical study of past experience, operational testing of plans through war-gaming, and the widespread use of staff rides at the campaign level. With this focus they acquired and retained a great dexterity in this art, the operational art. From the example of the Prussian and later German armies, all European development of operational art, including that of the Soviets, is derived.

In the case of the American experience, the importation of Napoleonic ideas came about largely through the vehicle of the writings of Jomini as interpreted first by Dennis H. Mahan and later by Henry W. Halleck. Mahan's teaching at West Point, and indeed the whole corpus of his writing, tended to stress Jomini's division of the study of warfare into: (1) Strategy; (2) Engineering; (3) Logistics; and (4) Tactics. Jomini also mentioned the existence of something he called "Grand Tactics" by which he apparently meant the maneuver of large forces to accomplish large ends. This would seem to be a different formulation and expression of the same basic concept which led to the idea of the operational level in the collective mind of the Prussian general staff. This Jominian vision of warfare was transmitted directly to the minds of the future chieftains of the US Army in the section rooms of West Point in the 1840s and 1850s.

That Jackson had absorbed some of this at West Point may be inferred from a letter he wrote to his sister from Jalapa, Mexico, during the Mexican War. He critiqued the conduct of operations by Generals Scott and Taylor:

> General Scott is by far the most talented and scientific, and, his comprehensive mind embraces not only different objects and ends but their several and combined bearings with regard to the ultimate object . . . . General Taylor is a plain, honest, sound minded, straight forward & undesiring man (the noblest work of God), if you knew him you would certainly like him. But he wants comprehensive view of a means to an end.

Jackson explained to his sister that victories should be obtained "without so reducing our army as to be unable to follow up the successes." He told her that Taylor did not meet this requirement well in Northern Mexico where he was "deceaved (sic) at Monterey he thought that their (sic) would be no fighting their (sic) and consequently did not prepare himself to take Ampudia's army prisoners or else make it a total reck (sic) with the loss of its arms and the saving of his own array." He thought Taylor did not follow up at Buena Vista as he should

have done. "In fine, General Taylor can not look beyond the gaining of a battle." (Lenoir Chambers, *Stonewall Jackson, The Legend and the Man*.)

2. This paper does not seek to make a historical contribution, per se. The Valley Campaign cannot be satisfactorily analyzed by using the existing correspondence and record. This is due in large measure to Jackson's extreme concern with operations security. He seldom discussed his aims, objectives, and methods even with his closest advisors, and he edited from after-action reports anything that he believed might have the slightest usefulness to the enemy (Jedediah Hotchkiss, *Make Me A Map of the Valley*). Therefore, the authors have drawn conclusions based not only upon the available historical record, but upon their collective military experience and judgment after a careful, on-site inspection of the terrain.



STRATEGIC VISION AND STRENGTH OF WILL:

IMPERATIVES FOR THEATER COMMAND

by

MITCHELL M. ZAIS

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While virtual libraries of material have been written on the topic of leadership, nearly all this literature tends to assume that the qualities and attributes which are required for success are the same irrespective of organizational level. Thus, one is left to presume that the most successful battalion or brigade commanders will necessarily perform most effectively at higher levels of command such as corps or army group. It is not the purpose of this essay to debate that premise. It assumes from the start that the reader readily recognizes the fallacy of this argument and accepts as axiomatic the assertion of Clausewitz that

> Every level of command has its own intellectual standard; its own prerequisites for fame and honor . . . . There are commanders-in-chief who could not have led a cavalry regiment with distinction, and cavalry commanders who could not have led armies.[1]

In spite of Clausewitz's observation, little has been written concerning the prerequisites, the qualities and attributes required for the leading of armies. In fact, there is no US Army doctrine, statement of philosophy, or any other document which specifies the necessary attributes of our most senior commanders.

In light of this deficiency, this essay will argue that there are at least two qualities which are essential for the most senior commanders, specifically, theater commanders during wartime. This list is not all-inclusive; the cited attributes merely constitute minimum essential conditions for successful wartime theater command.

Further, it is not the intent of this article to prove that the characteristics required in war differ from those required in peace or that the most effective peacetime commanders are not necessarily the best warrior leaders. The reader is presumed to agree with Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy during World War II, who, in advocating the promotion of aggressive fighters, not peacetime stars, offered the following observation to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz concerning the differences between senior commanders in war and peace:

> Most of us, if we had been required to choose at the beginning of the war between the brilliant, polished, socially attractive McClellan and the rough, rather uncouth, unsocial Grant, would have chosen McClellan, just as Lincoln did.[2]

In essence, Knox was simply stating that the qualities required of wartime commanders differ from those valued in peacetime.

Accepting the preceding premises, I would suggest that the two qualities of the wartime theater commander that are most critical can be termed *strategic vision* and *strength of will.*

STRATEGIC VISION

Strategic vision is the first essential requirement for the theater commander. It constitutes the ability to discern the means for the attainment of the ultimate political objective through the employment of military force. For example, Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., in his book *On Strategy*, argues that it was precisely the lack of this strategic vision that led to the ultimate defeat of US forces in South Vietnam.[3] Strategic vision is the single factor that enables the theater commander to act in accordance with national policy to direct the efforts of military force to obtain national goals. If one accepts Clausewitz's dictum that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means,"[4] then clearly the theater commander must understand the political goals of his government and possess a strategic vision of how those goals might best be attained. For the theater commander, political ends and military means are joined inextricably.

The requirement for strategic vision was, in Clausewitz's eyes, the most important single attribute of the senior or theater commander. He said,

> The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the . . . commander [has] to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which [he is] embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.[5]

In other words, it is strategic vision which enables the commander to judge the true nature of the war he is fighting and to link the political goals of that conflict to the military means at his disposal. Clausewitz concluded that in directing wars, "*What is required is* a sense of unity and power of judgment raised to *a marvelous pitch of vision*."[6]

Many contemporary writers have observed the importance of vision in directing the activities of large numbers of men undertaking great enterprises. Thomas E. Cronin, writing in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, discussed the importance of strategic vision. It is the vision of the senior leader or commander, he said, which provides an organization and its members "a clear sense of direction, a sense of mission." This sense of direction and mission, then, serves to "clarify problems and choices, . . . build morale . . . , and provide a vision of the possibilities and promise."[7] Similarly, Robert Mueller, Chairman of the Board of Arthur D. Little, Inc., saw that "the leader is the visionary providing immanence to the present and a transcendental drive into the future."[8] It is this vision which engages the enthusiasms and energy of subordinates as they strive to make the theater commander's vision a reality.

The theater commander's strategic vision includes the ways and means of obtaining military victory. Both Ridgway and Slim, in writing about their campaigns in Korea and Burma, respectively, described the vital importance of imparting to all their subordinates their personal visions of victory and the conditions and methods for obtaining it.[9]

Some would argue that tactical or operational genius is a requirement for the successful theater commander in wartime.

Major Mitchell M. Zais is currently in G3 Plans, I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington. He is a graduate of the Advanced Military Studies Program at the Command and General Staff College, where he was awarded the Master of Military Arts and Science degree. He is also a graduate of the US Military Academy and holds an M.S. degree in social psychology from the University of Washington, where he is presently a doctoral candidate. Major Zais has taught in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at West Point, and his assignments have included rifle platoon leader in Vietnam, 1970-71; rifle company commander in The Old Guard, Fort McNair; mechanized infantry company commander, Fort Riley; and infantry battalion XO and S3 in Korea.



But this is not entirely the case. At the theater level of war, strategic vision constitutes the essential level of military competence. The theater commander must merely have sufficient understanding of operations and tactics to know generally what lies within the realm of the possible. He can rely upon subordinates to translate his strategic vision into operational and tactical concepts. For example, General Eisenhower's direction of the European Theater of Operations exemplifies this principle.

As General Omar Bradley noted, Eisenhower's tactical and operational abilities were generally judged to be rather limited. In Bradley's assessment, "Ike was a political general of rare and valuable gifts, but . . . he did not know how to manage a battlefield."[10] Bradley suggested that General Marshall shared the same view of Eisenhower's tactical and operational capabilities. When Bradley was posted by Marshall to serve on Eisenhower's staff in North Africa, Bradley felt that "Perhaps Marshall was tactfully seeking a way of reinforcing Ike on the battlefield with professional generals skilled in infantry tactics, without actually saying so."[11] General Patton held a similar opinion, as Martin Blumenson's *The Patton Papers* revealed.[12] But it did not matter that Eisenhower was unskilled in tactics and operations, for he possessed the strategic vision of the requirements for victory and understood the importance of maintaining a solid alliance for its attainment. Also, Eisenhower coupled his strategic vision with the second imperative for the theater commander, strength of will.

STRENGTH OF WILL

It is the commander's strength of will which enables him to impart his vision to his subordinates and to ensure that they adopt his vision as their own. In other words, a strategic vision that exists only in the mind of the commander or his close associates is of no use. His vision must be transferred down through many layers of military organization. This can be accomplished only if the theater commander possesses the necessary strength of will to overcome obstacles to the transmission of his vision and to dominate the wills of those who would obstruct its attainment. In the face of setbacks, casualties, battle losses, and all the vicissitudes of war, there is ample opportunity for subordinates to lose faith, lose enthusiasm, and lose sight of the commander's vision. Strength of will enables the theater commander to maintain his vision as the foremost objective of his subordinates when weaker men around him have cause to abandon hope.

This strength of will has been variously called energy, firmness, staunchness, and strength of character. It is the force which, according to Clausewitz, resists

> the ebbing of moral and physical strength, . . . the heart-rending spectacle of the dead and wounded, that the commander has to withstand—first in himself, and then in all those who, directly or indirectly, have entrusted him with their thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears. As each man's strength gives out, as it no longer responds to his will, the inertia of the whole gradually comes to rest on the commander's will alone. The ardor of his spirit must rekindle the flame of purpose in all others; his inward fire must revive their hope. Only to the extent that he can do this will he retain his hold on his men and keep control . . . . The burdens increase with the number of men in his command, and therefore the higher his position, the greater the strength of character he needs to bear the mounting load.[13]

Other military writers have expressed the same idea, that strength of will is an essential ingredient of the senior commander, particularly the theater commander. Ferdinand Foch, the French theater commander of World War I, shared this view. In his book *Precepts*, he said,

> No victory is possible unless the commander be energetic . . . ; unless he possess and can impart to all the resolute will of seeing things through; unless he be capable of exerting a personal action, composed of will, . . . in the midst of danger.[14]

General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, the British theater commander of the Middle East Command in North Africa during World War II, also believed that strength of will was indispensable. He claimed that the "most vital of all" qualities of the commander is "what we call the fighting spirit, the will to win."[15] A related view has been expressed by John Keegan, professor of military history at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, in his landmark work, *The Face of Battle*. According to Keegan, "Mere hardness of character of the sort demonstrated by Zhukov or Model, rather than any particular strategic or tactical flair, increasingly became the principal military virtue as the Second World War dragged on."[16] Similarly, in his article "Leadership as an Art," James L. Stokesbury points out, "Military history is littered with the names of great and good men who were not quite hard enough, and whose disinclination to get their men killed caused only more suffering in the long run."[17] General Hooker's vacillation and timidity at Chancellorsville is a prime example.[18] In essence, what all of these authors are saying, in one way or another, is that strength of will is imperative if the senior commander is to impose his strategic vision on his subordinates.

CONCLUSION

Others might argue that different traits, abilities, or characteristics are imperative for the theater commander. Some might suggest that communications skills, or charisma, or any number of other qualities are critical. However, for every example one can find a counter. For every charismatic giant, great orator, or master writer, one can find a theater commander of average ability in these areas. General Grant was a virtual failure at every endeavor he attempted until he assumed command of the Union Army. S. L. A. Marshall reached the same conclusion regarding the limited number of requirements for theater command. Writing in *The Armed Forces Officer* on "Leaders and Leadership," he said,

> There have been great and distinguished leaders in our military Services at all levels who had no particular gifts for administration and little for organizing the detail of decisive action either within battle or without. They excelled because of a superior ability to make use of the brains and command the loyalty of well chosen subordinates.[19]

Likewise, Cronin reached the exact conclusion. In his lucid essay, "Thinking About Leadership," he notes that an essential requirement for the leader is "having excellent ideas or a clear sense of direction, a sense of mission. But such ideas or vision are useless unless the would-be leader can communicate them to his followers."[20]

Much of the discussion in the current military leadership debate concerns the ethical and moral requirements of our senior leadership. The historical evidence shows, however, that while many theater commanders have been men of high moral character, others, equally successful, have been ruthless, egocentric, inclined to drink too much, or libertine. As Robert Taylor and William Rosenbach remind us in their book *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, "Biographers err in attributing success to what we *want* leaders to be rather than to the realities of the person in time and place."[21] If we look at successful theater commanders of the past as they truly were, and not as we wish them to be, we will find that they possessed a wide assortment of strengths and weaknesses, personalities and temperaments, and skills and abilities. Strategic vision and strength of will seem to be the only attributes which consistently characterize the best theater commanders; it follows that these two attributes, above all others, can be considered imperatives for theater command.

NOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 111, 146.

2. Edwin P. Hoyt, *How They Won the War in the Pacific: Admiral Nimitz and His Admirals* (New York: Weybright & Tally, 1971), p. 168.

3. Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, Calif: Presidio Press, 1982).

4. Clausewitz, p. 87.

5. Ibid., p. 88.

6. Ibid., p. 112. Emphasis added.

7. Thomas E. Cronin, "Thinking About Leadership," in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, ed. Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 195, 197.

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10. Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 130.

11. Ibid., p. 131.

12. Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers: 1940-1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), pp. 139, 418, 537.

13. Clausewitz, pp. 104-05.

14. Quoted in Robert D. Heinl, Jr., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1966), p. 132.

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17. James L. Stokesbury, "Leadership as an Art," in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, p. 17.

18. Bruce Catton, *Never Call Retreat* (New York: Pocket Books, 1967), pp. 138-49.

19. S. L. A. Marshall, "Leaders and Leadership," in *The Armed Forces Officer* (Washington: GPO, 1975), reprinted in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, p. 44.

20. Cronin, p. 195.

21. *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, p. 1.



IN THE LAPS OF THE GODS:

THE ORIGINS OF NATO FORWARD DEFENSE

by

JAMES A. BLACKWELL, JR.

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> In my opinion as a military man . . . the people of Western Europe, with our assistance, and given time, can build up a sufficient force so that they would not be driven out of Western Europe. Now just exactly where they could hold . . . is in the laps of the gods.
>
> — General J. Lawton Collins
> Chief of Staff, US Army
> 19 February 1951

The military strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is two-pronged, consisting of the principles known as flexible response and forward defense. While the flexible response doctrine has been subjected to intense scrutiny since its promulgation in 1967, the forward defense strategy more often has been neglected by analysts. This article addresses this less thoroughly examined side of NATO strategy, exploring the operational origins, rather than the strategic or political origins, of the forward defense strategy in the formative years of the alliance, 1945-55.

NATO's historians have traditionally agreed that in the early years the strategy of forward defense was mainly a political and psychological necessity to ensure eventual German rearmament and participation, as well as to allay French fears of a defeated *Reich* rearmed for the second time in half a century. The Allies did not believe that it was a strict military requirement to protect every square inch of West European soil with forces in being. Many modern-day commentators argue that since the Allies have constructed a layered scheme of national corps sectors across the inter-German border from north to south, NATO plans to fight a hopelessly linear forward defense. These conclusions are, at best, incomplete.

It is revealing to trace the military implementation of the strategy of forward defense through the early years of Allied defense planning. From the perspective of the operational level of war, it becomes apparent that the forward strategy was then, as it is now, subject to wide variation in interpretation in spite of the political unity that prevailed in the articulation of the strategy itself.[1] This variation derived from many sources, but principally from differing operational concepts, contrasting national styles of war, and the clash of military personalities.

INITIAL PLANNING: 1945-49

On Victory in Europe Day, 8 May 1945, the armies of the Western Allies had three enormous tasks ahead of them: occupation, redeployment to the Pacific Theater, and demobilization. By the winter of 1945-46, the absence of a fighting enemy, combined with the problems inherent in demobilization and redeployment, caused a serious deterioration

in the battle-seasoned units of one of history's largest land armies. The discipline, morale, and supply problems in Europe were of such proportions that General Eisenhower's first replacement as commander of US forces in the European Theater, General Joseph T. McNarney, remarked that his troops "could operate in an emergency for a limited period at something less than 50 percent normal wartime efficiency."[2]

Yet as Allied soldiers indulged themselves in the spoils of victory and awaited their turn to go home, Western leaders grew more concerned with the postwar intentions of the Soviet Union. On 12 May 1945, British Prime Minister Churchill sent his "Iron Curtain" telegram to President Truman. That same month, Field Marshal Montgomery, in command of occupation forces in the British sector, was ordered not to destroy any more captured German arms, "in case they might be needed by the Western Allies for any reason."[3]

By the time of Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech in the United States in January 1946, military planners in the West began to redirect their thinking from occupation duties to contingency planning for the possibility of an attack from the Red Army, which had neither demobilized nor redeployed to the extent that British and American forces had. American occupation forces by July 1947 were stabilized at a low point in strength of 135,000 troops, a level at which they remained until the early 1950s.[4] The US forces had been reorganized in 1946 into three components: a constabulary—roughly a division in size—dispersed in small units throughout the American sector; the 1st Infantry Division; and various theater and military government supporting units. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes signalled a formal change in the attitude of the American government as to the purpose of these troops in a speech at Stuttgart on 6 September 1946, when he indicated that the Americans were now in Germany not only for occupation, but also for defense.

Accordingly, the constabulary was given primary responsibility for maintaining law and order, and the 1st Infantry Division was assigned a reserve mission to be ready to block any Russian advance. As the events of 1947 in Berlin, East Europe, and Greece were marked by the creation of Bizonia, the Marshall Plan, and the Truman Doctrine, US military leaders more fully comprehended the implications of the Cold War. On 4 August 1947, after the June failure of the Allied talks on troop withdrawals, the US military governor, General Lucius D. Clay, sent a wire to his superiors concerning a British proposal to the Americans for unilateral withdrawals; in his opinion the idea of leaving Western Europe in large numbers was tantamount to abandoning Germany to the communists.[5]

While American military planners were reorienting their thinking, Montgomery, now preparing himself for his future duties as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, directed his own Occupation Zone Staff in May 1946 to prepare a paper discussing defense against an external threat. In that paper he argued for a British presence on the Continent alongside potential allies.[6] Montgomery submitted his staff paper to the Ministry of Defense amid frequent trips back to the Continent in 1947 to inspect the British Army of the Rhine. By December 1947, the joint planners in the Ministry of Defense had considered his paper and proposed three possible strategies in the event of a Russian attack: an air offensive; a Continental defense; or a Pyrenees defense, followed by a liberation operation based from Spain and Portugal. The preference of the Ministry of Defense staff was the air strategy, with the land defense of the Continental strategy being summarily dismissed.

Captain James A. Blackwell, Jr., is currently serving as S-4 of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), Ft. Lewis, Washington. He holds a Ph.D. in International Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School, Tufts University. He has held command and staff assignments in the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and at the Armor School, and most recently was an Assistant Professor of Politics and Government at the US Military Academy.



Montgomery's reaction was not subtle: "I blew right up, saying that I disagreed completely . . . . We must defend Western Europe, not liberate it."[7]

While British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was preparing to make his public call for a Western European Union in January 1948, Montgomery was personally preparing a response to the Defense Ministry's European strategy paper. In his reply, dated 30 January 1948, he not only reiterated his argument for a conventional land defense, he also proposed his formula for effecting his strategy: "We must agree that, if attacked, the nations of the Western Union will hold the attack as far to the east as possible."[8] This is the earliest public record of an official postwar reference to a forward defense of Europe. Thus, at the operational level of war, Montgomery should be credited with being a fundamental proponent of forward defense.

Bevin's Western European Union proposal was welcomed, of course. The Brussels Treaty, signed on 17 March 1948, marked the beginning of joint military planning by Western armed forces. The first steps were the appointment of a military committee and the selection, in late September 1948, of Field Marshal Montgomery as Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, with headquarters in Fontainebleau, France. His committee began its planning in secrecy, but immediately came under public scrutiny and criticism as a debate ensued over where the defensive line should be drawn in Europe.

The public discussion was wide-ranging. Arguments were heard from a number of sources, contending that the line ought to be drawn variously at the Vistula, Oder-Neisse, Elbe, Rhine, Brittany Peninsula, or Pyrenees Mountains. In particular, the French generally were suspicious of British intentions to defend the Continent, based on their initial experience in the two previous world wars. Although Montgomery publicly declared, "Together we will fight to prevent this and we will win,"[9] many Frenchmen remained unconvinced. In the words of one French official, "If we must one day evacuate France it must not be a British officer who orders it."[10] General DeGaulle joined in this sentiment with his own brand of French nationalism, decrying alleged British intentions of planning an early withdrawal from the Continent in the event of a Soviet attack.[11]

As the Berlin crisis carried over into 1949, the public debate intensified and concern over American intentions rose. On 28 February 1949, French Premier Henri Queille pleaded for the United States to prevent a Soviet advance beyond the Elbe.[12] He expressed his concern graphically in a later interview when he said, "We know that once Western Europe was occupied, America would again come to our aid and eventually we again would be liberated. But the process would be terrible. The next time you probably would be liberating a corpse."[13] French Prime Minister Paul Ramadier gave official endorsement of the strategy of forward defense. In response to questions from the French communist opposition he mentioned the Rhine River as a defensive line, but then concluded, "We shall endeavor to halt the aggressor as far as possible from our frontier."[14]

Finally, once the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949, the United States committed itself publicly to the concept of forward defense. The day after the signing of the treaty, General Omar N. Bradley, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in a speech to Jewish war veterans in New York that America's commitments "have carried its international obligations east of the river Rhine."[15] Thus, at least in public, the Allies were agreed in principle that Western Europe must be defended forward. However, while the North Atlantic nations were publicly subscribing to the forward strategy, military planners were facing up to the realities of the military balance in 1948-49.

The Soviet Union could count on perhaps a hundred fully combat-ready divisions within a short time, including 22 in place at full strength in Eastern Europe which needed only orders to attack—contrary to the then-popular notion that they needed only shoes, which of course they already had. The Western powers had only ten divisions, all of

which were at less than full strength and readiness, and no quickly available reserves.[16] On 16 June 1948, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief—US General Clay, British General Robertson, and French General Koenig—agreed that the Rhine would be the defensive line in the event of an attack, and requested the immediate appointment of a supreme commander and the formation of an Allied staff to plan the "coordinated defense of the Rhine."[17] In August came the authority to conduct the planning effort, and General Clay could inform his superior, General Bradley, that a tripartite staff had begun its work in Wiesbaden. This staff operated in accordance with a directive that discussed plans to defend along the Rhine River, specifically incorporating the work of previous consultations which already had provided for initial positioning of forces.[18]

Thus, despite the somewhat ambiguous public statements on the nature of the notion of forward defense, and despite the lack of a formally integrated military structure or a supreme commander, there were by mid-1948 three separate but coordinated plans for a defense on the Rhine River, and there was a committee tasked to prepare a more fully developed combined forces plan. The military commanders of the occupation zones, recognizing that the defense of the separate zones had to be coordinated, anticipated that a more formal Allied command structure would be established in the event of war. They were reluctant to delay planning on the formation of Western European Union organizations, so they prepared the contingency plan for forward defense at the operational level in an informal, somewhat ad hoc fashion, knowing that if war came they would be held accountable for stopping the Red Army.

In September 1948 Montgomery became Chairman of the WEU Defense Organization. His first task was to select the high-level staff officers who would work with him in conducting the overall planning effort and who would hold, presumably, although not by explicit agreement, supreme command over the Brussels Treaty forces in the event of war. He selected British officers for the air and sea staff positions, but looked to the French for a land force representative. Montgomery reasoned that the French would make the greatest contribution to the land forces, and he was aware of French sensitivities to British command over Continental defense.

The first choice for the land forces position was General Alphonse-Pierre Juin, who declined the position. It was suggested in the press that General Juin shared General DeGaulle's misgivings about British domination of Western European Union forces, and for that reason did not take up the post.[19] The job then fell to General de Lattre de Tassigny, who had commanded the French First Army under US General Devers in the Southern Army Group during the Allied forces European offensive. General de Lattre brought with him an officer named Andre Beaufre, who would later become a significant contributor in his own right to forward defense concepts. By mid-November 1948, Montgomery's staff had pieced together the first joint defense plan for the WEU.

This plan was much more than the earlier effort of the local commanders to coordinate their separate defense plans. It called for three potential operations, depending on the level of forces available to the WEU on the Continent at the time of attack. The initial plan, based on existing force levels, was called the Short-Term Plan; it called for an emergency evacuation of the Continent behind a forward delaying action and a stout defense at the Pyrenees.[20] At a second level was the Medium-Term Plan, so named in anticipation of the time it would take to generate the forces necessary to implement it and to shift the logistical infrastructure away from the relatively exposed north-south axis of the occupation forces to a more secure east-west system. This plan called for a mobile defense in which the US constabulary, organized into armored cavalry units, would conduct the screening operation east of the Rhine along the border, in front of 18 divisions between the border and the Rhine. The bulk of the WEU forces, 36 divisions, would be employed in defensive positions along the Rhine River. This force was to hold

the Rhine until European and American reserves could be mobilized and deployed in a counteroffensive to force the aggressor's withdrawal back to the east.[21] The third plan, the Long-Term Plan, anticipated the day when up to 100 divisions would be available in Europe to conduct a linear defense along the border between East and West Germany. There apparently was no plan to construct heavy fortifications; rather, the divisions would be deployed to take advantage of terrain favorable for defense, weighting forces along the more vulnerable avenues of approach.[22]

Despite later public statements, there developed at about this time some important differences in approach between the French and British staffs at Fontainebleau.[23] To be sure, it was agreed by all that existing forces were incapable of holding even at the Rhine.[24] The disagreement arose over where the line of the main defensive effort was to be drawn once the Brussels Treaty states began to meet their commitments for additional forces. For the British, especially Montgomery, forward defense would be achieved by screening and delaying forces between the Elbe and the Rhine, with the Rhine River being the line along which the final stand would be taken.[25] To the French, particularly to General de Lattre de Tassigny, forward defense meant a stand closer to the Iron Curtain.[26] Thus there might have been a difference of opinion amounting to as much as 150 kilometers, considering the depth of the Fulda-Mainz corridor.

This first period of Western European military planning was marked by significant differences between the British and the French in the operational dimension of war. Although much of the planning at first consisted of ad hoc efforts, the military commanders recognized a need to be prepared to fight the Russians. The differences were both conceptual and personal, and they were present not only between Allies but sometimes, as in the British case, within the defense establishment of a single country. The formation of the WEU Defense Organization resulted in a coordinated plan, but the Union did not reduce the effect of the differences because it lacked sufficient troops to do much more than protect an evacuation of the Continent, and because it lacked a supreme commander with the authority to resolve the differences. But the danger of the Cold War suddenly going hot in 1950 soon imparted a sense of urgency at the operational level that was to produce temporary resolutions.

A SENSE OF URGENCY: 1949-52

Although the Berlin Airlift had been an overwhelming success by May 1949, and the April signing of the North Atlantic Treaty had seemed to signal for the Allies that the Russians might be contained in Europe with no further encroachments on the Free World, a number of subsequent events rapidly brought to the West a fear of imminent war with the Russians in Europe. The announcement on 22 September 1949 that the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic device caused consternation in Western military circles, more because of the unexpected quickness with which the Soviets had developed the bomb than from fear of their ability to deliver it in 1949 or 1950. The second event was the outbreak of the Korean War, half a globe away, in late June 1950. The Korean attack seemed to signal a Soviet willingness to use armed force in the Cold War, and Western Europe looked like an easy target for the massive Red Army in Eastern Europe. What had become obvious by late 1949 was that any defense of Western Europe, forward or otherwise, would require a contribution of troops in some form from West Germany. The unanimity of this view among the Western Allies did not, however, lessen the differences in approach to Continental defense, especially between the French and British military planners.

In the fall of 1949, Montgomery had told Bevin that a German contribution to WEU forces would be necessary. In November, Monty carried the same message to President Truman and to General Eisenhower—then President of Columbia University—in the United States.[27] Equally obvious was the implication that if the conquerors were going

to expect the conquered people to provide soldiers to oppose the new enemy, the territory of the occupied country would also have to be included in the defense plans. Accordingly, the protection of the North Atlantic Treaty was extended to Germany, and the doctrine of forward defense was adopted by the North Atlantic Council in its September 1950 meeting.[28]

The Brussels Treaty powers merged the military planning organizations of the Western European Union with analogous NATO structures in December 1950, and General Eisenhower was appointed the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) on 19 December. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was activated on 2 April 1951, and by February 1952 the council at Lisbon approved force goals for the implementation of the forward strategy. It is significant that in the September 1950 communique, "forward defense" was not established on any specific line, nor even was it specified that the defense would be mounted "as far east as possible." Indeed, the term "forward defense" is used nowhere in the text. Thus, the military planners were allowed some room for interpretation as to the operational implementation of forward defense.

Using this latitude of interpretation, the military planners prepared an operational concept that was in accordance with the spirit of the forward strategy, yet which sought to minimize the risk of a military defeat in the face of overwhelmingly unfavorable force balances. The solution was a mobile defense, calling for a delaying operation from the intra-German border westward to a final defensive stand along the Rhine. The defensive force would be required to hold until reinforcements from mobilized Continental reserves and from the United States, Canada, and Great Britain could be formed and launched into a counteroffensive.

The newly formed SHAPE staff began its work by drawing upon the staff work done by the Western European Union Defense Organization, the Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Plans. In the summer of 1950 the WEU had conducted an exercise under General de Lattre de Tassigny called "Triade." This exercise tested the ability of the deployed forces to conduct defensive operations to stop an attack. According to General Beaufre, both British and French Ministers of Defense concluded that the exercise was a success.[29] The plans called for stiff fighting east of the Rhine, using delaying tactics in order to stop the Red Army as far east as possible. In March 1951, the operational plans were being implemented; roads and bridges east of the Rhine were prepared for demolition, an important indicator of the plan to fight a delay east of the river.[30]

The fact that SHAPE was planning a mobile defense became clear in the public testimony of US officials in February 1951 Senate hearings on stationing US troops in Europe. At those hearings, General of the Army Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke of the "greater depth" that NATO forces could fight in with the four divisions that the United States planned to deploy in Europe.[31]

General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, stated clearly that a mobile defense was planned, using demolitions, antitank weapons, and mobile reserves,[32] all characteristics of a mobile defense rather than a linear or area defense. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, confirmed that delaying tactics would initially be employed.[33] Even the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, supported the delaying operation,[34] although other unofficial air power advocates at the hearings argued that ground forces might not be necessary at all in the light of the capabilities of the Strategic Air Command.[35] In retrospect, Drew Middleton's report in September 1951 on SHAPE's plans was probably accurate: "deliberate withdrawal in front of the Soviet attack across the North German plains and through the Fulda gap, followed by concerted attacks on the flanks of the Soviet advance by strong forces stationed around the base of the Jutland Peninsula and in the area of the Main River."[36]

The official pronouncements by the North Atlantic Council in September and December 1950 thus gave SHAPE planners

some leeway in planning for a forward defense which would conform to the realities of the military balance of the early 1950s. The mobile defense concept would ensure that the Russians would meet some organized resistance from the moment they crossed the border, but Allied delaying tactics, with large forces refusing to become decisively engaged, would prevent an early defeat at the hands of a foe with superior numbers. The Lisbon Conference of February 1952 called on Alliance members to provide sufficient forces by 1955 to mount a credible defense east of the Rhine without giving up territory. Nevertheless, critics of SHAPE's operational concept were quick to point out that the planned delay looked very much like an American and British plan to abandon the Continent in the event of an attack, much like the WEU Short-Term Plan.

In spite of repeated denials by General Eisenhower himself, this criticism persisted.[37] The principal sources of criticism were the French Gaullists and the West German Social Democrats. It is not insignificant that both groups were in the opposition to their governments in their national legislative bodies. For the West German Social Democrats (SPD), the issue was not so much forward defense as it was the implication of the strategy for the issues that the SPD considered most important: rearmament and reunification. The SPD leader, Kurt Schumacher, spoke in 1950 of establishing Western protection for Germany, "such as to enable a military decision on the Vistula and Niemen."[38] After initially voicing the SPD's opposition to *Vorfeld-Verwendung* (forefield employment) because of inadequate plans to rearm Germany, Schumacher late in September 1950 said, "We are ready to bear arms once again if, with us, the Western Allies take over the same risk and the same chance of warding off a Soviet attack, establishing themselves in the greatest possible strength on the Elbe."[39] For the SPD, apparently, a mobile defense was not an adequate return on the investment of Germans to rearm themselves. Chancellor Adenauer nevertheless contended that the September 1950 decision marked the end of a Rhine defense and the beginning of Allied abilities to mount a forward defense beginning at the border.[40]

In France, DeGaulle continued to allege that the true intention of the United States and Britain was to abandon the Continent in case of war. He pointed to the concept of a delay as merely a cover for another Dunkirk-style evacuation. Although Eisenhower appointed Marshal Juin to replace de Lattre de Tassigny as land force commander, DeGaulle was not appeased. He argued that the Allies were not committed to defense of the Continent, but were "disposed to limit their effort to defense of a few points: England, Spain, a Breton redoubt."[41]

DeGaulle's reference to "a Breton redoubt" was apparently taken from an account of General Eisenhower's congressional testimony in 1951. Although General DeGaulle's accusation may have been politically motivated with a view toward getting votes in the upcoming French national election, Eisenhower felt it was serious enough to warrant a public denial.[42] Furthermore, DeGaulle's charges were not without a basis in fact. As President of Columbia University, Eisenhower had said in October 1950, before the North Atlantic Council asked Truman to make him available for the SACEUR position, that American soldiers should not be stationed outside our continental limits; rather, they should serve as a global central reserve.[43] Other American conservative leaders had taken a similar public stance. For example, Senator Taft urged that the United States could not hold the Elbe line, and that therefore we ought to concentrate instead on the Navy and Air Force for defense.[44] In his congressional testimony in February 1951, General Eisenhower reworded his position but did not categorically support stationing US troops in Europe.[45] No amount of reassurance from the Americans could subsequently assuage the fears of the German and French opposition parties.

In spite of the misgivings of the aspirants to political power, the February 1952 Lisbon Conference marked a unity in the Alliance at the operational level that certainly has not

been achieved since. The widely accepted perception of the willingness of the Soviet Union to use force to achieve its hegemonic goals served to rejuvenate the wartime alliance relationships among the Western powers, particularly under the leadership of the former Supreme Commander of the coalition armies. As economic realities set in to cast doubt on the attainability of the Lisbon force goals, and as concern over Soviet use of force declined, the unity began to erode.

STRETCH-OUT: 1952-55

The Lisbon force goals were overly optimistic in terms of the Allies' abilities to provide fully combat-ready divisions for the Central European region. Indeed, there are, among those who participated in the Lisbon talks, some who believe that many Alliance members knew they could not meet their commitments even as they were making them.[46] This period was a time when the military planners occupied themselves with somehow reconciling the need for a forward strategy with the lack of sufficient conventional forces to conduct a defense at the border.

One potential solution that began to receive serious attention early in 1952 was the use of nuclear weapons to stop a Russian breakthrough east of the Rhine. General Beaufre was given the task of studying this potential, even as SHAPE's staff had completed its plans for the conventional mobile defense.[47] While General Beaufre began work on what was to become the important nuclear doctrine, two events dominated SHAPE in April 1952. The first of these was an early command cell exercise, which was held 2-13 April. The second event was Eisenhower's replacement on 28 April by General Matthew B. Ridgway.

The SHAPE exercise of April 1952 was the first of its kind. It was important not only for its role as a vehicle for practicing agreed NATO strategy and operations, but also for the method involved in the conduct of the exercise. In the event, known as "Venus de Milo" (no arms and all SHAPE[48]), the mobile defense was exercised on maps by SHAPE commanders and staffs under the overall supervision of the Deputy SACEUR, Field Marshal Montgomery. Montgomery handled it as a classroom exercise, challenging participants to react instantly to his prepared scenario.[49] By controlling the scenario and the procedures for this and subsequent exercises at SHAPE, Montgomery was able to influence the particular interpretation of forward defense practiced by SHAPE in the early years. Thus the idea that the Russians would concentrate their drive along the North German Plain approach came out of these "teaching exercises in which the great tactician lectured to his subordinate NATO commanders and their staffs in an entertaining but very positive way."[50] Montgomery would then have the main Soviet attack come out of the Magdeburg area, cross the Weser River, and dash to the Channel ports. He considered the larger Central Army Group region to be the more easily defensible, thus rendering a Soviet main effort there unlikely.[51]

The second critical event of April 1952 was Eisenhower's replacement as Supreme Allied Commander Europe by General Matthew B. Ridgway. In leaving the post to seek the Republican nomination for the US Presidency that year, General Eisenhower reported on the year's activities at SHAPE to the Standing Group. In this report, he stated his desire to have the forces required to fight a defense in depth in Europe.[52] In his assessment, NATO was not yet capable of forward defense at the Rhine River: "As of today, our forces could not offer prolonged resistance East of the Rhine barrier."[53] With General Eisenhower went a certain ability to produce consensus and urgency in operational matters among the Allies.[54]

General Ridgway ran head-on into the problems of differing national perspectives and personality conflicts as SACEUR. General Ridgway faced great problems of suspicious partners who doubted that French, British, or American troops would defend the smaller countries forward.[55] In responding to these suspicions, Ridgway went so far as to speak personally to the Dutch cabinet at

length to reassure them of the intentions of SHAPE to defend the territory of all members of NATO, but made clear that he would fight a delaying action rather than risk losing his entire force by taking a final stand too far forward.[56]

General Ridgway had a particularly difficult time resolving the personality conflicts within SHAPE. This was especially true in his own relationship to his Deputy Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Montgomery. By this time Montgomery had seen several Western European staffs come and go: two of his own in the Western European Union Defense Organization, and before that his staff in the British Occupation Zone, as well as Eisenhower's first SHAPE staff. Now he was to be subordinated to an American who had been a two-star general and division commander during the D-Day invasion, at a time when Montgomery had already been appointed a Field Marshal, the equivalent of a four-star general. Ironically, during the Normandy operation, Ridgway had worked under Montgomery in the Army Group responsible for the northern portion of the Allied invasion. At the outset of his new command, General Ridgway attempted to defuse any potential misunderstandings with Montgomery as to who was in charge; but apparently Montgomery would take matters into his own hands. Occasionally the Deputy SACEUR would give unofficial, personal recommendations to field commanders that were contrary to official SHAPE policy. When Ridgway would confront him with such veiled disloyalty, the result was less than satisfactory: " 'You're right Matt,' he'd say. 'You're quite right.' Then he'd go out and do it again."[57] Meanwhile, the public debate over forward defense was renewed as the failure to meet the ambitious Lisbon force goals became publicly apparent.

In the summer of 1952 there were a number of reports that the French had arrived at a concept of a withdrawal into a "French Fortress" if the Russians were to attack in central Europe.[58] These reports drew repeated denials from SHAPE in the fall of 1952 upon the conclusion of a large-scale maneuver involving NATO forces, including the newly deployed US, French, Belgian, and Dutch units, practicing delaying operations east of the Rhine River in Exercise Rosebush.[59] However, these denials failed to clear up the confusion regarding SHAPE's intentions, because SHAPE spokesmen seemingly contradicted each other. Specifically, Marshal Juin issued a statement in September 1952 asserting that his NATO land forces could delay east of the Rhine and hold firm at the river.[60] Juin's statement elicited an immediate critical response from the German Social Democrats who demanded a defense farther east.[61] In response to this demand from the SPD, the US forces commander in Europe issued a statement the following day, pointing out that in delaying operations terrain sometimes is traded for time, but denying that Exercise Rosebush revealed any operational plans for wartime contingencies.[62]

The apparently contradictory statements coming out of SHAPE caused consternation at the diplomatic level. At the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly, J. J. Fens, from the Netherlands, condemned any prepared plan to relinquish territory.[63] This brought a response from General Ridgway himself, who reiterated the mobile defense concept and again called for large numbers of reserves.[64] Marshal Juin rephrased his declaration into terms more acceptable to critics in the West German SPD.[65] Finally, the Standing Group itself stepped in to reassure the Allies of SHAPE's intentions, and it "reiterated the accepted strategy, namely the defense of all peoples and territories for which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is responsible."[66]

Despite the best of intentions, the SHAPE staff was unable to convince its critics in this period that its concept of a mobile defense between the Rhine and the intra-German border was the most forward defense possible within the constraints of the conventional forces that were available or planned for in 1952. By the autumn of 1952, the operational planners began to look seriously to battlefield nuclear weapons as the primary guarantor of forward defense at the border.

In September 1952, General J. Lawton Collins, US Army Chief of Staff, told a NATO press conference that atomic weapons "will result ultimately in the ability to do the job with a smaller number of divisions."[67] The first attempt to integrate nuclear weapons into SHAPE plans involved a plan to use atomic devices to destroy the Soviet army while keeping NATO forces deployed as they would be in a nonnuclear defense; it was known as the Ridgway Plan of 1952-53.[68] The results of war-gaming this plan were that conventional forces were destroyed faster and more completely in the firepower of atomic weapons, generating requirements for even more replacements of conventional forces to maintain the forward defense.[69]

The planners therefore started over by reexamining their assumptions and strategic concepts. The result was a plan called the New Approach doctrine of 1954-56, which "called for a tactical nuclear response to Soviet aggression in Europe from the outset."[70] This strategy was a trip-wire operational concept in which conventional forces were not needed for maneuver; instead, "manpower requirements are limited to those needed to force concentrations on the attacker, identify these . . . and deliver the nuclear firepower."[71]

General Beaufre confirms that the conventional forces took on the role of a trip-wire under the New Approach strategy.[72] US Secretary of State Dulles announced the strategy in his January 1954 "Massive Retaliation" speech. This strategy was not particularly secret[73] but the issue of the tactical use of nuclear weapons in forward defense, so controversial in later years, was lost in the background of the major issue of 1954: German rearmament.

It had become apparent in the early 1950s that the Germans would have to contribute to the conventional defense of the central region of Western Europe. Indeed, we have seen that this consideration was part of the rationale for the forward defense strategy. The Pleven Plan for a sort of European, non-national army became the vehicle expected to carry German rearmament through all the sensitivities of the Europeans' fears of a resurgent Germany. When the French National Assembly failed to ratify the European Defense Community Plan in August 1954, the Western powers, two months later, officially ended the occupation. They also offered sovereignty and accession to the Brussels Treaty to the West German state.

In anticipation of eventual rearmament, Chancellor Adenauer had appointed Theodore Blank as a special adviser on the question. Blank had a notable staff, including former *Wehrmacht* strategists of considerable success during the war who had been cleared of National Socialist ties. The West Germans for the most part concurred with both the forward defense strategy and the mobile defense concept.[74] There was at least one member of Blank's staff, however, who did not go along with the mobile defense idea, Colonel Bogislaw von Bonin.

Von Bonin proposed a linear defense at the border that would not yield an inch of German territory. What is significant about Von Bonin's proposal is not so much that it called for a truly forward defense with conventional forces, but the fact that his concept was rejected by the West Germans. Upon the rejection of his plan, Von Bonin went public with his dispute and was promptly dismissed. He was later connected to communist front organizations in West Germany.[75] It was ironic that his was a truly forward concept; supposedly that was what the Germans, French, and the smaller Continental states wanted, yet the proposal was nevertheless unacceptable to the most threatened ally, West Germany.

CONCLUSION

By 1955, Western Allied military strategy had come full circle. Starting in the occupation years of the 1940s, there was at the operational level an initial emergency defense plan, coordinated by the French, British, and American zone commanders. The Western European Union Defense Organization plan under the chairmanship of Field Marshal Montgomery produced the first integrated defense plan for the Brussels

Treaty Powers. When NATO formed SHAPE, General Eisenhower's staff took over the work and developed a plan for a mobile defense between the border and the Rhine. As the sense of urgency of 1945-52 abated, NATO members fell short of their goal of providing the nearly 100 divisions that would be required to fight a linear forward defense in accordance with the September 1950 council declaration on the forward strategy. The allied effort had begun, because of lack of forces in 1948, as an impossible forward conventional defense; it had evolved into a more practical mobile defense by 1952; but then it had regressed into an impossible forward conventional defense again and a reliance on nuclear weapons.

The early history of NATO thus demonstrates the complex operational origins of the forward strategy. All the factors affecting the operational level of war were present in vivid illustration in this time. Differing operational concepts were proposed by the various factions interested in forward defense, ranging from the British Ministry of Defense option of the Pyrenees defense to Von Bonin's linear defense proposal. The cultural, historical, and geographical makeup of the factor of a national style of war is amply portrayed in the tension among the French, British, American, and Benelux reactions to the various plans for forward defense throughout these years. And certainly the force of personality was a major contributor in determining the operational concept for the implementation of forward defense; plans changed with changes in command and as strong personalities came into conflict with each other. Still today, these several complexities continue to nag the operational dimension of NATO forward defense.

NOTES

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75. On the details of the Von Bonin affair, see Craig, pp. 22-25; "The Bonin Case: A German Controversy Over Rearmament, By a Former German General," US Air Force Project RAND Research Memorandum No. RM-1538, 1 July 1955; and Hans Speier, "German Rearmament and Atomic War," US Air Force Project RAND Research Memorandum No. R-298, 15 February 1957.



VIEW FROM THE FOURTH ESTATE

THE TEN COMMANDMENTS OF DEFENSE SPENDING

David Evans

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In January the Pentagon will submit to Congress the biggest peacetime defense budget in history—around $318 billion for fiscal 1987. In fact, every new budget in this decade has been the largest yet, and current plans are to set new records every year.

The Pentagon has come to resemble a huge Aztec totem that must be appeased by a constant flow of cash offerings. The frightened natives, the high priests warn, will remain safe only by pouring money into its fearful maw at the rate of $145,000 every minute, ten hours a day, every day, with no time off for coffee breaks or holidays.

As a career military officer, I served for years convinced that the size of the US defense budget was the rational product of three factors: an assessment of the threat, a strategy to counter it, and a determination of the funds needed to execute the strategy. As with the earth-centered universe, there was just enough evidence to make this theory believable.

Then I was assigned to the Pentagon.

There I encountered a value system of bureaucratic beliefs quite different from what I'd expected. These values drive the defense budget, sustaining its momentum through sheer weight of dogma, much like the Catholic Church in the days before Martin Luther.

This value system cannot be discovered in any briefing book; few in the building will admit the values even exist. But the unstated rules of the budgetary game are as real as cosmic rays, and they penetrate every pigeonhole of the Pentagon's labyrinthine bureaucracy. Although the rules take many forms, they can be reduced to ten commandments.

1) The defense budget, like the universe, will expand forever. This commandment is the original sin of defense planning. Every year the Pentagon spews out a new Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP) and each FYDP assumes increases of about $30 billion each year for the next five. The only major part of the federal budget growing at a faster rate is the interest payment on the national debt.

The FYDP isn't viewed by the Pentagon as a wish list. It is the blueprint upon which our defense posture is based; the Pentagon counts on these $30 billion-a-year increases indefinitely. In recent years the administration has been lucky.

Why does the Pentagon plan this way?

For the same reason that the administration "plans" to eliminate the deficit through economic growth alone. Hard choices are avoided; no special-interest constituencies suffer real pain.

The resulting defense budgets tend to look like a Sunday buffet, with more tanks for the Army, an advanced tactical fighter for the Air Force, and more ships for the Navy. Absent is the strategic coherence that Senator Sam Nunn and other knowledgeable critics have been asking for.

Because the services plan on having more money in the future, there are built-in temptations to start more programs. If budget cuts occur, production stretch-outs, cancellations, and frantic last-minute adjustments become the order of the day.

Congress is bad enough, with its pork-barrel perspective on what the nation needs, but the fact is that the Pentagon sets itself up for budgetary chaos on the very first day of its annual planning cycle.

2) Estimate the threat on a worst-case-basis; budget to meet it on a best-case-basis. The majority view in the Pentagon presumes that Murphy's Law does not apply to the Soviet military. A classic case of threat inflation involves the Soviets' T-80 tank, a sinister new machine the Pentagon solemnly reported in 1983 as having been in production since 1981.

It now appears that the 1400 T-80s opposite NATO are merely modified T-72s, a machine that has been in production for at least a decade.

The "missile gap" of the 1960s was a classic example of worst-case thinking.

But this pessimism, which serves to justify the need for more money, is strangely absent in the budgetary arena. Here an unrealistic sense of optimism prevails. Budgeteers assume a best-case vision of more money in the future, with the cost

of every activity, from procurement to operations, predicted with absolute certainty. The planning process, for example, almost invariably predicts that weapons costs will decline during the production cycle.

Almost invariably, the opposite is true. Yet not one dollar in the current defense budget has been set aside as a hedge against unforeseen cost overruns.

On the battlefield, the importance of an uncommitted reserve is drilled into our field commanders, for the simple reason that "no plan survives contact with the enemy." Yet Pentagon budgeteers act as though their spending plans will be executed perfectly when launched directly into the teeth of a Congress with an agenda of its own. With every planned dollar committed to something, what happens when the plan fails? Production runs get stretched out, as in the case of the M-1 tank, inflating even further the costs that were initially underestimated, leading to a vicious cycle of cutbacks and cost increases.

3) Requirements will expand to equal the available supply of money. The Pentagon rarely gets all the money it requests. Occasionally, however, it gets more than expected. These windfall moneys are not returned. Instead, requirements are adjusted after the fact to justify the extra funds. An example: After years of watching the officer ranks swell, especially in the senior grades, Congress in 1980 enacted the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, which established ceilings for each officer rank. As soon as it was published, those services with fewer officers than allowed promptly raised their billet "requirements" to equal the permitted number of majors and colonels.

Conversely, "requirements" for foreign-made weapons, even if they work better than our own, generally equal zero. The Pentagon has established a cushy relationship over the years with its favored contractors. Like expensive mistresses, they can be difficult at times, but they also can be gratifying to officers frustrated by the genteel poverty of active service and hungry for high-paying post-retirement jobs. Not for nothing have certain Pentagon leaders claimed that defense manufacturers "deserve" wages averaging 20 percent higher than the manufacturing industry in general.

4) Given a choice, pick the higher-priced spread. The recent past is littered with examples. For the cost of two F-15 fighters, the Air Force could have bought three of the highly regarded F-16 fighters, the undisputed winner of the lightweight-fighter competition of a few years ago. Now it's pouring money into the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). But there are alternatives to spending $500,000 to $1 million a copy for the AMRAAM. For openers, we could develop an improved Sparrow missile.

Similarly, the Navy chose the pricey Aegis air-defense system, mounted in a billion-dollar cruiser, instead of a cheaper, surface-launched version of its long-range Phoenix missile. The Army elected to field the M-2 "Bradley" troop carrier, which costs three times as much to operate as the M-113, a proven carrier that could have been upgraded at much lower cost. In fact, the prime contractor once proposed doing just that.

Even the Marine Corps is not immune to the preference for caviar over Grape Nuts. Its new expeditionary shelters—portable buildings such as maintenance sheds and field hospitals made of interlocking aluminum panels—cost about $150 per square foot. My home in the expensive Washington housing market cost about $75 a square foot.

The result of these choices? A steady decline in the size of the force at increased cost. It sometimes seems that budgetary expansion is preferable to force expansion.

5) A program divisible by 100 is more likely to be funded than one that isn't. The B-1 bomber is a good example. The Air Force wants 100, and after being canceled during the Carter administration, the B-1 has risen like some mechanical Lazarus to enter production this year. The Navy's goal of 600 ships is also well in hand.

The Army, however, is struggling to equip and modernize 26 divisions with its 25 percent share of the defense budget. The Air Force and Navy each get more than 30 percent of the defense budget.

Much of the Army's problem stems from its penchant for the higher-priced spread. But we now have more than two thirds of the defense budget devoted to the Air Force and Navy, services that exist, in large measure, to support the Army. Priorities somehow have gotten reversed.

A strong Navy is desirable, but why 600 ships exactly? Perhaps, as one cynic observed, because spreading 25 ships to each of the world's 24 time zones works out to exactly 600.

6) The force that deters is not the force that fights. This is the argument used, chiefly by the services, to justify buying more weapons while forgoing the necessary stocks of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts to keep them functioning in wartime. The assumption is that appearances are more intimidating to the Russians than real fighting power. One hundred F-15

fighters with limited supplies of fuel, missiles, and spare parts are presumed to be a greater deterrent than, say, 75 fighters fully stocked for sustained combat.

The Navy has two new carriers under construction but only enough ammunition to supply eight of the twelve battle carriers it already has. Neither the Army nor Marine Corps has enough ammunition to fight a conventional war for 30 days, yet both continue to spend disproportionately on more weapons.

This situation constitutes a big gamble—that the Russians calculate the military balance just like we do. We tend to count the gross numbers of Soviet forces—divisions, ships, fighter aircraft, and so forth—downplaying the fact that many of the 200-plus Soviet divisions are manned at 30 percent strength or less. "If a Soviet division in this shape frightens us," observes one Pentagon wag, "why shouldn't a US Army division in similar shape intimidate them equally?" He has a point, but only if the Russians are bluffing, too.

7) If the Russians have something we don't have, we must be doing something wrong. Despite talk about the Soviets stealing our technology, the Pentagon has a curious tendency to mimic Soviet developments, with two results: The Russians always seem to be "ahead," and their troubles become ours.

Examples are legion. Some years ago the Soviets introduced the AK-47 assault rifle, a fairly inaccurate, short-range weapon with a high volume of fire. The US Army's M-16 appeared a few years later, but it ate up so much ammunition that it was modified to fire three-round bursts.

In 1966 the Russian MiG-25 captured the world speed record. The Air Force saw it as the next-generation fighter and developed its own big, heavy fighter, the F-15. Then we discovered that the MiG-25 wasn't all it was cracked up to be. Now we're saddled with a better fighter, but one that gulps fuel and presents as big a maintenance burden as the veteran F-4 it was built to replace.

The Soviets are adding about 60 air-cushioned landing craft to their assault force. It must be a good idea, because our Navy now plans to buy 90—at $25 million each, more than the cost of an F-16 fighter. Our version of the landing craft has run into problems with its complex gas-turbine engines and electrical systems; the fact that the Soviets are groping with several different models suggests that they are experiencing similar design and reliability problems.

We may finally be learning that not all Russian weapons are good ideas. The Soviets fielded a mobile air-defense gun placed atop a tank chassis and plugged into a turret-mounted radar. The US Army was sufficiently impressed to spend almost $2 billion on a version of its own, the division air-defense gun, or DIVAD. After repeated test failures, Defense Secretary Weinberger recently ended its production. We should have known better than to copy a weapon made in a country that still can't produce a decent washing machine.

8) Tomorrow's weapon, at greater cost, is preferable to proven, off-the-shelf technology. For three decades the US defense establishment has failed to put in the hands of infantrymen a weapon that will kill tanks, even though this one capability could spell the defeat of the Soviet Army.

Recent reports suggest that about half of the US Army's long-range TOW antitank missiles won't work, and those that do are subject to cold-weather malfunction. The DRAGON medium-range antitank missile is of questionable accuracy and penetrating power. The short-range Light Anti-Armor Weapon, the soldier's last-ditch defense, will not penetrate a Soviet tank's frontal armor.

If those "heavily armed" Cuban day laborers building Salines airfield in Grenada last year had had just three Soviet tanks shipped down from Havana, one expert stated flatly, "the Cubans would have run out of targets before we could have killed them."

The Army knows it has a major anti-tank problem. Its solution is to live with it until a new weapon, the Advanced Anti-Armor Weapon System, or AAWS-M (pronounced "awesome"), is ready. This project, involving hundreds of millions of dollars in development costs, will not place a single antitank weapon in the hands of troops for at least five years.

Yet alternatives are available in the interim at less cost. The 106-millimeter recoilless rifle, for one, is a proven tank killer. Its blast signature—the flash of the weapon's firing—is no greater than TOW's (so no more likely to give away the gunner's position), and it is cheap and easy to produce. But the 106 is a *gun*, and therefore anathema to the Army's Missile Command, which would rather develop exotic guided missiles like AAWS-M to knock out tanks.

But if it's a missile the Army wants, it could buy a foreign system such as the European-built MILAN antitank missile, which the Iraqis have used with great success against Iran. As a foreign weapon, however, MILAN is not likely to clear the Army's procurement establishment, even if manufactured in the US under license. Yet the

likely threats facing the Army for the near term can be defeated by weapons such as MILAN.

Although AAWS-M might ultimately be better than the 106 or MILAN, it does not yet exist, and ambitious designs on paper have a history of getting scaled back as problems occur during actual development. Meanwhile, the Army is reluctant to siphon money from AAWS-M to fund an immediate solution to its antitank crisis.

9) Every man is an island, or the services are not their brother's keeper. Inter-service rivalries tend to be muted in budgetary good times, but self-interest remains the name of the game. Examples abound. In the Air Force, a caste system prevails among pilots. The Brahmins are fighter jocks committed to air-to-air battle. Strategic bomber crews, part of another unique Air Force mission, enjoy second-banana status. Lowest in prestige are the "mud pilots," who fly the boxy A-10 "Warthog" in close support of the Army.

"You have to understand," explains one expert, "when the Air Force talks interdiction, of strikes deep in the enemy's rear, it's really talking about *getting away from the Army*."

The Air Force's disdain for its Army-support mission is evidenced by the fact that the A-10 is no longer in production, and no replacement is in sight. The Army, left to its own devices, has built its own close-support air force—hundreds of armed helicopters costing as much apiece as the A-10 but carrying half the payload.

Similarly, the Navy has spent 40 years investing in carrier battle groups to refight the Battle of Midway, while strategic sealift, necessary for getting 95 percent of US forces and supplies to the fight, has languished. Yet transport is arguably the Navy's primary mission. The horrific cost of big carriers and their protective escorts has cut into the moneys available for sealift and warships designed to meet the primary threat to transports bound for Europe—Russian submarines.

The Army has compounded the Navy's neglect by building bigger tanks, guns, trucks, and helicopters, placing an even greater strain on limited Navy and Air Force transport assets. In a perverse about-face, the Army then created 10,000-man "light divisions" to ease the mobility problem. Now it has units charitably described as "light enough to get there but not heavy enough to win."

Meanwhile, the reserves, with fewer infighters manning the budgetary ramparts at the Pentagon, receive only six cents of every defense dollar. Yet the country cannot fight without them. More than half of the Army's infantry battalions and almost 30 percent of the Air Force's fighter aircraft are in the reserves. For years these units have been under-manned and outfitted with hand-me-down equipment from the active forces.

10) A new headquarters is the greatest force multiplier of all. For almost 30 years the number of battalions, ships, and aircraft has declined steadily. This smaller cutting edge, we are told, represents a more potent military because the latest weapons are more lethal—one new weapon is deadlier than two or three of the older model it replaces, hence the term "force multiplier." But as one expert on casualty rates has observed, "The increased theoretical lethality has been more than offset by increased dispersion of troops."

At the same time, the decline in the number of fighting units has been more than offset by an exponential increase in headquarters. We now have more assistant Defense secretaries, separate agencies, "management" headquarters, and staff officers than ever before.

The result is a steady decrease in the proportion of combat manpower at the very time we are supposedly engaged in a defense build-up. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Rapid Deployment Force. Recently renamed the Central Command, it is the first multi-service command to consist entirely of a staff—no legions, just palace courtesans.

Fighting units are to be placed under the Central Command headquarters in the event of a conflict. The rest of the time, all that exists of Central Command is a headquarters full of staff officers and attendant clerks and typists—as one senior officer put it, "500 busybodies and mischief-makers."

A large staff is no substitute for quality of thought. The strategic concept for fighting World War II was written by a single staff officer, Army Lieutenant Colonel Albert Wedemeyer; his plan was carried out by an army of 11 million. Yet the belief persists that more headquarters—more committees, really—are necessary to make the military more "efficient," to "multiply" combat power.

Creating more headquarters for today's military bureaucracy is like feeding cheesecake to a fat man. The way to put more tooth and claw into the force is to drive staffs away from their computer terminals and back to honest work with line units at sea and in the field. Flushing just *half* the uniformed manpower out of two activities—research-and-development and the ubiquitous "management headquarters,"—would be enough to activate two more Army divisions at full strength.

The national-defense effort has become so large, so diverse, and so compartmentalized that it defies the kind of simplification implied by the ten preceding commandments. In fact, an eleventh commandment holds sway that embraces many of those above. It is: **No one kicks sand in the face of high-tech.** We see it in the beverage coasters passed out by North American Rockwell, the prime contractor for the B-1 bomber; they come emblazoned with a lightning bolt and the blunt declaration "Technology is strength."

But is it? In the search for longer range, greater speed, and more accuracy, costs have skyrocketed. We have therefore been forced to buy less. Not to worry, goes the claim; the new weapons are costly because they're effective. It is technology, not numbers—machines, not men—that make us strong. One wonders. At the National Training Center, the Army is firing prodigious quantities of the latest gun and missile munitions to achieve relatively few kills. Weapons common to more than one service are yielding marked differences in effectiveness, suggesting that training in their use—in other words, the man behind the gun—remains paramount.

Yet the prohibitive cost of the latest precision-guided weapons precludes the intensive training needed to understand their quirks and capabilities. Fighter pilots and antitank-missile gunners might fire one missile a year—not enough to build confidence. Our training has become increasingly remote from the reality of war. The result is that a great deal has been spent to attain an increase in uncertainty. And if our high-tech systems don't work as planned, we are going to be in serious trouble because we lack the depth, the stockpiles, to continue plastering the enemy with fire after the first shock.

Contrary to much of the military establishment rhetoric, a renaissance of American military power may *not* be taking place. After spending nearly a trillion dollars over the past four years, the American military establishment continues to evidence the behavior of a dying star. It has shrunk to a fraction of its size of 30 years ago and, like a bureaucratic black hole, it is collapsing under the weight of its increasing cost.

It is taking more and more money to achieve even marginal increases. For example, after pumping up its procurement spending since 1980 by 121 percent after inflation, the number of Air Force aircraft increased by 4 percent. Chronic readiness problems will remain because of the higher operating costs of the new systems, to say nothing of the Pentagon's proclivity to buy more "things" while scrimping on the funds needed to keep ready what it has already bought.

But the past need not presage the future. Pentagon thinking can be changed. And just as an ocean liner takes two or three miles to alter course, it may not be necessary to wrench the Pentagon overnight into a radically different system.

Service unification, for example, need not be the sine qua non of defense reform. But it is necessary to move the system into new patterns of thinking if we are to overcome the "commandments" that now have the force of holy writ. There are several steps that would help:

- Don't allow planners to assume an unrealistically high growth rate in future defense budgets. That assumption dilutes discipline in making choices during the initial phases of the budgetary cycle.
- Paint the Soviet threat in more realistic terms. The size of the Soviet military is impressive, but years of Pentagon scare-mongering, largely for the purpose of extorting bigger defense budgets out of Congress, have succeeded in frightening the stuffing out of our own troops. "It's amazing," remarks one field-grade battalion officer, "how many of our junior officers are convinced the Russians are a vast, unbeatable horde." Defeatism among our own soldiery is dangerous. General George Patton struck a better balance when he told the men of his 2nd Armored Division in 1940 that the Germans, "whom we shall have the honor to destroy, are good soldiers and stark fighters. To beat such men, you must not despise their ability, but you must be confident in your own superiority."
- Reward austerity. The past three decades have demonstrated that proposing complex new weapons pays off for a service intent on increasing its annual budget. A service that proposed an austere, low-cost weapon to replace one twice as expensive would probably wind up with one-for-one replacement and a *cut* in its budget. We should be rewarding any service that achieves lower unit costs with a higher authorized force level. The point is to encourage trade-offs to produce a bigger force for the same amount of money.
- Build a military that can fight longer than 30 days. Prudence dictates that we should prepare for the most challenging case: a major conventional war. As the Iran-Iraq struggle has shown, short wars remain the exception. Unless we are prepared to "go nuclear" almost immediately, our field forces should be stocked to

fight for 60 days or until factories can increase their production of munitions, whichever takes longer. The force that *fails* to deter is also the one that must fight.

- Wherever possible, improve upon existing weapons rather than start over from scratch. This approach recognizes what author John Gall observed in his insightful book *Systemantics*: "Great advances are not produced by systems designed to produce great advances." Star Wars and AAWS-M proponents take note. The Marine Corps, which is interested in killing Soviet tanks instead of time, has shied away from AAWS-M, preferring instead to improve its existing DRAGON antitank missile. This effort will put a more useful weapon in the hands of the troops sooner, at much lower cost.
- Encourage competition where it pays off, and discourage it where it doesn't. A certain amount of inter-service competition is healthy. For years the Navy and Air Force engaged in a lively rivalry in the development of tactical jets. When the Navy built the highly successful F-4 fighter, it became the Air Force's primary fighter, too.

In fact, the Navy's dominance forced some soul-searching in the Air Force, which led to its new hot performer, the F-16. The jockeying for pole position in tactical jets has, on balance, yielded better results than the fighters coming out of Soviet design bureaus, where competition is virtually nonexistent.

But there is a costly down side to unrestrained competition, particularly where roles and missions are involved.

The Marine Corps is designed for quick smash-and-grab operations—seizing footholds on hostile shores. Its divisions are relatively light, and raw assault power makes up for limited staying power.

The Army, organized around heavy divisions, was designed to win protracted campaigns. But in recent years the Army decided that it wanted a piece of the action in low-intensity wars and began creating light divisions.

"What's going on here?" I asked a land-forces expert at the Pentagon.

"They want three active and one reserve light division," he said.

"The Marines have three active and one reserve division," I countered.

"You just broke the code," he replied.

Meanwhile, the Russians are maintaining their tank-heavy army while we fritter away resources on more of the wrong kind of forces needed to slug it out on the battlefields of Europe.

- Reduce overhead. The reduction or, preferably, the elimination of needless staffs should enjoy the highest priority. US conventional forces are presently allocated to six separate unified (or multi-service) commands, as well as a variety of lesser "sub-unified commands." How many warlords does it take to fight a war? Who takes responsibility for failure—or success?

Collapsing three, four, or six headquarters into one or two would eliminate much of the ambiguity and overlap prevailing in the existing fur ball of unified, specified, sub-unified, and various other joint and ad hoc commands.

These steps are not exhaustive, but they are a start. And we know what the result will be if things continue as they are. After spending more than $2 trillion in eight years, the force will still be about the same size as today's. There will be some new equipment, but not enough, and all of it a good deal more expensive to operate and maintain. Chronic readiness problems will persist. The Pentagon will still claim that the Soviets outnumber us in almost every way as it pushes for even bigger defense budgets.

The Aztecs' faith in their vengeful gods left them, in the end, ill-prepared to deal with the rapacious Spanish. We, too, may be placing our faith in the wrong idol, the size of the defense budget, rather than in the real fighting capabilities that should come out of it.

It should not require another four-year spending binge to realize not only that fundamental reforms are needed, but that we cannot afford to keep putting them off.

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This article is reprinted with permission from *The Washingtonian*, 21 (October 1985), 117-29. The author, LTC David Evans, is Operations Officer of the 3rd Marine Division. He previously served on Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's staff as director of manpower planning and analysis.



COMMENTARY & REPLY

Readers are invited to submit commentaries of up to 1000 words on articles previously appearing in Parameters. *Reader commentaries will be followed by the author's reply, should he choose to make one.*

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ON BUCKINGHAM AND MILITARY ETHICS

To the Editor:

I found MG Clay Buckingham's article ("Ethics and the Senior Officer: Institutional Tensions," Autumn 1985) both interesting and disconcerting. Interesting because it lays out in detail some real examples of compromised ethics, but disconcerting because of its naiveté and timing.

Let's question the timing first. Where was the public moral outrage when MG Buckingham was on active duty? Is it ethical to wait until his personal career risks have been reduced to zero before going public? And bemoaning the ethics problem now when it is popular to do so without proposing solutions is like supporting a balanced budget without saying where the cuts (or tax increases) will come from.

The naiveté of MG Buckingham's article can be seen in his basic thesis that "our whole moral and ethical concept of right and wrong stems from this thesis-antithesis of good and evil, and (he believes) that we cannot consider right and wrong within the military profession outside of this framework." That may be true, but it is moot, irrelevant, and naive because it avoids the cause of the ethics problem. The cause can be seen with an honest evaluation of Judeo-Christian, societal, and professional ethics.

First, regardless of the perfectly good and wholesome reasons by which the Judeo-Christian ethic was developed, it was enforced with a reward/punishment system. In succinct terms, if you're good, you will go to heaven; if you're bad, you will burn in hell.

Now let's address the issue about one human life being more valuable than another. Deep down inside, you know that some are more valuable than others within your personal set of ethics. Let's take the easiest—you value your family's lives more than others'. How much grief have you shed over Iranians and Iraqis killing each other? Compare that to your grief over the death of a close family member. And we care more about American lives in general than those of other nationalities. That feeling is reinforced regularly by newscasters who announce how many Americans are involved in an international crisis because they know you will be more interested in the Americans than people of other nationalities. Very few of us can "rise above" such feelings, because they are natural (or at least deeply ingrained). Don't try to deny them; they exist. We have a certain instinct for survival that has a hierarchy of priorities which starts with self and family, then "tribe," then species.

Relate reward/punishment and survival instinct to our professional ethics. Most of us are concerned with self-survival (or advancement), and we respond to rewards and punishments. That very simple and self-evident concept explains why many of the "successful" officers step over their peers and subordinates to get to the top and why we have so many "retired on active duty" officers and NCOs. The Army rewards both types of unethical behavior (the former with promotions and the latter with paychecks). It's that simple, unfortunately. Thus, the root of the ethics problem may not be low individual ethical standards within the Army, rather a system which rewards unethical behavior and is at the very best neutral (or possibly negative) toward ethical behavior. If so, then the solution might be to change the system so it rewards (or is truly neutral toward) ethical behavior and punishes unethical behavior. The question is, how?

A "solution" might be to add ratings by peers and subordinates to the rating scheme. After all, those who are quickest to recognize unethical behavior are peers and subordinates, not superiors. This is not a novel idea, and many people have "good" reasons for not instituting peer and subordinate ratings. But anyone who is afraid of being rated by peers and subordinates has no self-confidence and probably is a poor leader anyway. That same individual probably can be intimidated by the threat of a poor OER when told to do something that is unethical. We simply don't need people like that in the Army.

Rhetorically this is fairly simple; in practice, difficult, but not impossible. The cost may be steep in terms of breaking with tradition and holding leaders accountable to subordinates. But as MG Buckingham states in the conclusion to his article, "As professionals, we must be willing to pay it."

Most of us, if not all, understand the difference between good and evil. What we (the Army) refuse to recognize is that most people are motivated by survival and reward/punishment (perhaps an ethical flaw, but a fact), not by a higher sense of ethics. Thus, we are not going to solve the ethics problem with philosophical prattle or by wringing our hands. The solution is not to "teach" ethics, but to change the system that rewards unethical behavior. (Is it ethical to teach young officers to sacrifice their futures in the military on the altar of ethics while rewarding the hatchet man?) This is not to say that we should not teach ethics, but that it is not the solution to the problem.

But I'd be willing to bet that this Army's leadership does not have the courage to change that system or even admit that the system is the problem. After all, it has been very good to them.

LTC William T. Marriott III
Springfield, Va.

The Author Replies:

The issues raised in LTC Marriott's letter, and the tone of the letter itself, deserve at least some comment. There is insufficient space here to address all of his concerns in depth.

LTC Marriott challenges the ethics of the timing of my article and suggests that I should have been more open on the subject while on active duty rather than wait until the safety of retirement to "go public." For the record, the *Parameters* article was written at the request of some of LTC Marriott's contemporaries who had heard an address I had been invited to make at the Army War College on the same subject.

Throughout my career, I considered that my basic responsibility was to that small part of the Army which had been entrusted to my care, whether platoon, company, battalion, brigade, Army staff division, or what. My concern in each assignment was to discern right from wrong and to choose the right course of action as it applied to each situation. I was never reluctant to express and act upon ethical principles within the confines of my own immediate responsibility.

Obviously, I was an observer of what was going on around me, and as my concept of ethical conduct matured, I made judgments (mostly silent) regarding how my contemporaries and superiors conducted themselves. Upon reflection, I now believe that some of my own decisions were ethically unsound, and some of their decisions much closer to the ethical standards toward which most of us strived. I am not "morally outraged" now, nor was I ever. I was, however, deeply concerned that my own actions, and the actions of those for whom I was directly responsible, met the highest ethical standards and contributed to the security of the nation and thus the safety of the American people.

The purpose of the *Parameters* article was not to propose specific solutions, but to express my own conviction that how an officer conducts himself derives from his most deeply held values and convictions and that it is in the realm of values and convictions that ethics finds its roots. The article also proposed that the higher one goes in the structure of the Army, the more difficult and complex are the ethical issues, and therefore the more compelling are fundamental values and convictions as opposed to rules and regulations.

For some reason, discussions of ethics almost always eventually get around to the method the Army has developed over the years for evaluating performance and selecting people for assignments, schooling, and promotion. While on active duty, I lived through at least six major changes in the efficiency reporting system. During the latter part of my career, I lived through two major changes to the civilian rating scheme. In every case, the motive for change was to purify the selection system, i.e. to seek to develop a selection system which rewarded competence and penalized incompetence—and always there was the question of how to define "competence."

How do you spot and encourage a potential Eisenhower, or Patton, or Abrams, or Wickham in the early stages of his career? In an age when warfare is becoming more and more technological, how do you develop the broad range of technical specialists so essential at every officer grade level? And if ethical conduct in its most generic sense is an essential part of competence, how do you identify this quality, or the lack of it, and grade it in an evaluation system? Incidentally, every efficiency report revision I can remember included some reference to "courage of his convictions," "moral standards," or the like.

LTC Marriott's solution to add peer and subordinate ratings to the OER is, I'm sure, considered each time the OER is revised. For

reasons with which he may not agree, this proposal has been generally rejected. After all, we are an authoritarian profession, and anything that smacks of "selection by election" would most likely introduce abuses more serious than those corrected.

I cannot let LTC Marriott's broadside at the Army's leadership go unanswered. I was a part of the Army's leadership from the time I put on the gold bars of a second lieutenant. Certainly, any officer who has risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel is an essential cog in the whole leadership structure of the Army (and has ample reason to feel that the Army has been good to him).

During the last few years of my career, I was privileged to work closely with the highest leadership of the Army. It is my judgment that the moral climate at that level is superb. These general officers, most of whom had served in combat in two or three wars, and had consistently demonstrated dedication and competence of the highest caliber throughout their careers, were, with few exceptions, men (and women) of great moral courage and keen ethical sensitivity. They were strong men, with strong convictions, which often conflicted. And from time to time, one would retire, sometimes quietly, sometimes not so quietly, because of some deep personal disagreement with Department of Defense or Department of Army policies. They were also men who struggled to develop policies for the Army which could stand the most rigid ethical scrutiny, and I would challenge anyone to find one official DA policy which embodies unethical standards or requires unethical conduct.

However, regardless of how pure the policies and regulations might be at the DA level, it is in the implementation thereof down the line by fallible human beings where the unethical practices develop. The Army is only as pure as its whole leadership, and that leadership includes every commissioned officer in the US Army. And in the most basic sense, it is values and convictions which give content to character, and form the basis for an officer's conduct and decisions, be they ethical or unethical.

MG Clay T. Buckingham, USA Ret.



BOOK REVIEWS

Alternative Military Strategies for the Future. Edited by Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier. 236 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1985. $26.50.

This concise volume evolved from a November 1983 conference at Carlisle sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute bringing together participants from government and the academic world. The conferees discussed alternative military strategies and considered whether changes in the strategic environment require alteration of the basic premises underlying US military strategy since 1945. In the book, 11 defense specialists treat US interests and objectives, the changing strategic environment, the major security threats facing the United States, and present alternative military strategies ranging from strategic disengagement to more active global involvement.

In his typically direct and pragmatic way, Robert W. Komer in the Foreword provides—from a practitioner's perspective—11 basic propositions to help planners think through optimum US strategies in real-life situations. These propositions offer helpful guideposts for addressing one of our greatest needs—a clear statement of national interests and goals upon which may be erected agreeable policies and from which may be derived a strategy that will gain bipartisan support. The editors in an introductory chapter summarize the principal changes in strategic environment and set the stage for the constructive criticism which follows. In so doing, they provide a very useful critique of the military reform movement, the maritime strategists, the noninterventionists, and the traditionalists.

The strategic environment is examined in three chapters from different perspectives. Considering the general war contingency, a relatively optimistic view of NATO relations emerges from an examination of the changing strategic environment as perceived by West Europeans. Soviet perceptions—on which we admittedly do not have a satisfactory grip—are analyzed according to two different general orientations, defined as optimism and pessimism, which illustrate how different viewpoints can result in widely varying policy implications not only for the USSR, but for its neighbors and the West in general. It is predicted that Soviet national security leadership and policies, emerging from a 20-year period of stability, will inevitably change. (The rise of Gorbachev substantiates at least the leadership prediction.) The essential problem confronting American military strategists is defined as a lack of definitive and useful guidance from policymakers. This part concludes with a survey of some of the planning implications resulting from foreign policy ambiguity.

How best to cope with the strategic environment is approached first through a system analysis presentation of competing views of NATO's Central Region conventional balance and, then, by a look at the effectiveness issue from a military reformer's perspective. While acknowledging doubts about NATO's war-fighting capabilities vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact and such concerns as Soviet mobilization capabilities and the warning issue, this author presents a model of hypothetical military confrontation in Central Europe allowing for statistical weighting of key factors to illustrate the sensitivity of the battle outcome—with focus on the breakthrough—to assumptions consistent either with Soviet or NATO doctrines. Rejecting the system analysis approach, the military reformer, while criticizing America's technological emphasis and scenario approach to force development, emphasizes the importance of people and ideas in the development of needed highly capable conventional forces.

The final four chapters address in the context of alternative strategies how each author believes the United States should deal with the existing strategy-capabilities mismatch. One proposes closing the gap by building the required conventional forces to insure that the United States has the capabilities to defend its interests in an era of strategic nuclear parity—this by refining service missions and reapportioning to the Army and Air Force some of the now disproportionate Navy share of the defense budget. Another affirms the vital strategic importance to the United States of Western Europe and Japan and, while tailoring US participation in those regions, addresses the derivative interests in the Persian Gulf region and remainder of the Third World. This approach would improve US rapid intervention and forcible entry capabilities for Third World contingencies by expanding its amphibious, sea-based power projection, and naval gunfire capabilities and by transferring primary responsibility for the rapid

deployment mission to the Navy and Marine Corps. A third approach foresees a more intractable future strategic environment, departs from traditional methods by rejecting an interventionist policy, and would reduce the defense budget by scaling down US political commitments. The editors conclude with a set of four propositions basic to the strategic process, a summation of contemporary policy issues, and suggested US functional and geographic priorities and policies. They would realign existing roles, missions, and commitments to achieve budgeting flexibility leading to maintenance of essentially existing nuclear forces, reduction of conventional naval forces, reduction of European-oriented forces, and an increase in non-European mobility forces.

As might be suspected in a book this brief, these defense specialists offer much good material to stimulate thought, but the inevitable result is more critical than prescriptive. A general thrust supported by all but one of the contributors is that strategic nuclear parity requires development of conventional capabilities if deterrence is to remain effective. Useful suggestions on alternative ways to do that are presented although they are sketchy and, without a relevant grand or national strategy framework, they lack coherence. There is little substantive consideration of the proper mix of complementary political and economic instruments and no reference to the socio-psychological dimension. The focus is on major conventional forces—with limited reference to low-intensity conflict requirements, and less on strategy. In an increasingly complex strategic environment there is limited consideration given to Ambassador Komer's call for coalition emphasis and to the need to preserve essential freedom of action. This book provides a good discussion and summation of the main issues along with some healthy, constructive criticism. The senior member of the defense community will not find solutions here, but a good framework for further development. The book offers good reading for the aspiring strategist. As recommended by the editors, it should be read in its entirety.

GEN Wallace H. Nutting, USA Ret.
Biddeford Pool, Maine

Death of a Nazi Army: The Falaise Pocket. By William B. Breuer. 312 pages. Stein and Day, New York, 1985. $19.95.

The Allied operations in Normandy during the first three months of the invasion are of intense interest to serious students of warfare, but no period is so instructive as that of the breakout. Starting on 25 July 1944 with Omar N. Bradley's concentrated Cobra attack, when the First US Army destroyed the German left flank in several days, the subsequent maneuvers came to a climax on 20 August, when the Allies closed the Falaise pocket.

The events are rich in meaning and raise many significant issues about command on the higher levels, among them the difficulty of directing coalition forces, dealing with the demands of conflicting objectives, the problem of seizing unforeseen opportunities. The Allies won a great victory. Yet, despite their marvelous chance, they failed to trap and destroy completely the two German field armies near Argentan and Falaise or at the Seine River. Had they done so, they might have ended the war in 1944.

William B. Breuer, who landed in Normandy on D-day as a mortar platoon sergeant and who is the author of six other books, has narrated this campaign in immensely readable, sometimes exciting, prose. His descriptions of battle are good, although his portraits of the top leaders on both sides of the front are overdrawn. The account is long on color, short on analysis.

Like many Stein and Day books on military history, this one bears the marks of haste and carelessness. Major General Rudolf-Christoff von Gersdorff comes out as "Gusdorf." Kay Summersby is Eisenhower's "attractive chauffeur and confidante" on page 67, his "attractive aide and confidante" on page 205. Someone jumps on a bicycle and goes "peddling" down the road.

The developments deserve far more sober and thoughtful consideration than they receive here.

Martin Blumenson
Washington, D.C.

Patton: The Man Behind the Legend 1885-1945. By Martin Blumenson. 188 pages. William Morrow & Co., Inc., New York, 1985. $17.95.

Do we need yet another book about General George S. Patton, Jr.? Have not students of generalship and admirers of charismatic military leadership alike learned enough about him?

Had the writer of this new biography been almost anyone other than Martin Blumenson, this reviewer would be inclined to say yes, we've had enough. But thanks to his World War II experience and studies in general, and to his research for *The Patton Papers* (2 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972-74) in particular, Blumenson knows Patton better than any other military

historian; and because *The Patton Papers*, while liberally interspersing Blumenson's narrative and commentary among the papers, consists so largely of Patton's own writings, Blumenson's more personal overview and appraisal are to be highly welcomed.

Furthermore, the book is a useful corrective to the somewhat distorted image of Patton created by the General's almost-too-successful skills in self-advertisement. Patton was almost too successful in his own public relations campaign in the sense that his popularity was so obviously in large part a product of that campaign that critical students of the Second World War sometimes tend to perceive his reputation as almost *only* an outcome of self-promotion. That is, he was so good at inflating his own balloon that it is difficult not to distrust him; he might stand higher with the skeptical if there were less of the aura of the public relations man about him. But we need to curb our distrust. If Patton was an exceptional self-promoter, he was also much more. Specifically, he was the most capable American commander of a field army in World War II, the boldest, the least simply orthodox, the possessor of the keenest tactical and operational judgment and instincts. He was a great general.

And as Blumenson's new book emphatically reminds us, he could also be, when he chose, a great gentleman, an admirable personification of the chivalric kind of soldierly traditions that we associate with his ancestral Commonwealth of Virginia. To be sure, he was also often gross and uncouth, especially in conversation with his peers and often in his addresses to his troops. His compulsion to cast himself as the toughest of tough guys, along with his addiction to the least polite forms of Army vernacular as a means of fostering that image, must be counted not only among the least amiable but also in the long run the least effective expressions of his self-advertising. Somebody who tries too hard to seem tough and macho can only arouse suspicions about inner weaknesses. But Blumenson also shows us the courtly and generous Patton, especially in his patient dealings with those subordinate commanders in whom he perceived abilities that could not be rushed along too rapidly, in his treatment of young officers, and more often than not—the infamous slapping incidents notwithstanding—in his dealings with ordinary soldiers. The portrait of Patton the man, the personal side of the biography, is the strongest aspect of Blumenson's book and its major justification for being. And so much does the portrait highlight the gentlemanly Patton that this reviewer finished the volume almost liking him.

Almost, but not quite. George S. Patton, Jr., was not really likable or in the total of his personal characteristics admirable. He was not only too-often coarse and too persistent an advertiser of himself; he was also a flatterer of and sycophant toward his seniors while in private he belittled them. He was a bootlicker and a hypocrite. This unseemly side of his character appears more clearly in *The Patton Papers* than it does here, but Blumenson is too honest to conceal the sycophantic Patton even in a mainly sympathetic portrayal. More than that, Patton's superiors such as Generals of the Army George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower were correct in sensing that the sum of the various less-amiable characteristics amounted to an insecurity and instability verging at least on neurosis, unfitting Patton in their judgment for higher command than that of an army lest he make an utter wreck of the diplomatic aspects of more senior generalship. Blumenson is also too honest not to acknowledge these, Patton's most fundamental weaknesses. However sympathetic, this essentially personal biography reaffirms that while Patton was a great general, and sometimes even a great gentleman, nevertheless he was not a great man.

But let us not go too far. Blumenson is so honest that perhaps he acknowledges the weaknesses too fully, and implies too completely his acceptance of the judgment that as an army commander Patton had attained the highest level of command for which he was fitted. For myself, while I am not persuaded to like Patton the man as much as Blumenson seems to want me to do, I am inclined toward less caution about the limits of Patton's abilities as a general. Admitting his defects of character and his flaws as a diplomat, but considering the cautiousness and textbookish orthodoxy that so frequently characterized other Americans' generalship against Germany in World War II, I feel strongly tempted to argue that Patton would have been all in all a better commander at the next level above his own—at the level of the army group—than Marshall and Eisenhower conceded, and perhaps a better army group commander than General Omar N. Bradley. Even at army group headquarters, operational skills were more important than diplomacy, and in operational skills Patton had no American superior (while Bradley did not do all that well in the diplomatic side of his dealings with the British anyway). Had Patton, not Bradley, commanded the 12th Army Group rather

than only the Third Army, the envelopment of the Germans in the Falaise-Argentan pocket might well have closed more completely; the pursuit into Germany in the late summer and the autumn of 1944 might have had a better chance of surviving the tyranny of logistics; and the American armies would have been very likely to precede the Red Army into Berlin.

Such speculation confirms the endless complexity of Patton. Ultimately, that complexity alone would probably warrant another book about him. When the book is by Martin Blumenson, and embodies Blumenson at close to his best, then there is finally no doubt about its value.

Russell F. Weigley
Temple University

Wings Of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II. By Ronald Schaffer. 253 pages. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1985. $19.95.

This book addresses the issue of the morality of bombing cities (read "women and children") as opposed to purely military targets by the US Army Air Forces in World War II. Although the author rather piously disclaims any intention of suggesting how air arm leaders ought to have dealt with this moral issue, the thrust of the work strongly suggests that even though most of the senior officials often expressed their repugnance toward area bombing, in the end they practiced it, bowing to the argument of military necessity. "How often," the author asks, "was something done in the name of military necessity that could have been avoided through more careful reflection?" To ask, as the author does, "If war leaders steel themselves to the moral consequences of their acts, do they risk destroying what their country is fighting for?" is a legitimate and worthwhile question.

Admittedly, even the most noble ends become meaningless if the nation resorts to ignoble means to attain those ends. The question thus narrows down to this: Does the bombing of cities constitute ignoble means? The Law of Land War (Section 4, paragraph 41) offers guidance: "Loss of life and damage to property must not be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained." Was the fire-bombing of Tokyo, to take but one instance, justified? True, thousands of innocent lives were sacrificed, but the nerve center of the Japanese war machine was seriously disrupted and hundreds of "cottage industries" which supported that war machine were wiped out. This helped make the planned invasion of Japan, at great cost in US lives, unnecessary. Who is to draw the line to say the loss of life and damage to property were "out of proportion" to the military advantage gained?

Military men ought to be sensitive to the moral dimensions of their acts, but the tone of this book will probably put off the very reader it most needs to attract. The more subtle work of James Reston, Jr., *Sherman's March and Vietnam*, may prove to be more effective in reaching the military audience.

I. B. Holley, Jr.
Duke University

USSR Foreign Policies After Detente. By Richard F. Starr. 300 pages. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, Calif., 1985. $26.95.

Richard Starr is well known to students of communist affairs by his editorship of the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* and his books on Eastern Europe. His reputation as a scholar of Soviet affairs is well served by his latest book.

The principal value of this volume is as a factual source book for information about the policymaking process in the USSR, the instrumentalities of Soviet foreign policy (propaganda, espionage, military, and economic), and Soviet regional policies. There are 49 figures and tables of facts on Soviet military and economic activities, the names of personnel, organizational structure, and the like. Many of Starr's pages are chronological or topical summaries of issues; often his information is presented in summary outline form.

Though he briefly describes all of the salient issues of current Soviet foreign policy, Starr does not offer much in the way of analysis. This is regrettable because on some issues—such as arms control, with which he was involved as a negotiator—he might have offered insights not found elsewhere. Permeating the text is the thesis of Moscow's unadulterated commitment to expand Soviet power and advance world communism. There is evidence enough to support the case for Soviet aggressiveness, but Starr's single-minded concentration on that aspect of Soviet policy obscures some of the complexity and contradictions in Soviet behavior. He tends to exaggerate the consistency and success of Soviet policy and the weakness and inadequacy of the

West. Thus, for example, while describing the Soviet ICBM counterforce capability he fails to consider those weapons—SLBMs, cruise missiles, e.g.—where the United States is superior.

There are a few places where a good copy editor could have corrected contradictory statements. For example, in the introduction Starr states that the Soviets have refused to return to arms control negotiations after the 1983 walkout, but shortly thereafter he notes that bilateral talks started on 12 March 1985. On page 101 the number of Soviet forces in Afghanistan is put at 165,000, though page 205 has the more accurate figure of 115,000. These, however, are minor flaws in a book that contains important data not found in any other single volume on Soviet foreign policy.

Joseph L. Nogee
University of Houston

The Vietnam War: A Study in the Making of American Policy. By Michael P. Sullivan. 186 pages. The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky., 1985. $20.00.

Professor Sullivan uses the tools of modern political science, including content analysis and models, to examine Vietnam decision-making. His conclusions will startle some readers. For example, he advances the theory that Vietnam was not an important issue until policymakers made it one. This thesis has been heard before and has a legion of sponsors. But Sullivan's approach is interesting and his evidence strictly empirical: how many times was Vietnam mentioned in presidential State of the Union messages between 1946 and 1970? Using this criterion, we learn that before 1963 or so Vietnam was not much mentioned and therefore must not have been perceived by the government as important. No one will quarrel seriously with this. One may note, however, that the same case could be made, say, about the state of Washington, for the intrinsic strategic importance of a place is often obscure until it is threatened. Just let Canada invade the Pacific Northwest and watch the interest level rise. And there are those who believe that the jury is still out on the true significance of Vietnam to US interests.

Assuming for the sake of argument that Vietnam was not important, why did we go in? Sullivan argues that the US intervention in Southeast Asia was part of a more or less regular fluctuation in a pattern of international violence. We are not sure why this pattern exists, and perhaps a few will examine Professor Sullivan's charts and remain unconvinced that it is even there. But there is a sort of crude cyclicality in the moods of nations, and here I would agree. The United States began its major involvement in Vietnam at the tail end of a period of national exuberance. When the activist mood faded, as it was bound to do, the war was still there. The nation was left with the antiwar movement and the messy business of extricating itself with honor, which few think it had. The whole experience was a profound trauma, and the American psyche has been suffering ever since from post-Vietnam syndrome, an extreme reluctance to intervene overseas. Like the post-World War II exuberance, though, this will not last forever.

And herein is the danger. There is indeed a tide in the affairs of men, and Sullivan warns against letting it carry us out on the perilous seas of foreign adventurism unaware that we should have dropped anchor. The next fluctuation in our national pattern of behavior is likely to be toward exuberance again, and our leaders should not forget that as they go about the forming of policy. Once burnt, twice shy. We failed to take our optimism into account in Vietnam, and an ebullient national mood, coupled with an incremental, salami-slicing style of decision-making, led the nation into the quagmire willy-nilly. We made policy in Vietnam not from a long-range, rational perspective, but in the optimistic faith that if we kept plugging, the problem would go away. Nor was this because of any fatal weakness in a particular administration. Given the same circumstances, even with different leaders, we might very well get the same result.

Sullivan asserts that we did not go into Vietnam because of the Cold War; Vietnam was actually an anomaly within the Cold War. During the entire Vietnam era, US-Soviet relations were actually improving, and we are given some very convincing charts to prove it. Even our relations with the Chinese improved at the end. In fact, the Vietnam War "almost doesn't show up on the charts when we track the larger Cold War." Still we may wonder: if there had been no Cold War, would the United States have sent half a million troops to Vietnam? Here again the author's laudable commitment to empirical evidence has betrayed him. Without the Cold War atmosphere, without our fear and distrust of the Russians, the Chinese, and communism in general, what reason did we have to care if a merely patriotic group of simple agrarian reformers in Hanoi sought to unify their country?

It is easy to scorn from this distance the old view that North Vietnam was merely a cat's-paw of China-Russia, and no doubt that was a simplistic way of describing a complex state of relations. But we should bear in mind that it has long been the policy of the United States that no unfriendly power dominate Southeast Asia; that we have strongly favored a balance of power in the Orient at least since Theodore Roosevelt's day, and that if Hanoi is not an unfriendly major power seeking to dominate Southeast Asia (which is open to some question), neither is she our ally. They are not our vessels being serviced in the magnificent facility at Cam Rahn Bay.

Professor Sullivan has found a novel approach, and if we find much to quibble with in his argument, none will contest his final advice to define the national interest calmly before you send in the Marines.

Ted Gittinger
LBJ Library
Austin, Tex.

International Security Yearbook 1984/85. Edited by Barry M. Blechman and Edward N. Luttwak. 260 pages. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1985. $33.00 ($15.95 paper).

This yearbook is the second in a series prepared by senior fellows at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. In addition to an overview of major events in 1984 by editors Blechman and Luttwak, the yearbook provides an assessment of the East-West military balance, followed by essays describing developments in specific regions. While 1984 began with a high degree of international tension, it turned out to be a rather quiet year. In their overview, Blechman and Luttwak perceive a decline in the influence of the superpowers, which they describe as the "decay of bipolar order," and the opportunity for regional powers to assert themselves in world affairs. For those with a specific interest in military programs and capabilities, the essay by William Durch and Peter Almquist provides a comprehensive review of the military balance between East and West. Specific focus on NATO in 1984 is provided in a short essay by Jeffrey Record. Charles Gati describes how Soviet military, political, and economic interests were challenged during the year by the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. All indications are that a high level of tension will continue between the Soviet Union and its allies. Regarding the Middle East, William B. Quandt warns that it would be a mistake to conclude from a relatively quiet 1984 that stability has been achieved, an apt observation given recent events. This essay provides an excellent survey of events in key countries as well as an analysis of regional political developments. Thomas L. McNaugher's review of Southwest Asia focuses on the Iran-Iraq War and US security policy. In his essay on East Asia, Jonathan D. Pollack describes recent US regional security efforts in the Asia-Pacific region as a success story. Despite several major uncertainties, the United States has grounds for continued optimism. Joseph Cirincione provides an interesting survey and update on regional threats to Western security from Latin America. He reviews the critical events of 1984 pertaining to Central America as well as the debt crisis in South America. The final essay, by Alex Rondos, examines the retreat of the nation state in Africa.

The *International Security Yearbook* is an excellent book for the busy professional who appreciates a concise analysis of significant global events and their impact on US interests and security.

COL Robert J. Gerard, USA Ret.
US Army War College

Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency. Edited by Ian F. Beckett and John Pimlott. 232 pages. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1985. $27.50.

This slim anthology can make the reader grit his teeth, but it can also educate and enlighten. The editors, who are faculty members at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, have done a rather fine job of melding unifying themes on the art of counterinsurgency in analyses of seven different armies and their respective approaches to insurgency. There is only one poor article in the lot: USAF Colonel Peter Dunn's piece on the US Army in Vietnam.

The introduction by Beckett and Pimlott proclaims the British Army as superior to all others in this craft. Although the reader may quibble by wondering why the Empire is so small now and why British troops are still in Northern Ireland, the authors have managed to make a good case for the effectiveness of British methods and techniques. The first case study is done by Pimlott on the little-known but important Dhofar

Campaign of the 1970s. In this view, Colonel John Watts finally gets the credit he has long deserved. Altogether, this is a sound account that includes an excellent analysis of British and Omani success.

Pimlott also does the next piece, a hearty bashing of the French Army and its counterinsurgency methods. Francophobia aside, there is little victory to tell of in the French approach to the insurgent. The author concludes that the French now have no counterinsurgency capability and have elected to forego such skills in favor of intervention forces.

Colonel Dunn takes on the US Army in Vietnam. Infantrymen will be surprised to find that most of their units were mechanized and that they were rarely able to hold ground against their adversaries. Colonel Dunn weighs into what he describes as the "big bang generals" (whatever that means) and concludes by charging failure to "amateurishness" and the lack of professional ethics. Dunn uses no documentation from the other side, which is so readily available now, and relies on secondary sources, namely anyone who had something bad to say about America. His piece contains nothing new and is well worth avoiding.

F. A. Godfrey does an excellent analysis of the Latin American counterinsurgency experience and the campaign against the Tupamaros in particular. Beckett analyzes both the Portuguese in Mozambique and the Rhodesian experience. Both chapters are well done and provide much food for thought. Francis Toase concludes the book with a sketch of the South African experience against SWAPO. This piece contains a sound analysis as well as an interesting perspective of the evolution of an army, its methods, composition, and force structure.

In sum, the book is a good one (with the exception of Colonel Dunn's offering). It would make a fine reader for classroom use in any Low-Intensity Conflict course. One of its many strengths is that the authors have provided the reader with good subject bibliographies.

COL Rod Paschall
US Army Military History Institute
US Army War College

Ethics, Deterrence and National Security. By James E. Dougherty et al. 95 pages. Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Washington, D.C., 1985. $9.95.

This Foreign Policy Report, published in cooperation with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., presents six papers originally delivered at a conference in Bonn, Germany, 23-25 June 1983. The papers deal with several aspects of the recent antinuclear movement.

A closely paraphrased precis of each of the six papers is included in the introductory "Summary Overview." The six authors are James E. Dougherty, Midge Decter, Pierre Hassner, Laurence Martin, Michael Novak, and Vladimir Bukovsky. The papers by Dougherty and Bukovsky point up the Soviet influence in the antinuclear protest movement in Western Europe. Bukovsky provides details of the Soviet "struggle for peace" initiated in 1979. The Dougherty paper traces the involvement of the Christian churches in the peace movement and includes a review of the influence of the Enlightenment, Romanticism, Marxism, and Existentialism. Dougherty opposes the "hysterical" antinuclear movement and calls for rational support of an effective deterrence policy. Decter decries the misplaced idealism of the "peace movement" and suggests that the members of that movement are "moral evaders." Decter views the Soviet Union in realistic fashion as a clear threat to Western democracy, which is indivisible ("Should Western Europe go down . . . so too would the United States. And vice versa."). Hassner paints a picture of a dilemma of ultimate risks, risks between losing the liberty of Western nations to totalitarianism and the probability of the destruction of life on earth. He urges political understanding and rational management of the dilemmas of morality and arms control fostering a "credible deterrence and an operational damage-limiting defense if deterrence should fail."

Laurence Martin also writes in defense of deterrence, holding that "it is the least destructive strategy of all so long as it is successful." The fundamental task is to prevent nuclear war, and to do that "it may be necessary to soil ourselves with nuclear strategy." In this context, he holds that adopting nuclear pacifism may be less moral and less effective as a peacekeeping policy than nuclear deterrence. Michael Novak, in his paper, emphasizes the threat which the Soviet Union poses for Western Europe, pointing out the success which their SS-20s have had in removing the US nuclear umbrella protection of Europe (and accomplishing this by their mere presence, without being fired). He discusses the "inherent intentionality" involved in the possession of nuclear weapons, carefully distinguishing between the intent to *do* something and the intent to *prevent* something. He argues that the mission of nuclear deterrence is a moral mission if it prevents both

unjust aggression and any use of nuclear weapons. He points out that the most popular alternatives to nuclear deterrence (world government, a nuclear freeze, preemptive surrender) share a common naiveté about political institutions.

When the six papers of this Foreign Policy Report are viewed together, they constitute a general defense of the policy of nuclear deterrence and a series of rebuttals to the antinuclear peace movements of the early 1980s in Western Europe. Most see the issue not merely as a debate about US missiles being placed in Europe but rather as a more fundamental clash of political and moral ideals. Most reveal a deep distrust of Russian peace initiatives based on past actions and fundamental "proclivities" of Russian governments.

This small volume will be helpful to those seeking responses to the moral thrust of the antinuclear position provided that it is read with the understanding that it is not a balanced presentation.

COL Malham M. Wakin, USAF
Professor of Philosophy and Fine Arts
US Air Force Academy

Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College. By Harry P. Ball. 534 pages. The Alumni Association of the United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 1984. $18.50.

The dominant theme of this history of the US Army War College, by Colonel Harry P. Ball (USA Ret.), is the title—*Of Responsible Command*. Elihu Root, the founding father, spoke of this theme and two others at the laying of the cornerstone for the War College building in Washington in February 1903. The other themes on which student officers were "to study and confer" were "the great problems of national defense, (and) of military science." Root's concept of the Army War College was an amalgam of European experience, especially Prussian, and a domestic, pragmatic approach to what was possible in a democratic society suspicious of all things professionally military.

The author has written the first scholarly and comprehensive history of the US Army War College from concept to reality. His treatment of this approximately 80-year period divides conveniently into three historical segments in which he traces the development of the institution through two World Wars and into the present decade.

The first period, up to World War I and 1917, was a formative one in which the War College was torn between being a higher military school and serving as an operational aid to the War Department general staff. Suffice it to say that neither an individual nor an institution can serve two masters.

During the interwar years, the Army War College more nearly lived up to its role as envisioned by Elihu Root than ever before. The curriculum was strengthened, and the caliber of the faculty and students was raised significantly. The striking comparison of the role of the pre-World War I graduates in the first world conflict with those of the interwar period in World War II attests to the success not only of the Army War College but also of the educational and training system of which the War College was the Army's apex.

Despite the experience of World War II in joint and combined operations and the encouragement of Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, the establishment of an interservice school system made little progress with the Navy and newly independent Air Force. As a result, the US Army War College was reestablished, first at Fort Leavenworth in 1950, and then transferred to Carlisle Barracks as its permanent base in 1951. War College graduates likely will find the account of the years since then to be the most interesting part of the book, because each one will have his own recollections and opinions about the time he spent at this institution.

It is in the last third of the history of the War College that Colonel Ball demonstrates his scholarly balance and comprehensive coverage of some very controversial topics that created academic and service disagreements. I am sure that the alumni who participated in these events will not need this review to remind them of the details. Even as the author writes of War College problems in the 1970s and early 1980s, he does not divert from his candid approach. As a personal aside, I may say as a former staff and faculty member in this period, I found his treatment of the War College and its personnel to be eminently fair to all concerned.

So without reservations of any kind, I would highly recommend *Of Responsible Command* as a most interesting and rewarding book.

Dr. Charles S. Hall
Former Professor of Military History, USAWC
Camp Hill, Pa.

FSLN: The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution. By David Nolan. 203 pages. Institute of Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Fla., 1984. $14.95.

Logically organized and concisely written, David Nolan's brilliant monograph allows the careful reader to grasp what makes the Sandinistas tick. Quite simply this effort is must reading for anyone interested in understanding Nicaraguan reality today.

Early in the book the author states that his study is based on two fundamental assumptions: that the FSLN wants to effect major change in Nicaragua and that, for the most part, this goal has been ideologically motivated. These assumptions in turn raise two questions. What do the Sandinistas want Nicaragua to become and what world view causes them relentlessly to pursue that object?

While intermediate chapters examine the nature of various FSLN approaches, the core of this book is to be found in the first and last two chapters. The first chapter outlines the three most popular models used to explain the FSLN—social democracy, totalitarianism, and revolutionary socialism. David Nolan's analysis persuasively argues that the FSLN is essentially revolutionary socialist because their central focus is to cause fundamental social change through a positive transformation of the nature of man and not so much to obtain power for its own sake.

The second chapter defines the roots of Sandinismo as involving a tradition of political violence, the heroic image of Sandino, the Marxism of the student subculture, and the example set by Castro's revolution.

The penultimate chapter focuses on Humberto Ortega's pulling the FSLN together with a strategy designed to use all sectors of society, especially the bourgeoisie, yet maintaining a military monopoly to be used as soon as possible to create the conditions for successful revolution. After victory, the transition to socialism might be long, but it would be sure. The author points out in the last chapter that Sandinista ideology stresses that they are not mere Nicaraguan nationalists, but part of a larger anti-imperialistic ideological community dedicated to creating a socialist society free from capitalist exploitation where all men are equal. Their fundamental flaw stems from a definition of the "people" as only including those with the right level of revolutionary consciousness as defined by the revolutionary vanguard. Somoza's defeat came, however, from the effort of a broad-based majority which did not have then nor will it ever have the right revolutionary stuff.

This work should be taken seriously because of the exhaustive research evident and because bias is all but eliminated by the technique of explaining the FSLN's ideology through the thoughts of those that made it happen. The prose may be a bit dry, but the analysis is outstanding and precisely fits what this reviewer has seen since arriving in Nicaragua. The final 73 pages contain excellent appendices which provide a list of Nicaraguan organizations, short biographical sketches, and a chronology of the Nicaraguan revolution.

Given the challenge to US interests presented by the FSLN's hold on power, senior officials throughout the government should read this short but on-target analysis of what drives the Sandinistas.

COL Alden C. Cunningham
US Army Attaché
Managua, Nicaragua



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


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...From the Archives

THE HEART OF THE MATTER

In French the quality is called *l'audace*; in Yiddish, *chutzpah*; in American slang, guts. Audacious self-confidence is noted in every language and venerated in every military organization. The following anecdote from Switzerland offers a prime example.

During a visit to the canton of Appenzell in 1912, Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany observed the maneuvers of the local militia. He casually approached a lowly infantryman and asked, "Well, Swiss soldier, what will Switzerland do if I attack with three hundred thousand of my men?" The soldier replied, "We have just as many." The Emperor continued, "And if I attack with six hundred thousand?" The soldier paused and responded, "Well, then we will each shoot twice!"

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